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In recent years, power blackouts in Europe and North America have given a lasting im-
pression of the vulnerability of modern and high-technology societies. Although these 
outages did not last longer than a week and were locally limited, they already caused 
massive functional or supply disruptions, risks to public safety and damages running 
into billions. This book reveals possible consequences of a prolonged and widespread 
power outage for society and its critical infrastructures and it shows how Germany is 
prepared for such a disaster. By means of comprehensive impact analyses, the authors 
demonstrate dramatically that even after a few days only it is no longer possible to 
ensure that goods and services that are vitally necessary to the public are supplied as 
needed throughout the area affected. Moreover, it is revealed that further efforts must 
be made to improve the resilience of critical infrastructures and to further optimize the 
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The Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag is an independ-
ent scientific institution created with the objective of advising the German 
Bundestag and its Committees on matters relating to research and technology. 
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TAB’s task is to design and implement technology assessment (TA) projects and 
to monitor and analyse important scientific and technological trends and the 
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THE COMMITTEE’ S PREFACE 
Infrastructures such as a reliable energy supply, functioning water-supply and 
wastewater-disposal systems, efficient modes of transport and transport routes 
and also information technology and telecommunications technology that can 
be accessed at all times represent the lifeblood of high-technology industrialised 
nations. The Committee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment 
therefore commissioned the Office of Technology Assessment at the German 
Bundestag (TAB) to investigate the possible effects of a prolonged and wide-
spread power blackout on highly critical infrastructures such as drinking water, 
wastewater, information and communications systems, financial services and 
health services, especially against a backdrop where the blackout has a cascading 
effect spanning state and national boundaries. 
In Germany, several recent natural disasters and technical malfunctions (Elbe 
and Oder floods in 2002/2005, power blackout in the Münsterland in 2005, the 
Kyrill storm in 2007) have highlighted the population’s dependence on such 
(critical) infrastructures. Supply bottlenecks, public safety problems and disrup-
tions to road and rail transport have revealed the vulnerability of modern socie-
ties and made extreme demands on health, emergency and rescue services. 
Since almost all critical infrastructures rely heavily on a power supply, a scenario 
of a widespread and prolonged power blackout involving massive disruption to 
supplies, economic damage and risks to public safety is a very serious matter. In 
2004 the National Crisis Management Exercise (LÜKEX) highlighted the prob-
lematic consequences and chains of consequences and also the enormous diffi-
culties faced by federal structures in managing such a crisis and threat situation 
that strikes without any advance warning. 
As far as can be seen, however, the possible consequences of such an event have 
not yet been subject to an in-depth, systematic analysis in the literature or in 
official documents. 
The analyses conducted by the TAB reveal that the consequences of such a pow-
er blackout could at least be akin to a national disaster. All internal and external 
civil protection forces would need to be mobilised in order to at least mitigate 
the effects. 
The TAB report indicates how the resilience of critical infrastructures could be 
strengthened and how possible courses of action within the national system for 
disaster management could be improved. The report thus makes a valuable 
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contribution towards heightening awareness of this issue within industry and 
society and offers the committees of the German Bundestag a sound basis for 
further consideration. 
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Modern, high-technology societies based on the division of labour have an ad-
vanced, highly complex network of »critical infrastructures« that supply the 
population with vital/essential goods and services. These critical infrastructures 
include information technology and telecommunications, transport and traffic, 
energy supply and health care system. The internal complexity of and high levels 
of interdependence between these infrastructures make them extremely vulnera-
ble. In the past decade in particular, terrorist attacks, natural disasters and ex-
tremely grave accidents have demonstrated the far-reaching consequences that 
damage to or failure of critical infrastructures can inflict on our social system as 
a whole. 
With electrically operated devices now virtually omnipresent in our living envi-
ronment and our world of work, the consequences of a prolonged and wide-
spread power blackout would combine to produce an extremely serious damage 
situation. All critical infrastructures would be affected and it would be almost 
impossible to prevent a collapse of society as a whole. Yet despite this potential 
for threat and disaster, society exhibits limited awareness of the risks involved. 
Following a decision by the Committee on Education, Research and Technology 
Assessment, the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag 
(TAB) was commissioned to undertake a systematic analysis of the consequences 
of a prolonged and widespread power blackout. The study was also to examine 
the capabilities and limits of the national disaster management system for deal-
ing with such a major damage situation. 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY 
Germany’s sophisticated disaster management system is characterised by a pro-
cess of task-sharing between the Federation and the federal states (Länder) that 
is anchored in the Basic Law. The two-way carve-up of civil protection in a state 
of defence (Federation) and peacetime disaster control (Länder) creates a policy 
area with several echelons and a plethora of authorities (Federation, Länder, 
counties, parishes), aid organisations and support forces. 
Responsibilities and measures are defined in numerous laws and ordinances. The 
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act of the Federation represents an im-
portant basis for disaster management at operational level. The revised version 
of 29 July 2009 aimed to achieve greater integration between the capacities of 
the Federation and those of the Länder. The Federation augments the disaster 
control structures of the Länder in numerous areas. At the same time, the facili-
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ties and forces of the Länder can also be used to avert defence-related threats. 
Several acts based on the principles of safeguarding and of precautionary 
measures offer extensive options for controlling scarce structures, goods and 
services (e.g. in the fields of nutrition, transport, post and telecommunications). 
The laws of the federal states on emergency assistance and disaster control are 
also especially significant. In particular, they regulate the organisation and the 
tasks of the disaster control authorities and specify the measures to be taken in 
responding to disasters. Since, according to estimates, 80% of critical infrastruc-
tures are in private ownership, these laws aim to achieve a security partnership 
between the state and business enterprises. 
On the question of disaster management, the inclusion of Germany in the 
Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection 
assistance interventions, which was established in 2002, is also of relevance in 
the context of the European Union (EU). Germany has also concluded a number 
of bilateral agreements on disaster assistance. 
When a power blackout occurs, local authorities, institutions and organisations 
are initially responsible for dealing with the consequences. Depending on the 
situation (interregional) and the way in which the blackout develops (prolonged 
with significant consequences), the next-highest levels are then successively mo-
bilised up to the level of the Federal Ministries. Responsibility thus lies with the 
higher disaster control authorities, which commissions the (local) subordinate 
disaster control authorities with (operational) implementation of the required 
measures. 
To reconcile this heterogeneous combination of players and their different man-
agement and communications structures, it is necessary to convene crisis units at 
all levels (parish, federal state, Federation) if a prolonged power blackout strikes 
and extends across regions. Interregional coordination is necessary to ensure 
coordination of the different activities by the aid organisations (e.g. German Red 
Cross, Maltese Cross Relief Service, fire services) and support forces (Federal 
Agency for Technical Relief, Federal Police and Federal Armed Forces). Presum-
ably, the Federation would also need to become involved and assume at least a 
coordinating role. 
In this context, various supportive systems and processes for obtaining, pro-
cessing and disseminating information are available – such as the Internet-based 
German Emergency Planning Information System (deNIS), which serves to in-
form the public (deNIS I) as well as ensure direct (information) management of 
major disasters (deNIS II plus). In addition, the SatWaS satellite-based warning 
system enables the national dissemination of alerts to all situation centres, civil 
protection liaison offices, broadcasting corporations and other media. The main 
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task of the German Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ) is to ascer-
tain a uniform assessment of the situation. 
CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND 
WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT 
Causes of prolonged, interregional power blackouts include technical failure and 
human error, criminal or terrorist acts, epidemics, pandemics or extreme weath-
er events. Many people expect the likelihood of power blackouts to increase in 
future, not least because of an increased risk of terrorist attacks and climate-
related extreme weather events as causes of a network collapse. Experiences of 
previous national and international power blackouts indicate that major damage 
can be expected. Although previous power blackouts have lasted for a few days 
at most, some have caused estimated costs amounting to several billion US dol-
lars. A power blackout lasting several weeks is likely to cause far higher damage. 
The various critical infrastructure sectors rely heavily on a continuous supply of 
electricity. The consequences of a power blackout extending across several Län-
der and lasting for at least 2 weeks would be tantamount to a disaster. This situ-
ation is described in further detail below. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
A widespread, prolonged power blackout would have dramatic consequences 
for information technology and telecommunications. Some telecommunications 
and data services would fail immediately, or at the latest after a few days. 
Within the complex topology of information and telecommunications networks 
there are different levels of dependence on an external power supply: with a fixed-
network telephone system the (digital) end devices and subscriber terminals fail 
immediately, followed by the local switching exchanges. With mobile networks, 
end devices that are charged and can function for a few days under moderate us-
age would be less affected compared with the base stations that allow users to dial 
into the network. Due to the increased volume of calls, these are mostly overload-
ed within a few minutes or fail because the emergency power supply only func-
tions for a short period. 
Mass media are especially important for communicating with the population 
during a crisis. Some newspaper publishing companies and printing houses have 
emergency power supply capacities, allowing them to play a certain role in in-
forming the population. Public-law broadcasting corporations are better pre-
pared for power blackouts and are able to continue transmissions. However, if 
they have no electricity, citizens are unable to receive broadcasts via their televi-
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sions. Consequently, radio – which can be received via the millions of battery-
operated devices owned by the public – represents one of the most important 
channels for informing the population in the event of a crisis. 
With regard to communication by authorities, the current status of information 
does not permit an assessment that applies equally to all players and networks. 
For example, the communications networks of the Federation, i.e. the Berlin-
Bonn Information Network (IVBB) or the Information Network of the Federal 
Administration (IVBV), can generally continue operations for 2 to 3 days with 
the aid of emergency power generators. However, this is not sufficient to allow 
communications to function on a broad scale. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
It can be assumed that the mobile radio technologies powered by emergency 
power supplies and also the grid-bound means of communication that can be 
used by the Federal Armed Forces, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief 
(THW) or telecommunications companies in the event of an incident are primar-
ily intended to serve these organisations’ own requirements; they are not de-
signed to ensure communication by authorities, the general public and business-
es over a large area. 
Even in the first few days, it emerges that if a prolonged, widespread power 
blackout strikes, the minimum level of telecommunications services planned and 
required by law to cover the event of a disaster cannot be provided by telecom-
munications suppliers. The reserve capacities such as »uninterruptible power 
supply« (UPS) and emergency power generators that are maintained for key 
communications systems are either exhausted after a few hours or days or prove 
ineffective because end devices have failed. 
Within a very short time, therefore, the population is deprived of the ability to 
communicate actively and in dialogue form by telephone and the Internet. The 
number of electrically powered network routers, switching exchanges and radio 
antennae for fixed-network and mobile telephony and also the Internet makes it 
almost impossible to ensure their wide-scale reconnection because thousands of 
battery storage units need to be charged and fuel tanks replenished. At most, it 
may be possible to partially reactivate individual infrastructure elements towards 
the edges of the area affected by the power blackout. Moreover, the failure of 
communications infrastructures also affects the authorities and task forces, who 
use the remaining/partially restored communications capabilities on a priority 
basis. 
It would appear that from an economic and technical point of view, it is not cur-
rently possible to ensure sustained safeguarding of communications networks to 
enable a stable, extensive portfolio of services to be maintained for customers. 
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As far as can be determined, concepts offering at least a defined minimum level 
of service in the event of a prolonged power blackout have not yet been devel-
oped. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
The above assessment of the vulnerability and coping capacities of the »infor-
mation technology and telecommunications« sector in the event of a prolonged, 
widespread power blackout harbours numerous uncertainties. There is therefore 
a clear need for further information and research. 
> In principle, such research should include estimating the minimum level of 
communications for the scenario presented in this report; this would then 
make it possible to determine the underlying technical conditions required for 
various levels of supply. Corresponding sub-areas to investigate could include 
an estimate of customary communications and data flows and also an as-
sessment of existing redundancies and of network segments and nodes of crit-
ical importance for operations. 
> In addition, existing concepts for emergency power supplies in the field of 
information technology and communications could be reviewed and new, 
improved approaches developed. In this context, it would be necessary to es-
tablish an overview of emergency power supplies for the various communica-
tions networks and services. The same applies for the capacities and possible 
uses of telecommunications emergency power systems that can be used on a 
mobile basis and that have to be supplied with emergency power. This would 
make it possible to specify the technical requirements for a crisis communica-
tions network that is, for example, reduced to major cities and central nodal 
points. 
> Research should also examine possible adjustments to the contingency 
measures prescribed by law. Corresponding legal/scientific analyses should 
aim to identify means for increasing the resilience of the information technol-
ogy and telecommunications sector in the event of a power blackout. 
> Finally, it is important to mention forward-looking analyses of the frame-
work conditions for the sector. These should consider technological innova-
tions (electro-mobility, »intelligent« networks) and also political (liberalisa-
tion, privatisation and deregulation), economic (diversity of competing sup-
pliers, rapid product change) or socio-cultural changes (such as changes in 
forms of communication and media usage among the population). There is a 
need to investigate whether research and development processes could be en-
couraged in order to develop IT and telecommunications applications that are 
less heavily dependent on the power supply network. 
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TRANSPORT AND TRAFFIC 
In the »transport and traffic« sector, electrically driven elements of the transport 
modes road, rail, air and water either fail immediately or after a few hours. This 
applies both to means of transport and also to infrastructures, as well as to the 
management and organisation of the respective transport modes. Important fac-
tors include the abrupt shut-down of rail transport and logjams of individual 
motor traffic and local public transport in densely populated areas. While port 
operations largely come to a standstill, airports prove relatively robust and resil-
ient. 
Immediately after a power blackout, road traffic becomes chaotic, especially in 
major cities. Junctions and also numerous tunnels and barrier systems are 
blocked and long traffic jams start to form. There are numerous accidents, some 
of which result in injuries and fatalities. Emergency medical services and task 
forces encounter major difficulties in carrying out their duties (e.g. caring for 
and transporting injured persons or fighting fires). Since most petrol stations are 
out of action, numerous vehicles become stranded and individual motor traffic 
falls sharply after the first 24 hours. Due to the shortage of fuel, local public 
transport can at most be maintained at a rudimentary level. Traffic on motor-
ways is less affected throughout the entire duration of the power blackout. 
The power blackout brings electrically-powered rail transport to an abrupt 
standstill. Large numbers of people are trapped in underground trains and in 
railway carriages. The functions of control centres, signal boxes and safety tech-
nologies are drastically restricted. The curtailing of rail transport dramatically 
curbs the population’s mobility. 
With air transport, ground operations at major airports are ensured throughout 
the power blackout thanks to emergency power systems and fuel supplies. Air-
craft can therefore still take off and land to a limited degree. 
The far-reaching consequences of the power blackout for shipping are particu-
larly evident in ports. Here, the power blackout interrupts the loading and un-
loading of ships because, for example, the conveyor belts or electrically operated 
cranes no longer work. All processes falter, all port operations come to a stand-
still and goods pile up. Whereas the loss of inland ports has a mainly regional 
effect, the loss of sea ports as centres for the transhipment of national and inter-
national goods is felt throughout Germany and even across Europe. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
The consequences of a power blackout set in abruptly and on a massive scale. 
Numerous accidents, stranded trains and underground trains, diverted flights, 
lorry jams and stockpiles of goods in ports result in major restrictions in mobili-
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ty and goods transport. In major cities and conurbations in particular, traffic 
jams and accidents produce chaotic situations on the roads. Fire-fighting, emer-
gency medical services and patient transport operations, interventions to ensure 
emergency power supplies and a number of additional measures to manage the 
general damage situation are significantly hampered. Since all petrol stations are 
out of action, fuel for emergency vehicles becomes scarce. Moreover, there is a 
threat of major bottlenecks in supplying the population with, for example, food 
or medical requisites. 
The authorities and aid organisations are thus faced with complex challenges. At 
local level it is, for example, necessary to ensure an adequate supply of fuel for 
task forces and for the emergency generators of particularly sensitive critical in-
frastructure components (such as emergency control centres, water works, and 
hospitals). In addition, it is necessary to clear, block off and impose traffic bans 
for important stretches of road and rail transport to ensure they are made and 
kept clear for the emergency task forces. Finally, it is necessary to establish (in-
terregional) transport axes and to make transport capacities available in order to 
ensure the supply of essential goods, especially by rail. During the power black-
out, the relevant authorities must consult with logistics companies and the rail 
operators to decide which routes should be kept open and which measures 
should be implemented to ensure emergency operation. 
In the sub-sector of »air transport«, current arrivals and departures can in some 
cases still be processed thanks to an extensive emergency power supply. Howev-
er, German air traffic control will soon reduce or prohibit aircraft movements, 
forcing airlines to divert flights to areas not affected by the power blackout. At 
airports, ground operations must still be maintained, site security must be en-
sured and passengers who are still at the airport must be looked after. It is also 
necessary to examine to what extent supply flights are possible (where applica-
ble as visual flights) for the population concerned. 
In view of the serious disruptions at inland ports and sea ports in the sub-sector 
»water«, the relevant port authorities attempt to reduce port operations, to clear 
stockpiles of goods, to contact ships and ports in Germany and Europe that are 
not affected and to communicate with the relevant authorities in a bid to divert 
the transport of goods and process it via road and rail. The fire service and the 
Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) are used where necessary, e.g. to 
establish a temporary power supply using mobile generators or if dangerous sit-
uations arise in connection with hazardous goods. This presents major difficul-
ties given the breakdowns in information and communications technology. 
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WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 
Water is a non-substitutable foodstuff and guarantees minimum standards of 
hygiene; as such, it is an indispensable resource for meeting basic human needs. 
However, water is also of major importance for trade, the retail sector, industry 
and public institutions. After just a very short time without electricity, water 
infrastructure systems can no longer be operated. The consequences of a failure 
in the water supply would be catastrophic, especially as regards supplying the 
population with drinking water. 
In the field of water supply, electrical energy is required for the transport, treat-
ment and distribution of water. Electrically operated pumps are especially criti-
cal for guaranteeing the respective functions. If these pumps fail, it becomes im-
possible to pump ground water and obtaining water from surface waters is, at 
the very least, heavily impaired. In addition, treatment plants and the distribu-
tion system can only be fed by natural gradients, meaning considerably less wa-
ter can be made available and high-lying areas can’t be supplied with any water 
at all. 
The reduced water supply also affects wastewater disposal: For example, the 
volume of foul water falls, and the composition of foul water changes. There is 
therefore a risk that the highly concentrated wastewater will form deposits in the 
sewerage system and lead to blockages and smells. Since wastewater lift pumps 
often have no emergency electricity back-up, wastewater may escape from the 
pipes. Sewage plants are generally equipped with emergency power supply ca-
pacities which allow full-load operation. If the emergency power supply fails, 
wastewater volumes have to be stopped before they enter the sewage plant and 
must be fed into the surface water. This inflicts direct damage on the environ-
ment. 
An interruption to the water supply has a major impact on domestic life: It be-
comes impossible to maintain normal personal hygiene and most households 
have no hot water. The ability to prepare food and drinks is limited and toilets 
can’t be flushed. The longer the blackout lasts, the more pronounced the prob-
lems are likely to become. People soon run out of clean clothes and the hygiene 
situation becomes precarious. Toilets become blocked. There is a growing risk of 
disease spreading. Another indirect consequence of a power blackout is a grow-
ing risk of fires  in industry as a result of the failure of cooling systems and 
process control systems or in households as people attempt to cook or heat and 
light their homes without electricity. The reduction in or loss of water supply 
impairs fire-fighting capabilities, meaning that especially in towns with their 
high population densities, there is a risk of fires spreading through blocks of flats 
and even across entire districts. 
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VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
In Germany, the effects of a power blackout on the water infrastructure systems 
vary considerably from region to region. It can, however, be said that most of the 
drinking water and wastewater storage facilities in the networks and plants and 
also emergency power supply capacities are at most designed to bridge supply 
interruptions lasting just a few hours. 
Managing the direct and indirect consequences of a power blackout requires 
measures involving considerable effort/expense in terms of manpower, organisa-
tion, time and material. This includes supplying the public via emergency wells 
(5,200 in Germany) and the use of mobile toilet trailers. Other measures include 
maintaining the supply and disposal networks at low levels of operating perfor-
mance by means of bridging measures and functional replacement of individual 
components and systems that depend on the power supply. In particular, this 
requires the use of mobile emergency power generators. These must be operated 
at alternating sites, e.g. at pump facilities in the sewage network or on electric 
pumps within the water supply network. As long as an emergency power supply 
is available, the water supply can be operated with a limited level of perfor-
mance, restricted availability in the distribution network and/or reduced drink-
ing water quality. Water potability can then be ensured by consumers, e.g. 
through the use of sterilisation products. Whether these measures are capable of 
coping with disasters over a prolonged period is doubtful, especially in view of 
the scarce emergency power generator capacities. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
Since water infrastructure systems are of paramount importance for supplying 
the population, there is a need to develop advanced safety concepts. The tech-
nical rules of the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Wa-
ter (DVGW) already contain numerous elements of the Water Safety Plan of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). However, since there has been little em-
phasis on risk assessment in the field of water extraction, treatment, storage and 
distribution, analyses are required in order to make it possible to prioritise the 
measures that need to be developed. Existing vulnerability analyses reveal that 
the consequences of a prolonged power blackout for the water infrastructure 
have not yet been investigated on the basis of models. Models that consider the 
water infrastructure as part of a mesh of interacting infrastructures could prove 
particularly suitable. Findings could prove helpful when developing a preventive 
disaster management system. 
Vulnerability and resilience factors should be increasingly integrated into plan-
ning for future systems. For example, more intensive R&D work is already be-
ing conducted in the field of wastewater treatment plants with a view to increas-
ing energy efficiency and the production of autonomous energy through the 
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conversion of biogas into electricity at cogeneration power stations. Even with 
the current level of knowledge, it is conceivable that expanding this technology 
would make it possible to achieve a self-sufficient energy supply. Isolated net-
work capability of local power generators could help improve the sector’s resili-
ence following a power blackout. These systems should aim to enable the simple 
and safe transfer of sewage treatment plants to an autonomous operating status. 
As central elements of the infrastructure, water works should also work towards 
achieving energy self-sufficiency and isolated network capability. 
In the short-term, there is a need for improvements to non-system-based safety 
concepts. In the case of sewage treatment plants, for example, there are still con-
siderable shortcomings in terms of fitting plants with systems for continuous 
power supply, in terms of emergency power generators and in terms of furnish-
ing the plants with operating resources (e.g. diesel) for a prolonged period. 
The field of fire protection offers opportunities for reducing vulnerability – for 
example by developing and using new technologies that reduce water require-
ments through more effective use of fire-fighting water. 
FOOD SUPPLY 
The food sector covers the complex supply chain from raw materials production 
through to the purchase of finished products by the end consumer. A power 
blackout causes major disruption to the supply of foodstuffs; demand-based 
provision of foodstuffs and their distribution among the population become pri-
ority tasks for the authorities. Successfully managing the supply of foodstuffs is 
vital not only for ensuring the survival of large numbers of people but also for 
maintaining public order. 
Within the first few days, a lack of air conditioning and ventilation results in 
damage to the production of fruit and vegetables under glass, and to goods in 
storage. In animal husbandry, stall facility functions for maintaining the life and 
health of animals are initially ensured through (prescribed) emergency power 
generators. However, the loss of other stall and milking technologies has a det-
rimental effect on the animals’ well-being and in the case of dairy cattle can lead 
to udder infections and ultimately to death. As soon as the supply of fuel for 
emergency power generators is exhausted (generally after 24 hours), the animals 
start to suffer because it is impossible to supply them manually with food, water 
and fresh air. Most problems are encountered in looking after pigs and poultry 
kept in groups of several thousand animals. Under such conditions the animals 
often don’t even survive the first hours. 
The food processing sector often comes to an immediate standstill, thus inter-
rupting supplies to retail warehouses. Although these warehouses keep extensive 
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stocks of foodstuffs, these are mostly in the form of frozen/chilled products. On-
ly a few warehouses are able to maintain the necessary emergency power sup-
plies for longer than 2 days. This has a massive detrimental impact on the rate of 
goods turnover and thus on supplies to branch outlets. Shelves empty within a 
matter of a few days. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
The increased demand makes the food trade industry the weakest element in the 
food supply chain. Serious food supply bottlenecks can be expected after just a 
few days. As part of their disaster management efforts, the authorities can take 
the following measures: 
> The rationed release of stocks of the »civil emergency reserve« and of the 
»federal reserve of grain« is initiated on the basis of the Emergency Food 
Supply Act. Where possible, these stocks undergo further processing and are 
distributed via collective care centres. 
> Transport capacities are made available on the basis of the Traffic Services 
Act (VerkLG). Measures are also put in place to step up interregional supply-
ing of the affected region by the trade sector. 
> Food handout centres are set up in selected retail food branches. These are 
equipped with emergency power generators and given consideration during 
the allocation of fuel. The relevant companies coordinate the required logis-
tics in consultation with the authorities. 
> Since most people are unable to prepare hot meals, large canteens are for ex-
ample set up by the THW, the German Red Cross and the Federal Armed 
Forces, or hot meals are handed out. 
Despite best efforts, however, it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to en-
sure satisfactory extensive distribution of food supplies to meet requirements. 
Communicating information on stocks and demand between headquarters, 
warehouses and branches is made considerably more difficult because of the 
failure of telecommunications connections. Disaster management by the authori-
ties suffers considerably from the lack of a uniform picture of the situation; this 
also significantly hampers interregional planning and coordination of measures. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
Key starting points for improving the sector’s resilience in terms of food supply 
include the regional central warehouses of retail trade operators and in some 
cases selected branches. These could be equipped with a reliable emergency 
power supply. If power supply points are available this would enable the use of 
mobile generators, although their use would have to be ensured over a long pe-
riod. Another possible course of action would be for the central warehouses to 
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have an autonomous power supply based on renewable energies, thus permitting 
a high level of self-sufficiency. 
The possibility of public-private security partnerships to strengthen the sector’s 
resilience could also be examined. The starting point could, for example, involve 
a concept aimed at an agreement with the retail sector to provide one branch 
outlet suitable for coping with disasters for every 10,000 inhabitants and also a 
food warehouse in every federal state that was equipped with extensive stocks, 
means of communication and emergency power generators. Isolated-network-
compatible decentralised power generators that use renewable energy sources 
could also be considered for suitable locations. These would be included in a 
central database, which could be used by authorities and companies to coordi-
nate deliveries in the event of a disaster. 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Almost all institutes involved in supplying medical and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts/services to the population rely directly on the supply of electricity. Conse-
quently, the health sector, which is organised on a decentralised basis and is 
heavily based on the division of labour, is only able to withstand the conse-
quences of a power blackout for a short time. Within one week, the situation 
deteriorates to such an extent that even intensive deployment of regional relief 
capacities is unlikely to prevent an extensive collapse in the supply of medical 
and pharmaceutical products and services. 
After just 24 hours, there is a marked decline in the health sector’s ability to 
function. Hospitals can maintain only limited operations with the aid of emer-
gency power generators; dialysis centres and old people’s homes and nursing 
homes must at least be partially cleared and functional areas have to be closed. 
Most doctors’ surgeries and pharmacies can’t continue operating without elec-
tricity and are shut. 
Drugs become increasingly scarce during the first week as the production and 
sale of pharmaceutical products in the area affected by the power blackout is no 
longer possible and stocks at hospitals and at any pharmacies that remain open 
become increasingly fragmentary. Perishable drugs in particular can only be ob-
tained in hospitals, if at all. Bottlenecks in the supply of insulin, blood products 
and dialysis fluids have dramatic consequences. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
With its decentralised structure, after just a few days the sector finds itself una-
ble to cope with autonomous management of the blackout’s consequences. 
Alongside increasing exhaustion of internal capacities, the efficiency of the 
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health system is also reduced by the failure of other critical infrastructures. 
Shortages in the supply of, for example, water, foodstuffs, communication services 
and transport services exacerbate the problems in terms of the scope and quality 
of medical care. 
The emergency medical services can only be used to a limited degree for 
transport and evacuation missions. Many emergency calls by the public are una-
ble to get through to them because of the damage to the communications infra-
structure. Coordinating the deployment of the emergency forces also becomes 
considerably more difficult. The dwindling availability of fuel also presents 
problems. This has a huge detrimental impact on pre-clinical medical care. 
The care focussed in hospitals threatens to collapse. Initially, some hospitals can 
maintain a reduced level of operations and thus become central hubs for medical 
care. In most cases, they still have certain stocks of medications and sufficient 
staff and fuel. Medical staff involved in outpatient care support the work of the 
hospitals. However, this relatively good situation means that when other facili-
ties (such as old people’s homes, nursing homes and dialysis centres) have to be 
evacuated, their patients are sent to hospitals, threatening the collapse of the 
capacities that still exist. Although hospitals’ emergency plans make provision 
for discharging as many patients as possible, the disastrous situation outside the 
hospitals means that at most, it is only possible to discharge patients who can 
look after themselves independently. Even initial assistance by the Federal 
Armed Forces within the framework of »civil–military cooperation« can at best 
provide only selective relief. 
A disaster would be likely by the end of the first week at the latest; this would 
entail damage to the health of or the death of very large numbers of people and 
would create a problem situation that could not be overcome using local-
ly/regionally available resources and personnel capacities. Without the addition-
al external input of medical goods, infrastructures and specialist personnel it 
becomes impossible to provide medico-pharmaceutical care. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
Hospitals play a key role as anchor points for medical care of the population. 
Although they do exhibit a certain level of resilience, this is not enough to com-
pensate for the loss of all other facilities – especially decentralised outpatient 
care. Continuous replenishments of fuel must therefore be ensured for the exist-
ing emergency power generators that are mostly available. To a limited extent, 
this would require the storage of fuel on-site or agreements with suppliers (who 
would probably find it difficult to effect deliveries because of the general conse-
quences associated with the power blackout). In principle, feed points for emer-
gency power supplies need to be provided for when planning hospital buildings. 
Ultimately, hospitals should be defined as having priority entitlement for the 
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allocation of fuel by the disaster control authorities. A more far-reaching ap-
proach is to ensure the highest possible level of energy self-sufficiency and isolat-
ed network capability; work on this has already started in many hospitals within 
the context of environmental protection efforts and measures to reduce energy 
consumption. Possibilities for treating water/transporting water from emergency 
wells to hospitals/emergency hospitals should be examined in greater depth to 
ensure the supply of drinking water to hospitals. 
Improved stocking of medical supplies could help increase resilience significant-
ly. The inclusion of additional derogations in the Pharmaceuticals Act could also 
be considered to accommodate emergencies and disasters. The aim must be to 
ensure practical regulations for a prolonged disaster situation and to ensure sup-
plies for the population. Finally, it would appear necessary to include manufac-
turers and wholesalers and also pharmacies in disaster management. This would 
require all the aforementioned players to take precautions to ensure the manu-
facture and distribution of supplies in the event of a prolonged power blackout. 
In this context, it is necessary to examine in which (legal) form this could be im-
plemented. 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Individual sub-sectors of the financial services sector appear relatively resilient, 
even when faced with a widespread and prolonged power blackout. According 
to experts, the transmission of data and payments between banks, the clearing 
organisations and the stock exchanges, and also data management and also oth-
er critical business processes can be guaranteed for a long period through the use 
of emergency power supplies or can be outsourced to a region that is unaffected 
by the blackout. Even within the stock exchange system, the measures planned 
for disasters are sufficient, in technical, personnel and organisational terms, to 
ensure essential operations for the duration of the power blackout. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
The communication paths between the banks, clearing organisations and trading 
centres on the one hand and on the other hand the individuals and companies 
who demand financial services prove less robust. The failure of the telephone 
networks and of the Internet in the affected area means that after just a short 
time, it is no longer possible to process financial services. Many banks that re-
main open after the onset of the power blackout close after a few days. As cash 
dispensers have also stopped working, the supply of cash to the population 
threatens to collapse. It can be assumed that this and the failure of electronic 
payment facilities in businesses and banks will eventually lead to anger and to 
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aggressive altercations as members of the public find themselves unable to effect 
payments. 
The lack of electronic payment facilities and the dwindling ability to supply cash 
to the population prove to be the Achilles heel within the sector. This increases 
uncertainty amongst the population. People become afraid they will no longer be 
able to buy food and obtain other daily requisites. Informing customers and ap-
propriate communication of risks in consultation with the disaster control au-
thorities thus assume increasing importance. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
The German Federal Bank must work with other organisations and emergency 
forces involved in civil protection to ensure at least a rudimentary supply of cash 
to the public. The banks need to be included in this process. A comprehensive 
organisational and logistics concept needs to be developed to ensure the delivery 
and issuing of cash. An enhanced security concept also needs to be developed as 
it is uncertain whether private security companies could sufficiently guarantee 
the delivery of high volumes of cash. 
CASE STUDY ON »PRISONS« 
Emergency power generators initially enable correctional facilities to maintain 
their principal operational functions. These mainly involve securing the prison-
ers and the provision of basic services (lighting, ventilation, heating). The first 
phase of the power blackout proves the most chaotic. A daytime power blackout 
is particularly problematic as large numbers of prisoners are not in their cells. 
All security elements, building services facilities, IT equipment and means of 
communication without an emergency power supply stop working. This makes 
it necessary to shut the prisoners in their cells on a long-term basis. Alongside 
the resulting psychological stress, prisoners also experience health problems due 
to deteriorating hygiene conditions, inadequate food supplies and a lack of heat-
ing. 
The staff at correctional facilities also experience increasing stress levels and 
over-tiredness. Added to this, traffic problems mean some staff arrive late or are 
unable to get to work at all. These factors combine to increase the overall risk of 
insubordination and unrest. Due to the effects of the blackout on other sectors, 
police forces and other support forces cannot be relied on to provide relief. En-
suring the supply of power through emergency power generators now assumes 
top priority. This is the only way to ensure (reduced) operations and adequate 
monitoring of the prisoners. Even if this succeeds, the situation becomes increas-
ingly difficult to control – not least due to hygiene, medical and other supply 
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problems. The situation is exacerbated if the number of detainees rises due to an 
increase in crime and arrests in the affected area. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
On-site fuel reserves at correctional facilities are probably only sufficient for a 
few days. The availability of mobile emergency power generators and the deliv-
ery of additional quantities of fuel are therefore imperative to ensure emergency 
power supplies. If emergency power supplies are jeopardised, transferring pris-
oners to other correctional facilities outside the affected area that have not 
reached their maximum occupancy rates is almost unavoidable. 
Even if emergency power supplies are functioning, a correctional facility’s ability 
to cope would be called into question after a few days due to security and health 
problems. Consequently, and due to the risk of escapes, a decision must be taken 
to evacuate the correctional facility and steps taken to initiate the process. This 
could trigger huge coordination problems because of the loss of fixed-network 
and mobile telephone systems. It is also doubtful whether it would be possible to 
call on sufficient and suitable transport capacities or indeed the necessary securi-
ty personnel. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
It is not possible to identify explicit statutory regulations on emergency power 
supplies for correctional facilities. It was not possible to clarify with certainty 
whether relevant standards exist at the level of administrative regulations, based 
on the disaster control and assistance acts of the federal states. It is also uncer-
tain whether a prolonged power blackout forms part of correctional facilities’ 
emergency plans or of alarm and emergency plans of the subordinate disaster 
control authorities and whether corresponding exercises are organised with the 
involvement of external support forces. There is a need for further information 
and legal clarification concerning situations where possible exceptional measures 
become necessary (e.g. non-acceptance of day-release prisoners or targeted re-
lease (»prison leave«) for certain groups of prisoners. 
The sector-based consequence analysis of a power blackout revealed the limited 
capacities for managing the consequences. Moreover, the significant interde-
pendence of the sectors further reduces resilience and limits opportunities for the 
assistance system. This assessment is further substantiated below, and some 
cross-sector conclusions are provided. 
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BEHAVIOUR 
If the power supply fails, everyday activities are called into question and cus-
tomary communication paths become largely unusable. The associated perils 
and uncertainties unsettle citizens and shatter their confidence in their ability to 
control their living conditions. This is compounded by the fact that those affect-
ed are unprepared when the power blackout strikes and by the uncertainty con-
cerning the duration of the blackout. If supplies slow down, if there is a lack of 
information and if public order starts to collapse, individuals feel helpless and 
experience stress. 
Fear and uncertainty do not trigger uniform reactions in terms of human behav-
iour. On the contrary, a broad range of different, sometimes conflicting reac-
tions is likely. Some individuals and groups abandon the established standards 
of community living. They become less considerate, more aggressive and more 
prone to violence. Willingness to help can wane. However, other responses may 
include cooperation, empathy and a willingness to help, with the people con-
cerned feeling this helps them cope with the disaster. 
For the members of the aid agencies, the consequences of the power blackout 
include extreme stress and physical and psychological strain. A lack of resources 
and insufficient coordination at local level, combined with different organisa-
tional cultures can trigger inappropriate behaviour when people are faced with 
danger; it can also hamper efficient communication and cooperation between 
the emergency forces or incite conflicts among helpers. 
The behaviour of groups and individuals in a disaster situation has still not been 
researched in sufficient depth. There is, for example, a lack of analyses on how 
people behave in terms of protecting themselves, escaping and providing support 
and on the accumulation of stresses in prolonged situations of threat. At the 
same time there are, however, a number of largely dubious assumptions – espe-
cially concerning expected, largely antisocial, apathetic or panic-stricken behav-
iour by the public. Further clarification is therefore required on this aspect – es-
pecially regarding the possible ways in which the public can provide assistance 
in disaster situations. Using the example of a power blackout, differentiated re-
search efforts could contribute to an analysis of human behaviour when people 
are faced with threats and also of misdemeanours and their respective causes; 
such issues have not been considered in any great depth in disaster research to 
date. Such studies should also consider the behaviour of helpers. There is also a 
need for information and research concerning communication and cooperation 
between organisations. More detailed socio-scientific and interdisciplinary anal-




LEGAL ASPECTS OF DISASTER CONTROL 
The consequences and chains of consequences triggered by the power blackout 
create a situation in which the lives, the physical integrity and the security of the 
population are threatened to a high level and in which major material damage 
occurs. A threat and damage situation develops requiring the mobilisation of 
interregional resources to enable the state to meet its duty of protection. Corres-
ponding requirements have been created by the legislator and regulator at legal 
and administrative level. 
For example, various contingency acts can be used to activate disaster control 
capacities in order to support regional capacities. This opens up the following 
options: 
> Elements of the Federal Armed Forces are mobilised within the context of 
»civil-military cooperation«. As well as providing personnel support (e.g. for 
the police, disaster control authorities or health establishments), this also 
makes material resources available. For example, hospitals and collection cen-
tres can be equipped with camp beds and tents, large canteens can be set up 
or Federal Armed Forces vehicles can be used for transport and evacuation 
measures. 
> Certain (mainly public) operators can be granted preferential access to tele-
communications and postal services on the basis of the Law Concerning the 
Transformation of the Deutsche Bundespost Enterprises into the Legal Struc-
ture of Stock Corporation (PTSG) and a corresponding statutory instrument 
by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). 
> To safeguard food supplies, the Emergency Food Supply Act (EVG) permits 
recourse to the »civil emergency reserve« and the »federal reserve of grain«. 
> Following declaration of a special emergency situation by the Federal Gov-
ernment, private companies can provide transport capacities under the Traffic 
Services Act (VerkLG) to support the area affected by the crisis. The Federal 
Office for Goods Transport makes these transport capacities available to the 
agencies requesting the assistance. 
To safeguard fuel supplies, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi) can issue a statutory ordinance to release stocks on the basis of the Pe-
troleum Stockholding Act. Fuel can be made available and distributed via the 
rail network using diesel-driven vehicles or by tankers. 
In combination with other state legislation and statutory instruments and official 
implementing provisions, the prerequisites for mobilising disaster management 
capacities even outside of the affected area have been established on a compre-
hensive and differentiated basis in order to ensure specific and cross-sector re-
quirements are met. 
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At the same time, this plethora of legal materials appears excessively complex 
with little evidence of coordination. For example, the legal bases for disaster 
management in the »health« sector are set down in at least eleven federal and 
state laws and ten statutory instruments/administrative regulations. This range 
of instruments must be used by the relevant players at the various levels in an 
objectively appropriate way, at the correct time and in a way that ensures all 
instruments are coordinated with each other. This is only possible if the crisis 
units have competent specialist personnel, if there is a common understanding of 
the regulations and if foresighted precautions are taken to ensure the laws and 
statutory instruments are applied to optimum effect. It would appear these re-
quirements are not yet met. 
PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERS 
The task of ensuring well-coordinated emergency and crisis management is made 
even more complex because of the need to include relevant players from outside 
the authorities. Alongside the energy utility companies, these include numerous 
additional companies such as information and communications companies, the 
food industry or the security industry. The plurality and heterogeneity of these 
establishments complicate this task considerably. By way of example, the »wa-
ter« sector has 5,200 organisations involved in the supply of water and 5,900 
involved in water disposal, while the »information technology and telecommu-
nications« sector has 3,000 service providers. Some of these operate on a local 
basis, others at interregional level and all have very different capabilities and 
capacities in terms of crisis management. Due to the plurality and heterogeneity 
of the possible security partners available to the authorities, it can be assumed 
that there is a need for further optimisation in recruiting private security part-
ners at county and federal state level and in integrating them within crisis pre-
vention and management. 
NETWORKED DISASTER MANAGEMENT –  
COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION 
Modern information and communications technologies are virtually indispensa-
ble for generating a uniform picture of the situation and for coordinating the 
numerous regional and interregional crisis units and operations control centres. 
Following a power blackout, however, it becomes virtually impossible to access 
public communications infrastructures. Moreover, the available management 
capacities and the authorities’ own communications networks are not designed 
to withstand a prolonged power blackout. 
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> Public safety authorities and organisations (BOS) communicate via the closed 
BOS radio network. A nationwide digital radio network is to be established 
by 2012. However, in terms of dependence on the power supply, the modern-
isation of the BOS radio network will create greater vulnerability in the event 
of a power blackout. Whereas the analogue relay stations had an emergency 
power supply that could last for 4 to 8 hours, the base stations of the new 
system are only designed to allow battery-based bridging of 2 hours. 
> The Federal Armed Forces use the digital TETRAPOL radio network, which 
enables mobile voice and data communication. This is not directly compatible 
with the digital BOS radio network. Since the Federal Armed Forces are un-
likely to be deployed until after a few days, the BOS radio network will no 
longer be functioning by this time. 
> The local crisis units would also have the option of resorting to mobile radio 
stations that are not dependent on the power supply network. The telecom-
munications companies and also the THW and the Federal Armed Forces 
have alternative network equipment that enables them to establish voice and 
data services and supply them via emergency generators. However, the emer-
gency generator capacities of the THW, for example, are limited. They are 
primarily intended for communication by the crisis units and operations con-
trol centres. The capacities of the telecommunications companies are not 
known. 
> Other possible options to be used in the event of a power blackout include 
the establishment of temporary field cable networks, assistance by amateur 
radio operators pursuant to Section 2 [2] of the Law Concerning Amateur 
Radio Service and the use of satellite communication. Communication by 
means of field cables relies on mobile power generators, which have to be 
supplied with fuel after a short time. By contrast, amateur radio equipment 
has extremely low energy requirements. Satellite telephony and satellite-based 
Internet connection offer adequate transmission routes, provided the required 
terrestrial elements (e.g. the ground stations) have a power supply. 
The authorities are thus able to restore individual infrastructures on a selective 
basis. One option consists in supplying mobile communications base stations 
and the corresponding mobile services switching centre (MSC) with emergency 
power on at least an hourly basis. Provided a connecting chain can be estab-
lished via additional MSCs, it is possible to establish connections between users 
within range and also in the area not affected by the power blackout. However, 
it is doubtful whether it would be possible to ensure a prolonged power supply 
or to network with other MSCs within and outside the area affected by the 
power blackout. 
It can therefore be assumed that despite determined efforts to restore communi-
cations infrastructures, it is not possible to establish a uniform picture of the 
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situation. Feasible technical options tend to be of a short range and duration; 
supply proves problematic and forces and measures can only be coordinated to 
an unsatisfactory degree. Disaster management by the authorities thus continues 
to reveal major shortcomings. 
CRISIS COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC 
Due to the failures in the »information technology and telecommunications« 
sector, dialogue-based crisis communication with the public becomes largely 
impossible. Since the rudimentary remaining or restored communications capa-
bilities can only be used by the authorities for direct rectification of damage and 
disaster control, communication with the public is mainly reliant on local bat-
tery-based warning systems, radio announcements and sound trucks. Since radio 
broadcasters are also suited to broadcasting warning messages and information 
via the Federal Government’s satellite-based warning system (SatWaS), the au-
thorities endeavour to supply selected broadcasting stations with emergency 
power to ensure a means of communication during the crisis. Experience has 
shown that established reception centres such as mayor’s offices, fire stations or 
church halls can become hubs for the dissemination of information. Tannoy an-
nouncements by emergency vehicles or patrols by the emergency forces offer 
further ways of meeting the public’s need for information. 
It is, however, clear that such fragmented (one-way) communication cannot 
meet requirements in terms of continuous, target-group-oriented crisis commu-
nication. If mains-based communication fails as extensively as described above, 
it will be extremely difficult to convey credibility and create trust. Since it is still 
largely unclear how such crisis communication could be established without 
electricity, there is a need for studies to examine concepts and practicality. 
SUPPLYING FUEL AND EMERGENCY POWER 
The availability of fuel is crucial to disaster management. The supply of fuel is, 
for example, indispensable for: 
> Emergency vehicles of the aid organisations and support forces; 
> Diesel-operated rail vehicles to evacuate stranded trains and for transport 
purposes and also for local public transport buses in order to maintain a min-
imum level of transport services; 
> Emergency power generators to enable sensitive infrastructure components 




In principle and despite the unfavourable underlying conditions (including in 
particular the loss of petrol stations), the existing management capacities in the 
form of fuel stocks offer the necessary prerequisites for ensuring the mobility 
required by the players involved in disaster management. For example, the pe-
troleum stocks prescribed by law mean significant reserves of fuel are available 
that could cover requirements even during a prolonged power blackout. Since 
petrol and diesel are mainly stored in above-ground tank facilities, the tankers or 
tank wagons can be filled using the principle of gravity if electricity is not avail-
able. 
Despite this potential there are question marks over the extent to which these 
capacities and resources can be mobilised and used in the event of a power 
blackout. For example, due to the damage to traffic infrastructures, it will not be 
possible to deploy transport vehicles quickly or in sufficient quantities in order 
to prevent fuel bottlenecks, especially in urban centres. Coordinating the distri-
bution of fuel deliveries in line with requirements is an extremely complex task, 
even if it is possible to mobilise sufficient tankers of petroleum companies and 
logistics service providers under the Traffic Services Act (VerkLG). Since a large 
area is involved, problems are likely to be encountered in agreeing responsibili-
ties, and logistics challenges will also arise. Problems are compounded by the lack 
of communications opportunities, meaning many places receive inadequate sup-
plies or no supplies at all. 
Overall, it is clear that extensive measures are in place to guarantee transport 
services in order to supply fuel in the event of a crisis. However, the specific 
conditions of a power blackout mean that prompt, well-coordinated mobilisa-
tion and distribution of fuel reserves becomes a critical factor in managing the 
consequences of a blackout. 
One means of increasing the sector’s resilience is to improve the resources avail-
able directly at local level. For example, measures could be taken to equip select-
ed petrol stations with emergency power generators and to supply them with 
fuel on a continuous basis. Assuming such petrol stations were made available to 
the authorities and the relief organisations on a priority basis, the time pressures 
associated with delivering fuel reserves would be reduced and the mobility of the 
emergency forces and their ability to intervene would be guaranteed for a certain 
time. In order to ensure continuous operation of emergency generators, it would 
at the same time be necessary to replenish selected relevant security-critical loca-
tions with the necessary fuel in time. 
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ISOLATED NETWORKS AS A POSSIBLE MEANS OF ENSURING 
A STABLE POWER SUPPLY AFTER A BLACKOUT 
The resilience of numerous infrastructure elements is limited by the low battery 
and fuel capacities of uninterruptible and off-grid stand-alone power supply sys-
tems. However, given the huge requirements and increasing competition for fuel, 
even nationwide expansion of stationary and mobile emergency power genera-
tion capacities would at most achieve selective, temporary improved resilience of 
critical infrastructures. 
Concepts involving the development of isolated networks therefore appear to 
offer better prospects for achieving a sustained improvement in the resilience of 
(emergency) power supplies. By using local networked power generators, re-
gionally restricted isolated networks could continue to generate power after a 
power blackout. Even the selective development and expansion of isolated net-
works (especially ones based on renewable energies) that was limited to public 
institutions that play a key role in disaster control could improve the resilience 
of the power supply and therefore the resilience of critical infrastructures. A 
model project to investigate technical and economic feasibility is therefore pro-
posed. 
PROVIDING INFORMATION TO AND HEIGHTENING AWARENESS 
AMONG THE POPULATION 
A significant deficit exists in terms of the public’s awareness and attitude. People 
do not consider the power supply as a critical infrastructure to be an important 
issue; they ignore the possibility of power blackouts and the consequences of an 
interruption to the power supply. People are generally quick to forget power 
blackouts when they do occur. 
Disasters such as power blackouts are usually associated with extreme weather 
events and terrorism. Since natural events are perceived as unavoidable and ter-
rorism is viewed with a certain fatalism, people believe that as individuals, they 
can’t take precautions against what are assumed to be exclusive causes. Conse-
quently, the public takes no noticeable steps to prepare for a power blackout 
and people are therefore unable to cope adequately with the consequences. In 
view of the meagre level of awareness concerning the risk of and threats associ-
ated with a power blackout, there is a need to consider how information and 
advice could be used to awaken and maintain the public’s interest, thus making 
it possible to address citizens in an appropriate way in crisis situations. In this 
context, the first step would be to elaborate a scientifically based strategy for 
communicating risk to the public before a power blackout. In doing so, citizens 
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should not be considered as passive disaster victims, but as capable players who 
can assume an active role. 
CONCLUSION 
The consequence analyses have revealed that even after a few days, it is no long-
er possible to guarantee area-wide supplies of vital/necessary goods and services 
to meet with the public’s requirements within the region affected by the black-
out. Public safety is jeopardised; the state can no longer meet its duty of protec-
tion, as anchored in the Basic Law, to protect the life and limb of its citizens. 
Although the probability of a prolonged power blackout affecting several federal 
states may be low, if such an incident did occur, the resulting consequences 
would be tantamount to a national disaster. Even if all internal and external 
forces and resources were mobilised, the situation would not be »controllable« 
and could at most only be mitigated. 
Further efforts are therefore necessary at all levels in order to increase the resili-
ence of critical infrastructure sectors in both the short and medium-term and to 
further optimise the capacities of the national system for disaster control. The 
responsible parties within politics and society should therefore continue to ac-
cord high priority to a power blackout scenario as a prime example of »cascad-
ing damaging effects«, not least in order to also raise awareness of the issue in 





VULNERABILITY OF MODERN SOCIETIES 1. 
Infrastructures such as secure energy transport networks, a functioning water 
supply, efficient transport means and routes and also information and telecom-
munications technology that can be accessed and used at any time are consid-
ered lifelines of modern, high-technology societies. Together with other sectors 
(such as authorities and the administration, health), they form the »critical infra-
structures« of modern societies (Figure 1). These ensure that the population is 
continuously supplied with vital/necessary goods and services. They are also of 
fundamental importance for the quality of location and competitiveness of a 
national economy within the globalised international market. 
FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 
 
Source: BMI 2009; Lenz 2009, p. 19 
All sectors are, to a greater or lesser degree, closely intermeshed and dependent 
on each other (Lenz 2009, p. 20). Due to their high levels of internal complexity 
and numerous mutual interdependencies, critical infrastructures must be exten-
sively and in some cases globally networked on an informational basis and con-
trolled and managed at various levels. Their complexity means defects can have 
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component can jeopardise system interactions and process flows. This also 
means that »increasingly fewer resources can create increasingly complex prob-
lems with increasingly more serious consequences« (Dombrowsky/Brauner 
1996, p. 88). Due to their internal complexity and their (physical or logical) in-
terconnection with other systems, functional breakdowns as an element of natu-
ral or man-made disasters can result in the social system as a whole collapsing: 
the information society is robbed of its (technically based) ability to generate, 
process, store and communicate data, and to obtain and apply knowledge. 
Communication stops, and mobility, the supply of energy, production and con-
sumption decline to almost archaic levels. 
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, in 
Madrid (2004) or London (2005) emphasised the vulnerability of open societies. 
However, their critical infrastructures are also threatened by natural disasters, 
particularly serious accidents, operational breakdowns or system malfunctions. 
Germany’s dependence and vulnerability have also been highlighted several 
times in recent years as a result of natural disasters and technical failures (e.g. 
Elbe and Oder floods in 2002/2005, power blackout in the Münsterland in 2005 
and in parts of Europe in 2006, the Kyrill storm in 2007 and volcano activities 
in Iceland in 2010). The supply bottlenecks, disruptions to public safety/security 
and chaotic situations surrounding aviation and road and rail transport that 
manifested themselves following these events also revealed the potential threats 
faced by modern societies. Additional risks and threats such as epidemics and 
pandemics, terrorist attacks or attacks using chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear agents highlight the threats faced by highly developed, technological 
nations. The Commission on Civil Protection of the Federal Ministry of the Inte-
rior (BMI) rightly states that »our society faces a level of vulnerability that must 
be taken seriously« (Schutzkommission 2006, p. 9). 
The experience gained from major damage situations and the potential risks as 
described above have also shown that protection of critical infrastructures and 
efficient crisis and emergency management in the event of a disaster represent an 
overriding challenge. In principle, there is still agreement that identifying and 
analysing risks and threats and developing associated concepts for integrated 
protection, risk and crisis management are of vital importance for security and 
for (preventive) protection of the public. 
Consequently, there are also increasing discussions on whether the traditional 
principles and structures of civil and population protection are perhaps not com-
plex enough, given the innovative nature of many threats and also the complexity 
and interdependence of networked systems, processes and social action (Dom-
browsky/Brauner 1996, p. 9) and if this is the case, how such principles and struc-
tures could be improved. Concern is raised, for example, because there is no uni-
form system of risk and crisis management among the relevant players, because 
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there is an absence of coordinated concepts for protecting and alerting the public 
and because the public’s self-help capabilities are not very well developed (Reich-
enbach et al. 2008, p. 27; Schutzkommission 2006; see also Chapter II). 
A POWER BLACKOUT AS A CATALYST FOR 
A »NATIONAL DISASTER« 2. 
The authors of the »Green Paper« of the cross-party alliance on the future of 
public safety and security (Zukunftsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit) have made an 
important contribution to heightening awareness of the risks and challenges as-
sociated with public safety and security in Germany (Reichenbach et al. 2008). 
Drawing on selected scenarios, they have demonstrated that in addition to caus-
ing considerable damage, terrorism, organised crime or even epidemics can also 
mean public safety and security can no longer be guaranteed in some cases. 
The authors also emphasised that due to the virtual omnipresence of electrically 
operated devices and electric control systems in our living environment and our 
world of work and due to the fact that almost all critical infrastructures rely 
heavily on an uninterruptible power supply, even a widespread and prolonged 
power blackout can lead to huge disruptions to functions and supplies, to eco-
nomic damage and to considerable threats to public safety and security and pub-
lic order.1 »Such a power blackout would be a prime example of cascading 
damaging effects.« (Unger 2008, p. 91) Sector-specific and cross-sector conse-
quences would equate to or at least be akin to a catastrophe. This observation is 
based on two arguments. A power blackout represents a combined disaster be-
cause the electricity supply reveals interdependencies with other essential infra-
structures. Almost all sectors and areas of life would be so deeply affected that it 
would probably no longer be possible to guarantee public safety and security or 
to guarantee supplies for the population (Reichenbach et al. 2008, p. 27). A pro-
longed power blackout would also represent a »national disaster« because as 
stated by the »Green Paper«, neither the public, business enterprises nor the 
state are prepared for such a situation (Reichenbach et al. 2008, p. 84). 
Vulnerability is heightened precisely because the power supply in most advanced 
nations functions on a relatively reliable basis for long periods of time and be-
                                            
1 As early as 2004 the National Crisis Management Exercise (LÜKEX) highlighted the 
problematic consequences and chains of consequences and also the enormous difficul-
ties in deploying existing capacities to manage such a crisis situation that strikes without 
any warning. The power blackout crisis manual [Krisenhandbuch Stromausfall] that 
was published at the start of 2010 confirms this view (Hiete et al. 2010). Using selected 
sector analyses as a basis, it addresses questions relating to crisis management in the 
event of a widespread interruption to the power supply, based on the example of Ba-
den-Württemberg. 
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cause almost all technical systems and social actions are based on this relative 
reliability2 . This »paradox in terms of vulnerability« means that where supply 
services are organised so that they become increasingly less susceptible to break-
down, «(the effects of) any disruption to the production, sale and consumption 
of supply services are all the more pronounced« (Steetskamp/van Wijk 1994, 
p. 20; see also BMI 2009, p. 11 ff.). However, there is limited, if any, social 
awareness of this potential risk. The findings of a study conducted in the Neth-
erlands in 1994 still apply: Citizens, companies and public organisations do not 
consider a power blackout as a serious risk, even though such an event »can 
develop into a disaster-like situation« (Steetskamp/van Wijk 1994, p. 22) within 
the first 24 hours. 
FIGURE 2 EXAMPLES OF MAJOR POWER BLACKOUTS 
 
Own image 
                                            
2 Germany’s power network repeatedly experiences minor power blackouts at different 
levels of the network. For example, in 2007, the average time for which power was not 
available was 19.25 minutes per end consumer, while the figure in 2008 was 
16.89 minutes. By contrast, until now there has never been a need to bridge a blackout 
lasting weeks or even months (www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/Elektrizitaet 
Gas/Sonderthemen/SAIDIWertStrom 2008/SAIDIWertStrom2008_node.html). Howev-
er, it is important to note that blackouts caused by »force majeure« are not included in 
the statistics on non-availability. Silvast/Kaplinsky (2007) provide data and information 
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Although some larger power blackouts in Germany and in other countries have 
at least given some indication of this (Figure 2), disaster research to date has – as 
far as can be ascertained – not yet considered the possible consequences of such 
an event in any real depth or to any systematic extent. As yet, there are no inte-
grated consequence analyses for a scenario involving a »power blackout«.3 
MANDATE, METHOD, STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 3. 
MANDATE 
In view of the potential for disaster presented by a prolonged and widespread 
power blackout, the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag 
(TAB) was commissioned to undertake a systematic consequence analysis of 
such an event. The analysis was to examine the effects of a prolonged and wide-
spread power blackout on society and its critical infrastructures. The analysis 
was also to act as a starting point for assessing the extent to which Germany is 
prepared for such a major damage situation. 
The corresponding concept proposed by the TAB and advocated by the Com-
mittee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment initially set a broad 
framework. The study was to focus on examining the following: 
> The vulnerability of sample sectors and infrastructure facilities and also the 
coping capacities of specific sub-sectors within society and the authorities, 
> The limits of and possibilities for communicating risks, informing the public 
and mobilising their self-help capabilities and 
> The possible means of action open to organisations involved in civil protec-
tion and disaster assistance 
against the backdrop of a prolonged and interregional power blackout. 
METHOD AND FOCAL POINTS OF THE STUDY 
Due to the complex material, the differentiated structures in terms of expertise 
and players as regards disaster control and civil protection and also in particular 
the gaps in literature, documentation and data, an in-depth exploratory study 
was first conducted as part of an initial phase. The aim of this exploratory study 
was to ascertain initial findings on possible consequences and chains of conse-
quences for selected sectors that result from a power blackout and on the ability 
                                            
3 Two exceptions confirm this finding: the previously mentioned study by Steetskamp/van 
Wijk (1994) and the current power blackout crisis manual »Krisenhandbuch Stro-
mausfall« (Hiete et al. 2010). 
38 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
of these sectors to manage such consequences; it also aimed to develop concepts 
and methodical approaches for a subsequent main phase of the TAB project. 
The following key points were then addressed in the main phase: 
> Consequence analyses for selected critical infrastructure sectors: These anal-
yses aimed to portray plausible consequences and chains of consequences 
triggered by a power blackout and thus to provide initial indications of the 
vulnerability/resilience of the respective sector. 
> A discussion on attitudes and behaviour shown among the public: This area 
of the study aimed to develop some hypotheses on attitudes and behaviour 
patterns associated with a power blackout. 
> Players and structures within the German disaster management system: This 
area of the study was designed to consider which players and structures with-
in the national system for disaster control are relevant in peacetime in the 
event of a major damage situation caused by a power blackout. 
SECTORS AND CHALLENGES 
Using the findings from the initial phase as a basis, the following threat situa-
tions were analysed in more detail: 
> Supplying the population with food (»agriculture/food trade« sector) 
> Ensuring a minimum level of medical and pharmaceutical supplies (»health« 
sector) 
> Maintaining the (drinking) water supply and wastewater disposal (»water 
and wastewater disposal« sector) 
> Guaranteeing adapted mobility/transport capacities (»transport and traffic« 
sector) 
> Enabling sufficient financial services (»financial services« sector) 
> Maintaining/restoring adequate communications channels (»information 
technology and telecommunications« sector) 
> Guaranteeing public safety and security – case study on »prisons« 
This selection was based on the view that the protection, safety/security and life 
of the population and also the sustainability of social structures can only be 
guaranteed if it is possible to ensure that the public is adequately supplied with 
the necessary goods and services in these sectors in particular, if public safety 
and security can be safeguarded as far as possible and if threats to the life and 
limb of citizens can be averted. 
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR 
In principle, it can be considered that »human reactions« make a disaster, »not 
the wreckage, destruction or malfunctions« (Dombrowsky/Brauner 1996, 
p. 119). Another area of the study therefore focussed on the issue of behaviour 
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and patterns of behaviour exhibited as a result of and during the course of a 
power blackout. A prolonged power blackout will create uncertainty and fear 
among the population, and also create threats to life and limb. According to the 
research on the behaviour of individuals and groups in disaster situations, it can 
be expected that even a power blackout would give rise both to antisocial, illegal 
and aggressive conduct and also to empathy, a willingness to help and rational 
and decisive action. There is, however, insufficient knowledge on the social and 
socio-psychological dimensions of such a disaster (e.g. BBK 2008a, p. 155; 
Schutzkommission 2006, p. 90). 
Overall, it could be considered that some assumptions on the behaviour and 
»malleability of the population« in extreme situations need to be examined in 
order to allow a realistic assessment of the role of the public and of professional 
and voluntary helpers and link this to the issue of disaster management (Dom-
browsky/Brauner 1996, p. 24). It was therefore deemed appropriate to also in-
clude the issue of behaviour in the consequence analysis. A (limited) study of the 
relevant literature was conducted. Since there are hardly any corresponding sci-
entific studies on the behaviour of individuals and groups in the event of a disas-
ter involving a »power blackout«, sources relating to other types of disaster 
were analysed to determine if they were transferable to a situation involving a 
power blackout. Instead of pursuing own research questions or collecting own 
data, this approach aimed to identify gaps and deficiencies in research and to 
put these forward for discussion. 
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF DISASTERS 
Germany’s national system for providing assistance in peacetime disaster situa-
tions provided another focus for the study. An overview of the most important 
relevant structures, forces and institutions at regional, national and municipal 
level was therefore ascertained. Emphasis was placed on the capacities of these 
structures, forces and institutions and their ability to act in the event of a pro-
longed and widespread power blackout. The relevant legal bases were also ex-
amined. No attempt was made to achieve a systematic or complete review or to 
conduct a jurisprudential analysis. The findings of the consequence analysis were 
then used to make an initial assessment of the coping capacities available within 
the national crisis management system. 
COOPERATION WITH EXPERTS, MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS 
The following expert reports were commissioned in order to provide the TAB 
report with a sound scientific basis: 
> Vierboom & Härlen Wirtschaftspsychologen GbR (2009): Kurzgutachten für 
den Themenbereich »Risiko- und kommunikationspsychologische Bestim-
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mungsfaktoren des Umgangs mit einem großräumigen Ausfall der Stromver-
sorgung in der Bevölkerung«. Cologne 
> Prognos AG (2009): Konzeptstudie »Gefährdung und Verletzbarkeit moder-
ner Gesellschaften – am Beispiel eines großräumigen Ausfalls der Stromver-
sorgung«. Basel 
> Vierboom & Härlen Wirtschaftspsychologen GbR (2010): Kurzgutachten zu 
einer Literaturstudie über Faktoren und Maßnahmemöglichkeiten der Kata-
strophenbewältigung auf der Verhaltensebene. Cologne 
> Ernst Basler + Partner AG (2010): Folgen eines Stromausfalls für die Sekto-
ren/kritischen Strukturen Verkehr, Finanzdienstleistungen, IuK-Technologien 
sowie Gefängnisse. Zollikon 
Grateful thanks are extended to the authors of these reports. They set about 
handling a very difficult subject that has been the focus of very few studies with-
in a very short space of time. The experts overcame this challenge supremely and 
thus provided a sound basis for this report. The report’s authors are responsible 
for any inadequacies contained in the report. 
The report is also based on various information provided in writing and by tele-
phone by institutes, organisations and companies in response to specific ques-
tions by the project team, as well as on detailed meetings with experts from the 
critical infrastructure sectors. These included experts from industry, authorities, 
science and politics, who were asked to attend meetings by the authors of the 
expert reports commissioned by the TAB and also by the project team. It is im-
portant to remember that some experts refused to answer questions or did not 
respond at all. Since not all persons who were approached wished to be or 
agreed to be mentioned by name in the report, it was decided not to include the 
names of the individual experts consulted. 
The project team also received valuable support from the Federal Office of Civil 
Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) and from the Federal Office for Infor-
mation Security (BSI). Grateful thanks are extended to the colleagues from the 
BBK and BSI for their help. 
The following colleagues also assisted during the project and in drafting the final 
report: Dr. Harald Hiessl and Peter Zoche from the Fraunhofer Institute for Sys-
tems and Innovation Research in Karlsruhe, and also Dr. Reinhard Grünwald 
from the TAB team in Berlin. The authors would also like to extend their thanks 
to Brigitta-Ulrike Goelsdorf, Head of the TAB Secretariat, who worked so hard 
proofreading the manuscript and managing the report’s appearance, especially in 
terms of images and layout. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
The present report is structured as follows: Following this introduction (Chap-
ter I), Chapter II discusses the principal structures, players, procedures and ca-
pacities of Germany’s system for crisis management in relation to a major power 
blackout. Chapter III forms the core of the report. It contains consequence anal-
yses for selected critical infrastructure sectors (Chapter III.2.1 to III.2.7). These 
are supplemented by discussions on possible attitudes and behaviour patterns 
that could be displayed by the public in the event of a power blackout (Chap-
ter III.3). 
In Chapter IV the most important conclusions are presented. Using the vulnera-
bility analyses provided in Chapter III as a backdrop, it summarises the key 
weaknesses inherent in the sectors and also cross-sector vulnerabilities. This sec-
tion also includes an assessment of the management capacities of the German 
system for crisis management and also outlines and discusses starting points for 
improving the resilience of critical infrastructures in the event of a disaster in-
volving a power blackout. Finally, the report discusses prospects pertaining to 
information, research and action. 
In conclusion, it should again be emphasised that the TAB project was commis-
sioned to investigate the »consequences« of a power blackout; specifically, the 
mandate did not include the causes of such a blackout. This focus is firstly justi-
fied because frequent and in-depth studies are already available on the causes of 
power blackouts, along with recommendations for safety/security and preventive 
concepts.4 Secondly, and by contrast, there are very few detailed sector-based 
consequence analyses on the expected effects of such blackouts. In this connec-
tion, BMI/BBK (2007, p. 188 ff.) also emphasises that in contrast to the well-
investigated vulnerability of the »energy/power generation« sector, considerable 
uncertainty prevails concerning the precise vulnerability of other critical infra-
structures following a power blackout/the degree of criticality between critical 
infrastructures and whether »effective consumer protection is actually possible« 
(BMI/BBK 2007, p. 190). There is therefore a need for studies into these issues 
(i.e. into the consequences of a power blackout).5 
                                            
4 Studies of power blackouts (Münsterland, Emsland) focus on the origin of the blackout 
and on prevention in the sense of avoiding a blackout, but not on reducing harmful 
consequences. 
5 In the final analysis, this statement also means that identified solution strategies do not 
serve to prevent a blackout in the sense of preventing its occurrence. On the contrary, 
the technical and political options that need to be identified involve the preven-
tion/reduction of problematic consequences and limitation of damage (Chapter IV). 
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This TAB report is therefore largely treading on virgin soil. There is little litera-
ture or research available on the subject of the study. If available at all, any data 
on the players and resources involved in disaster protection and also any rele-
vant statistics (e.g. on damage) or systematic evaluations of disaster operations 
even for such a disaster situation prove incomplete, difficult to verify and there-
fore also difficult to evaluate (Dombrowsky/Brauner 1996, p. 23; Schutzkom-




THE SYSTEM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY II. 
Germany’s historic evolvement of a »security architecture« has also led to the 
development of an »assistance system« (Weinheimer 2008) for peacetime disas-
ter control. This system is expected to be able to cope with multifarious threats 
(Chapter I) (BBK 2008a, p. 9). While disaster risk management and disaster con-
trol is the responsibility of the federal states, it is also expected to deal with risk 
and damage situations of national importance (such as serious radiological and 
biological incidents, disruptions to critical infrastructures, terrorism and also 
natural disasters or epidemics). The Federal Government supports the federal 
states in this task. Based on a »network that spans society as a whole« (BBK 
2008a, p. 76), forces and institutes at national, regional and municipal level in-
cluding the fire services, the aid organisations and the Federal Agency for Tech-
nical Relief combine to constitute what can, even in international terms, be con-
sidered a »unique deployment of forces«, despite the fact that »more than 80 % 
is accounted for by voluntary members« (Weinheimer 2008, p. 165).6 
Some observers believe that given the extreme vulnerability of critical infrastruc-
tures and the widespread and possibly prolonged disaster situations associated 
with damage to or the failure of such infrastructures, the »German system of 
crisis management« (BMI 2008) is not yet sufficiently prepared. Among other 
things, questions are raised about the two-way carve-up of civil protection and 
disaster control and about the associated plethora of authorities, aid organisa-
tions and public safety authorities and organisations (BOS). This creates addi-
tional problems relating to responsibilities and authority, as for example with 
regard to the exercise of police, other civil protection and military functions or 
with regard to the separation/coordination of civil protection and disaster con-
trol. If the corresponding players are to work together successfully, the numer-
ous different management and communications structures must be coordinated 
as effectively as possible at national and Länder level. Some people doubt 
whether this can succeed in widespread, extremely unstable situations if civil 
protection is not managed from »one single source«. 
According to estimates, around 80 % of critical infrastructures are in private 
ownership. Consequently, a »security partnership« between the government and 
private companies is considered necessary in order to achieve the objectives of 
peacetime disaster control (BBK 2008a, p. 89 ff.; BMI 2009), and thus make it 
                                            
6 According to Weinheimer (2008, p. 165), the number of personnel in the specified or-
ganisations totals 1.8 million; however, the number of people who can actually be mo-
bilised on an operational basis is »significantly lower«. 
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possible to guarantee the protection of citizens7. Nevertheless, the Federation 
and the Länder retain special responsibility for this core task of ensuring nation-
al security. In recent years, the responsible government players at federation and 
Länder level – often acting in conjunction with representatives from industry 
and society – have implemented numerous activities in terms of concepts, plan-
ning, legislation and organisation in order to better fulfil this responsibility. This 
includes the formation of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster As-
sistance (BBK) in 2004 following the adoption of the »New Strategy«8. As a 
Higher Federal Authority under the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(BMI), one of its key tasks is the elaboration of concepts for the analysis and 
protection of critical infrastructures. Its tasks also include »providing infor-
mation on the importance of critical infrastructures for the government and for 
society, heightening awareness among authorities, companies and the general 
public, portraying the tasks, functions and interdependencies of/between critical 
infrastructures, developing and strengthening cooperation between authorities 
and companies, … proposing short, medium and long-term measures for the 
protection of critical infrastructures« (BBK n.d.). 
The rewriting of the Act on Civil Protection was an important step from a legis-
lative point of view. The Law on the Reorganisation of Civil Protection 
(ZSNeuOG) of 29 July 2009 redefined the division of tasks between the Federa-
tion and the Länder in the field of disaster control. It aims to create a more effi-
cient and flexible joint system of assistance. The previous coexistence between 
the Länder disaster control structures and the structures prescribed by the Fed-
eration for enhancing disaster control were restructured so that augmentation of 
disaster control now builds on the Länder structures. Federal resources can thus 
also be deployed in the event of peacetime damaging events and Länder disaster 
control structures can also be used to avert defence-related disasters. 
                                            
7 Based on the »National Plan for the Protection of Information Infrastructures« (NPSI) 
that was adopted in 2005 (NPSI) (BMI 2005b), the BMI and the BSI elaborated the 
»CIP Implementation Plan« – in cooperation with around 30 major German infrastruc-
ture companies and their trade and industry associations (BMI 2007). 
8 At the Conference of Ministers of the Interior at the start of June 2002, the Federation 
and the Länder agreed on a new framework concept for civil protection: the »New 
Strategy for Protecting the Population in Germany«. It is based on the principle that the 
Federation and the Länder have joint responsibility for threats and damage scenarios 
that are unusual or widespread in nature, or that are of national importance. Among 
other things, the new framework concept aimed to ensure improved dovetailing of assis-
tance capabilities of the Federation (especially the THW) and of the Länder (fire bri-
gades and aid organisations) and also to create new coordination tools for efficient co-
operation. Some people question whether the »New Strategy« is still adequate against 
the backdrop of present conditions and of those expected in the future. 
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With regard to improving the basis of information and to improving warning 
capabilities, reference is made to the introduction of the German Emergency 
Planning Information Systems (deNIS I and deNIS II plus), SatWaS and the 
German Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ) (Chapter II.2). 
Since 2004, interdepartmental and interstate crisis management exercises have 
been used to practise the German system for crisis management and also the 
cooperation between the Federation and the Länder. These LÜKEX exercises are 
designed to result in a critical analysis and in corresponding measures for further 
development of crisis management concepts and structures. The exercises are 
also deliberately conceived as a joint activity between the Federation and indus-
try. Among other things, the efforts to further develop the structures for manag-
ing unusual threat situations have resulted in plans and protection concepts (e.g. 
»Baseline Protection Concept«, »National Plan for the Protection of Information 
Infrastructures«, »National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastruc-
tures« and »Protection of Critical Infrastructures – Risk and Crisis Manage-
ment«). 
Finally, publicly funded research is also making increasing contributions to an 
improved and more practical understanding of the risks and threats faced by 
modern industrial and knowledge-based societies. Greater attention is also being 
focussed on technological and social options for increasing the resilience of criti-
cal infrastructures. In this connection, it is important to mention the Federal 
Government’s Security Research Programme, which promotes research aimed at 
developing practical solutions designed to increase the safety and security of citi-
zens. 
The following section outlines selected legal bases for peacetime disaster control 
(Chapter II.1). This is followed by an overview of the structures, players and 
processes that would be mobilised in the event of a prolonged power blackout 
(Chapter II.2). 
LEGAL BASES FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT 1. 
The legal bases for managing the consequences of a widespread power blackout 
are provided by a broad body of legislation at both international and national 
level. Nationally, the rules and regulations extend from the Basic Law to imple-
menting provisions for authorities. 
INTERNATIONAL 
At international level, assistance in disaster situations is regulated at the level of 
the EU and NATO and also through bilateral treaties. 
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The Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which was established in 2002, 
provides the EU with an instrument for combatting disasters through mutual 
assistance.9 The basis for this is provided by a decision of the European Council 
of 23 October 2001 (2001/792/EC, EURATOM in the revised version 2007/ 
779/EC, EURATOM). Moreover, Article 18 of the Treaty on the stepping up of 
cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border 
crime and illegal migration of 23 June 2008 (2008/615/JI) stipulates that the 
competent authorities of the member states shall provide mutual assistance in 
connection with disasters and serious accidents. The Monitoring and Infor-
mation Centre (MIC) represents the operational organ of the Community 
Mechanism. Each member state may request assistance via the MIC.10 . The 
»Crisis Steering Group« was set up at the level of the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union. It is responsible for crises and emergencies that 
have far-reaching effects and that are of major political significance. At the level 
of the Ministries, agreements have been concluded aimed at managing commu-
nication between the German representatives and the relevant players in Germa-
ny (BMI 2010, p. 17). 
Article 196 of the »Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union« addresses 
the issue of civil protection. It specifies the Union’s aims as supporting and com-
plementing member states’ actions in civil protection and responses to disaster 
situations. The necessary measures should be established in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, excluding any harmonisation of the laws of the 
member states. 
According to a decision by the North Atlantic Council on 29 May 1998, 
NATO’s disaster relief makes it possible to request assistance from member 
states and to coordinate the provision of such assistance on a central basis (Geier 
et al. 2009, p. 100). 
In addition, there are numerous agreements on bilateral assistance in the event 
of disasters or serious accidents (e.g. with Belgium, Denmark, France, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, the Russian Federation, Switzer-
land, the Czech Republic and Hungary). There is also a framework agreement 
between Germany and France on cross-border cooperation in the health sector; 
in particular, this makes provision for a cross-border emergency medical service 
(Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 118). The BBK has concluded cooperation agreements with 
various neighbouring countries (BBK 2008a, p. 93). 
                                            
9 A study by the Environment Directorate-General revealed that although the EU Mecha-
nism currently facilitates support, it cannot guarantee it (ECORYS Research and Con-
sulting 2009, p. 10).  
10 In this context, Lüder (2009, p. 119 ff.) raises the question as to how the Community 
Mechanism »can be reconciled with the localisation of non-police-based emergency re-
sponse across the member states and the operations information stored there«. 
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FEDERATION 
The Basic Law (GG) regulates the division of tasks between the Federation and 
the federal states (Länder). Civil protection is the task and responsibility of the 
Federation (Article 73 No. 1 of the Basic Law). According to Articles 30 and 70 
[1] of the Basic Law, responsibility for disaster control11 in peacetime lies with 
the federal states. However, according to Article 35 [2] second sentence of the 
Basic Law, a federal state may, in response to a natural disaster or to a particu-
larly grave accident, request the assistance of police forces of other federal states, 
or of forces and facilities of other administrative bodies and of the Federal Police 
or the armed forces. If a threat extends beyond the territory of a federal state, 
the Federal Government may, in accordance with Article 35 [3] of the Basic 
Law, instruct the Land governments to make police forces available. The Federal 
Government may also deploy units of the Federal Police (pre-2005 the Federal 
Border Police) and the armed forces to support the police forces (Paul/Ufer 
2009, p. 118 and 120). Notwithstanding these two cases, Article 35 [1] allows 
the possibility of mutual assistance between the Federal and Länder authorities 
(administrative assistance). 
In addition to civil protection responsibilities, the Civil Protection and Disaster 
Management Law of the Federal Government12 (ZSKG) also regulates disaster 
control within the framework of civil protection as well as disaster assistance by 
the Federal Government. In this context, the use of facilities of the Federal Gov-
ernment pursuant to Section 12 is of particular significance. According to this 
provision, the Federal Government makes the facilities it keeps available for de-
fence scenarios available to the Länder in order to assist them in their duties re-
lating to disaster control. Conversely, the disaster control forces and facilities of 
the Länder are also used for defence functions (Section 11 [1]). The Federal 
Government augments their facilities and equipment in the field of fire protec-
tion, NBC protection and care (Section 13 [2] ZSKG). 
This law made it possible for the Federal Government, following a request by a 
federal state or by several states affected by an incident, to coordinate the assis-
tance measures in consultation with said federal state or states (Section 16 [2] 
ZSKG). Where required, the facilities of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and 
Disaster Assistance (BBK) are also available to the federal states, including in par-
ticular with regard to ascertaining and assessing situations and verifying and plac-
ing scarce resources (Section 16 [1] ZSKG), as they can enlist the support of the 
German Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ) and also of the deNIS 
                                            
11 A uniform nationwide legal definition exists for the term disaster control (Weinheimer 
2008, p. 143). 
12 Civil Protection and Disaster Management Law of the Federal Government (ZSKG) of 
25 March 1997 (BGBl. I, p. 726), amended by Section 2 No. 1 of the law of 29 July 
2009 (BGBl. I, p. 2350). 
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database (Chapter II.2). However, management and coordination of all assistance 
measures is the responsibility of the relevant Länder disaster control authorities. 
They are responsible for operational crisis management and oversee disaster con-
trol forces and facilities as regards implementation of their duties. 
Acts of a precautionary nature 
By adopting several emergency preparedness and precautionary acts (see text box) 
and also numerous associated statutory instruments, the Federal Government has 
established a broad range of means of action. These acts and instruments can be 
used to mobilise scarce and critical resources. In addition to the precautionary 
stocking of key goods such as food or fuel, the precautionary acts also lay down a 
catalogue of measures permitting extensive control of scarce goods and services 
and of the corresponding infrastructures in the fields of energy, nutrition, 
transport, post and telecommunications. 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND PRECAUTIONARY ACTS 
> Petroleum Stockholding Act  
Petroleum Stockholding Act in the version pronounced on 6 April 1998 
(BGBl. I, p. 679), last amended by Section 165 of the ordinance of 
31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407). 
> Energy Security Act  
Energy Security Act of 20 December 1974 (BGBl. I, p. 3681), last amend-
ed by Section 164 of the ordinance of 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407). 
> Emergency Food Supply Act  
Emergency Food Supply Act of 20 August 1990 (BGBl. I, p. 1766), last 
amended by Section 186 of the ordinance of 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, 
p. 2407). 
> Law Concerning the Transformation of the Deutsche Bundespost Enter-
prises into the Legal Structure of Stock Corporation  
Law Concerning the Transformation of the Deutsche Bundespost Enter-
prises into the Legal Structure of Stock Corporation of 14 September 1994 
(BGBl. I, p. 2325, 2378), last amended by Section 2 No. 3 of the law of 
2 April 2009 (BGBl. I, p. 693). 
> Traffic Services Act  
Traffic Services Act of 23 July 2004 (BGBl. I, p. 1865), last amended by 
Section 304 of the ordinance of 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407). 
Standards and rules and regulations 
Additional provisions for managing a power blackout exist in the form of stand-
ards and bodies of rules and regulations. For example, the DIN Deutsches Insti-
tut für Normung e.V. defines numerous technical requirements for safety and 
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security (e.g. of equipment, processes, buildings).13 The trade and industry asso-
ciations also have numerous bodies of rules and regulations such as – in the field 
of water/wastewater – those of the German Technical and Scientific Association 
for Gas and Water (DVGW) and of the German Association of Water, 
Wastewater and Waste (DWA) (Chapter III.2.3). Corresponding standards can 
be used in legislation, in administration and in legal relations. 
THE LÄNDER 
The federal Länder are responsible for legislation relating to peacetime disaster 
control, the emergency medical services and public health services.14 They are 
also responsible for the law relating to hospitals, taking into account the com-
peting legislative competence of the Federal Government (Paul/Ufer 2009, 
p. 126). 
The disaster control laws of the federal Länder are of particular significance. Eight 
federal Länder have special disaster control laws, while five federal Länder have 
implemented combined laws for fire protection and disaster control. In Bremen 
and Saxony, disaster control is anchored in assistance laws, which also regulate 
fire protection and the emergency medical services. In North Rhine-Westphalia, 
for example, the fire protection and assistance law regulates the management of 
emergencies caused by natural events, explosions or similar incidents.15 Adminis-
trative provisions regulate key aspects of local disaster management (such as the 
work of task forces or announcements of threats over the radio) (Paul/Ufer 2009, 
p. 129). The police laws of the Länder regulate matters relating to emergency re-
sponse by the police. Police service regulations specify the principles governing 
police work and also police measures in specific situations. 
There are also disaster control plans issued by the competent authorities. These 
are only partly accessible to the general public. In particular, these deal with the 
procedure for warning the public, the emergency measures to be adopted in the 
event of a disaster and also the emergency forces and resources. 
These laws and plans are used as a basis for organising, at the level of the sub-
ordinate disaster control authorities, disaster control and disaster assistance by 
other authorities and national aid organisations and also the deployment of dis-
aster control units. 
                                            
13 These also include the DIN-EN standards on emergency power supplies and on emer-
gency lighting in certain buildings or on the technical equipment of emergency vehicles. 
14 The Länder are also responsible for the material resources – in conjunction with the 
municipalities and the aid organisations. Added to this is the Federal Government’s civil 
protection equipment, which it also makes available for disaster control purposes. 
15 The term disaster is not used; the term major damaging incident is used instead. 
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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY: 
PLAYERS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 2. 
The regulation of disaster preparedness and disaster control as outlined above 
reflects the federal system of the Federal Republic and the associated organisa-
tional sovereignty of the Länder/municipalities. One consequence of this ap-
proach is that it is not possible to ensure uniform management and coordination 
of and cooperation between the numerous players at multifarious levels. This 
situation is frequently criticised and has for example been referred to as »frag-
mentation of civil protection policy« 
However, over the last 5 years in particular, the system of crisis management has 
undergone continuous further development in line with the changed threat situa-
tion (Unger 2008). At the same time, efforts have pushed ahead at European 
level to dovetail national crisis management systems. As part of this process, 
numerous measures have for example been adopted with the aim of creating a 
certain level of uniformity, especially at management level. In order to standard-
ise the command and control structures at the various levels of crisis manage-
ment, the Länder agreed on use of a set of basic unifying recommendations with-
in the context of their overall management system. For example, »Fire Services 
Regulation 100« (FW DV 100) is to be applied to all organisations at operation-
al and tactical level, and the »Guidelines for setting up administrative and or-
ganisational task forces« are to be applied at administrative and organisational 
level. The Länder also agreed on a procedure for interstate disaster assistance. 
The following section outlines the crisis management system in Germany – tak-
ing into account cooperation between the various players   in the event of a pro-
longed, interregional disaster situation. 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT THE LEVEL OF THE FEDERATION AND THE LÄNDER 
When a power blackout occurs, local institutions, organisations and authorities 
(mayor’s offices) are initially responsible for dealing with the consequences. De-
pending on the situation and the way in which the situation develops, the next-
highest levels are then successively mobilised (regional commissioner, Länder 
ministries, federal ministries). The highest disaster control authority of a Land is 
generally the Ministry of the Interior. The subordinate disaster control authori-
ties in the non-city states are mainly the counties and the county boroughs, while 
in the city-states they are the departments of interior affairs (Paul/Ufer 2009, 
p. 131 ff.). In the event of a widespread power blackout, administrative task 
forces at all levels step in to manage the tasks arising (Hiete et al. 2010, D4). 
The competent subordinate disaster control authorities are responsible for im-
mediately initiating all necessary measures required to avert or manage damag-
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ing events. They are also responsible for reporting situations to higher echelons 
in order to ensure that the necessary information and reports on the situation 
are also transmitted to the Interior Ministry without delay. 
With interregional power blackouts, responsibility lies with the higher disaster 
control authority, which commissions the (local) subordinate disaster control au-
thorities with (operational) implementation of the required measures. It manages 
disaster prevention in its capacity as »local operations control centre for disaster 
control«. In the event of an impending or actual disaster situation, it can issue 
instructions to the disaster control task forces (e.g. police, fire service, THW) and 
to all other parties involved in disaster assistance. The individual federal forces 
send expert advisors or liaison officers to the local forces. According to the »Con-
cept for Interstate Disaster Assistance« that was agreed by the Länder in 2004, the 
highest department of internal affairs will contact the departments of internal af-
fairs of the neighbouring Länder and request assistance forces. The forces that are 
deployed report to the management authorities of the Land that has requested the 
assistance; the competent subordinate authorities of the neighbouring Länder are 
informed of the progress of the cross-state assistance. 
In addition to this, the Federal Government also becomes active, at least in a 
coordinating role, due to the significance of the damaging event for the country 
as a whole. In parallel to the Länder structures, the Ministry of the Interior 
would also set up a crisis unit16 with the aim of collating the available infor-
mation. This includes, among other things, the competent technical departments 
for crisis management and civil protection, public safety and information tech-
nology, and also the BBK, the BSI, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and 
the Federal Agency for Technical Relief. Other departments and departmental 
authorities can be called on where necessary (BBK 2008a, p. 91). The basic ad-
ministrative structures of department-based crisis management are shown in 
Figure 3. 
Due to the interregional character of the power blackout, Federal and Länder 
coordination groups are formed. Interstate coordination within Germany is or-
ganised via the situation centres of the interior ministries and between their de-
partments. 
Cooperation between the Federal Armed Forces and the federal and Länder au-
thorities and also with the districts, counties and county boroughs is regulated 
on a level-appropriate basis in an instruction of the Federal Ministry of Defence 
(BMVg) (BMVg 2008). 
                                            
16 The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) is responsible for coordinating natural disas-
ters or especially grave accidents. According to the Constitution, emergency response 
remains in the sovereignty of the federal Länder. 
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FIGURE 3 SYSTEM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY THE FEDERATION AND THE LÄNDER 
 
Source: BMI 2010, p. 18 
The German Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ) plays a special 
role. It operates a permanently contactable information centre for widespread 
threat situations of national importance and assists in the placement of re-
sources. The situation centre is considered the »heart of the national and police 
information network and of resource management in disaster and crisis situa-
tions« (BBK 2008a, p. 80). For example, as part of interregional disaster assis-
tance to manage the consequences of a power blackout, the Federation can con-
tribute by compiling a national picture of the situation. 
If disaster assistance also has to be coordinated on an international level, specific 
capacities are available through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and 
through the EU with its Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). These cen-
tres allow members to exchange information with each other and to coordinate 
the deployment of task forces (NATO 2001, p. 21). 
The Internet-based German Emergency Planning Information System (deNIS) 
can also be used. Its task is to combine and edit information and to make it 
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available both to the public (deNIS I) and also for direct (information) manage-
ment of major disasters (deNIS II plus17). The Federal Government’s satellite-
based warning system SatWaS can be used to disseminate alerts across Germany. 
It enables the transmission of high-priority alerts to all civil protection liaison 
offices, broadcasting stations and other media such as major press agencies and 
Internet service providers, and to the situation centres of the BMI and of the 
Länder interior ministries. A warning message sent to broadcasting corporations 
may include an order to interrupt the current broadcast and pass on a certain 
text immediately via the transmitter. 
The crisis units of the ministries are especially important. Figure 4 shows the crisis 
units that have been set up at the federal level and whose task is to support crisis 
management by the Länder by providing specific departmental expertise. 
FIGURE 4 CRISIS UNITS OF THE MINISTRIES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
 
Source: BMI 2010, p. 14 f. 
The Inter-ministerial Coordination Group of the Federation and the Länder 
(IntMinKoGr) plays a key role during a prolonged and widespread power 
blackout. If the situation is such that the system of cooperation between the cri-
sis units proves insufficient, this coordination group can be convened by the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) in order, for example, to arrive at joint 
situation assessments and recommendations for action, and to ensure coordinat-
ed communication between the Federation and the Länder (BMI 2010, p. 16). 
                                            
17 deNIS II plus was first used for the LÜKEX 2007 exercise. Its aim was to provide the 
participating situation centres with an up-to-date picture of the situation (www.bbk. 
bund.de/nn_401590/DE/02__Themen/11__Zivilschutztechnik/04__Warnsyst/01__Sat 
Was/SatWas__node.html__nnn=true; accessed on 10.5.2010). 
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FIGURE 5 HIGH COMMAND FOR DISASTER CONTROL OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 
 OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 
 
Source: From IMSH 2010, p. 11 
Led by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Inter-ministerial Panel on Na-
tional Crisis Management constantly optimises inter-ministerial crisis manage-
ment. Furthermore, agreements have been concluded that make it possible to 
call up inter-ministerial joint crisis task forces at the Federal Ministry of the Inte-
rior in certain cases. 
Due to the varied federal peculiarities, it is only possible to make limited general 
statements on the structures of crisis units or management units at federal state 
level. Figure 5 shows the structure of the high command for disaster control 
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son group and the contact group are of particular importance for widespread 
situations. The liaison group assumes coordination and communication func-
tions with regard to other departments and subordinate authorities at federal 
state level. The contact group comprises liaison officers of different players in-
volved in disaster control (e.g. liaison officers of the Federal Armed Forces or 
representatives of the THW, the fire services or the German Red Cross (DRK)). 
Its task consists in maintaining and coordinating the operational response (using 
additional forces and resources where applicable). 
The high command is convened by the Ministry of the Interior where this is re-
quired by a situation. Its main task is to observe the situation. Acting in a spe-
cialist supervisory capacity, it intervenes where necessary in the measures taken 
by the subordinate disaster control authorities and supports these authorities 
without, however, assuming actual control (IMSH 2010, p. 11). 
AID ORGANISATIONS AND SUPPORT FORCES 
At the operational level of emergency response and management, numerous 
players become involved at Federal and Länder level when a disaster strikes 
(Figure 6). The following section examines the police, the THW, the Federal 
Armed Forces and also the fire services and their coping capacities. 
POLICE FORCES 
The police forces are made up of different organisations. Alongside the police 
tactical units, the most important and largest units include the (former) branches 
of the Constabulary and the Criminal Police Office. Disaster control is not one 
of the core tasks of the police forces at federal and Länder level. Consequently, 
no corresponding special organisational units are established and even the quan-
tity and quality of technical equipment are not designed for the requirements of 
disaster protection.18 However, in threat situations and major damage scenarios, 
the police forces are responsible for emergency response and for maintaining 
safety and order. Police and non-police high commands work together in such 
cases. 
The tasks of the German Federal Police (BPOL) include border protection, tasks 
of the railway police, protection against attacks on aviation security, police tasks 
when a state of tension/state of defence exists, supporting the police of the feder-
al Länder especially at times of major deployments and assistance in the event of 
a widespread and prolonged power blackout including the air rescue service. 
The BPOL currently has around 40,000 employees; of these, around 30,000 are 
law enforcement officers. 
                                            
18 Limited quantities of equipment such as lighting systems, transport lorries and power 
generators are available. 
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FIGURE 6 AID ORGANISATIONS AND SUPPORT FORCES 
 
ASB: Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (Workers’ Samaritan Federation); BBK: Bundesamt für 
Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance); DLRG: Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (German Lifeguard Associa-
tion); DRK: Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (German Red Cross); JUH: Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (St. 
John Accident Assistance); MHD: Malteser Hilfsdienst (Maltese Cross Relief Service); THW: 
Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal Agency for Technical Relief) 
Own image 
Cooperation between the BPOL and the federal Länder in the event of disasters 
or grave accidents is based on Article 35 [2] of the Basic Law (GG) in conjunc-
tion with Section 11 of the Federal Police Act (Hiete et al. 2010, D 20). 
FEDERAL AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL RELIEF 
The Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is responsible for technical as-
sistance in civil protection and disaster control. At the request of the bodies with 
responsibility for emergency response, it renders administrative assistance pur-
suant to Section 1 [2] second sentence No. 3; such assistance is mainly rendered 
in connection with local emergency response in cities and local authorities. Sup-
port is given to the fire services and also to emergency medical services or the 
police in cases involving mass injuries.19 The THW units report to the local crisis 
management units. 
                                            
19 This was the case at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm (2007), where the THW’s tasks 
included securing the power supply, lighting of control areas and operation of assembly 































 2.  CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY: PLAYERS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 57 
 
The following units and power generators are available for managing a power 
blackout: 
> 89 units in the electricity supply section 
> 83 units in the infrastructure section 
> 140 units in the lighting section 
> 5,000 power generators ranging from 5 to 9 kW each. 
> 570 power generators ranging from 10 to 99 kW each. 
> 140 power generators/emergency power systems of approx. 100 to 400 kW 
each (THW website a & b) 
The THW has more than 80,000 voluntary helpers and around 850 full-time 
employees. It comprises 8 state branches and 668 local branches. The state 
branches are the points of contact for the supreme Land authorities and for the 
state branches of other organisations and bodies. Each local branch is presided 
over by the local officer who acts as honorary administrator. At the level of in-
dividual organisations, the offices of the THW maintain contact with the offices 
of the Federal Armed Forces and the German Federal Police. The cross-regional 
deployment of THW teams is coordinated by a team of management and coor-
dination staff within the THW management structure. During operational de-
ployment, this team maintains the necessary contact with other federal teams 
deployed (BBK 2008b, p. 101). 
FEDERAL ARMED FORCES 
The Basic Law stipulates that the Federal Armed Forces should primarily be de-
ployed for the external defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, 
Article 35 [1] of the Basic Law (GG) makes it possible for (technical) administra-
tive assistance to be provided, although not through the use of specific (military) 
resources of the armed forces. In addition, Article 35 [2] of the Basic Law pro-
vides for the Federal Armed Forces to be deployed at the request of a federal 
state in order to assist, for example, in natural disasters or in the event of a par-
ticularly grave accident. This must constitute supplementary assistance and must 
not involve long-term cooperation. If a threat involves more than one federal 
state then according to Article 35 [3] of the Basic Law, the Federal Government 
may deploy units of the armed forces to support the police forces. 
The Federal Armed Forces currently comprise around 188,000 full and part-
time soldiers, 38,700 basic military service conscripts and 26,500 conscripts on 
longer military service; around 90,000 reservists are also available, many of 
whom can also be deployed for disaster control protection tasks within the 
framework of »civil-military cooperation«. Regular cooperation/relationships 
between the military commando authorities and the civil authorities should be 
ensured at all levels of the federal system in order to prepare for deployment in 
the event of a disaster. 
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FIGURE 7 TERRITORIAL NETWORK OF THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES FOR 
 CIVIL DISASTER CONTROL 
 
Source: Streitkräftebasis 2007 
In view of the significant problems arising in the wake of a power blackout, the 
Federal Armed Forces could, among other things, provide assistance20 for the civil 
authorities in the following areas (BMI 2005a, p. 6 ff.): 
> Coping with large numbers of injured persons, including in particular with 
the provision of air transport capacities; 
> Providing communications support for the aid organisations and their man-
agement; 
> Providing engineering and other support, including air transport for people 
and materials. 
                                            
20 The extent to which this is possible in the light of the increasing obligations incumbent 
on the Federal Armed Forces in connection with international missions cannot be de-
termined here (see, for example, Rechenbach 2005, p. 159). 
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Services such as these are almost entirely based on »resilient resources«. They 
can be operated on a self-sufficient basis and should be designed for long periods 
of deployment. 
The provision of communications support includes the provision of mobile of-
fices, the establishment and operation of network-independent communications 
structures (satellite and radio communication) by the signal corps and the provi-
sion of liaison personnel for decision-makers and the supporting organisations. 
According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) (2005a, p. 9), a mobile, 
multi-tiered management organisation (personnel and materials) with network-
independent communications connections would be available in the event of a 
disaster in order to control the deployment of military forces to support the rele-
vant disaster control authorities at local level. 
Civil-military cooperation (ZMZ) within Germany and disaster assistance con-
stitute key tasks of the Joint Support Service (SKB). The Joint Support Service is 
not a branch of the Armed Forces such as the Army, Navy and Air Force, but it 
does represent an independent military sphere of authority. To fulfil national 
territorial tasks, the Joint Support Service has a territorial organisational struc-
ture, based on military districts, that includes four military districts. 
In a disaster scenario prompted by a power blackout, the Armed Forces Support 
Command (SKUKdo) could be the national joint operations command for the 
Bundeswehr forces deployed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny. The Regional Command (LKdo) that advises the Land governments in mat-
ters relating to disaster control works in the crisis unit of the federal state affect-
ed by the disaster. Liaison commands exist at the subordinate echelons (adminis-
trative regions, counties and county boroughs) within the framework of civil-
military cooperation.21 These commands communicate with authorities and or-
ganisations concerning possible assistance by the Federal Armed Forces. They 
are manned only by regionally based reservists who can be called up immediate-
ly in the case of a mission. When not involved with missions, the head of a liai-
son command also acts as contact person for the local authorities on matters 
relating to disaster control. This concept creates a »geographical congruence of 
civil and military structures« (Lüder 2009, p. 144). 
The Federal Armed Forces only provide assistance following a request by the 
competent civil authorities. The higher command authorities (Armed Forces 
Support Command (SKUKdo), Military District Command (WBK)) decide on 
the type and extent of support, in consultation with the management commands 
of the organisational sectors planned for the mission. At the operations site, the 
Federal Armed Forces teams report to the competent WBK commander regard-
                                            
21 31 district and 426 county liaison commands have been established with around 5,500 
reservists (BBK 2008a, p. 33). 
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ing fulfilment of their duties. The officer with responsibility for local operations 
takes instructions from the competent (civil) disaster control authority. The 
length of the operations by the Federal Armed Forces is limited to the time for 
which no other adequate operations and assistance teams are available (BMVg 
2008). 
FIRE SERVICES 
Fire services comprise professional fire brigades, voluntary fire brigades and 
works fire brigades. They cover the largest area of all emergency response organ-
isations. The voluntary fire brigade alone had around 1,039,000 active members 
in 2007 (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 NUMBER OF FIRE BRIGADES IN GERMANY AND THEIR MEMBERS (2007) 






Fire brigades 100 24,410 982 
Members 27,816 1,039,737 32,752 
Source: Deutscher Feuerwehrverband 2009 
Much of the fire services’ equipment is geared to the requirements of disaster 
control. They have key material resources in the form of vehicles, rescue equip-
ment and communications facilities to ensure they can carry out operations at 
local level even in difficult conditions. However, some complaints are voiced 
that insufficient investment by those responsible for fire protection means the 
material equipment of some fire brigades is still inadequate (Rechenbach 2005, 
p. 162). Out-dated equipment and long response times make it more difficult to 
accomplish tasks effectively. 
It is said that to date, the system of crisis management in Germany as described 
above has »never reached its limits« (Unger 2008, p. 100). The two following 
chapters (Chapters III and IV) aim to examine, as far as possible, if this would 
also apply in the event of a prolonged and widespread power blackout. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND 
WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT III. 
INTRODUCTION 1. 
The main aim of the TAB project was to analyse the vulnerability of critical in-
frastructures in the event of a prolonged power blackout affecting several federal 
Länder. This was done by conducting consequence analyses of selected critical 
infrastructure sectors (see Chapter I.3 for a discussion of the selection process 
and associated reasons). Some hypotheses are developed concerning possible 
attitudes and patterns of behaviour by the population affected by the blackout. 
The findings are documented in this chapter (Chapter III.2 and III.3). This is 
preceded by comments on the possibility and likelihood of a prolonged power 
blackout extending across regions and also on the costs of such a blackout 
(Chapter III.1.1 and III.1.2). 
COMMENTS ON THE CAUSES OF A PROLONGED AND 
WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT 1.1 
The stipulated aim of the TAB project was to study the »consequences« of a 
prolonged and widespread power blackout – not its causes. Despite this re-
striction, possible causes and probabilities of such a blackout occurring22 were 
examined in order to clarify whether such a serious power blackout as assumed 
in the TAB’s mandate could actually occur. 
So what are the possible and plausible causes? The list of possible threats caused 
by either nature or human beings is long, but not all result in a prolonged power 
blackout. Reichenbach et al. (2008, p. 20 ff.) list some of the causes as technical 
and/or human failure, criminal or terrorist acts, an epidemic/pandemic or climat-
ic events such as storms, snow and ice or floods. 
> Technical/human failure could result in serious disruptions to network man-
agement and network control processes. 
> An organised criminal act results in significant damage to technical infrastruc-
tures within the distribution network. 
> A serious natural event (heavy rain with flooding, storms, heavy snow, ice 
storms) could result in an extensive power blackout. 
> A pandemic results in a large number of people falling ill; employees remain 
at home to look after their relatives. This could also result in a prolonged 
power blackout. 
                                            
22 BMI/BBK (2007) identified up to 300 possible threats as potential causes. 
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As well as being perfectly plausible in terms of current framework conditions for 
power generation and supply, this risk assessment is also relevant for any future 
changes. These include the following developments, among others (BMI/BBK 
2007, p. 92 f.) 
> An increase in decentralised, stochastic current feed in connection with an 
expansion of commercial activities increases the risk of network failure and 
higher blackout rates. 
> Germany could increasingly become a target for attack by terrorist groups 
planning a well-prepared attack on power supply facilities. 
> Climate change could result in more and more severe extreme weather events. 
Overall, there are good grounds for assuming that the likelihood of a power 
blackout will increase in future (BMI/BBK 2007, p. 180). 
However, given the current framework conditions and structures for the electric-
ity supply system and also the relatively high resilience of the overall system, it 
can be assumed that a prolonged and interregional power blackout would re-
quire the physical destruction of key components that are difficult to replace in 
several power stations (e.g. the turbine generator set) or in the transport net-
work (e.g. transformers) (Prognos 2009, p. 7). Even when considered from the 
point of view of the power supply companies, »several very specific elements 
would have to malfunction or be destroyed« in order to lead to substantial or 
even catastrophic damage (BMI/BBK 2007, p. 94 and 178). 
A fictitious but sufficiently plausible causal scenario is provided for illustration 
purposes: As a result of targeted, surprise campaigns, a fire starts simultaneously 
in the generator transformer23 of several power stations in Germany; numerous 
transformers are destroyed and rendered unusable.24 This triggers a power fail-
ure across large parts of Germany. After around 24 hours the relevant persons 
with responsibility at local level and in the central crisis units of the utility com-
panies and also the authorities25 become aware that the power blackout could 
last a few weeks.26 
                                            
23 A generator transformer forms part of a power station and transforms the voltage cre-
ated in the electrical generator into high voltage, which is then fed into the grid by 
means of trunk lines. The transformers are generally located in the outer section of a 
power plant. 
24 Among the »critical elements« that could seriously jeopardise the electricity industry, 
the joint report by the BMI/BBK (2007, p. 78) mentions the simultaneous failure of 
»several large power stations«. 
25 In such a situation, responsibility for managing the risks resulting from the specified 
activities initially lies with the police and fire service until a disaster is pronounced; 
thereafter, the disaster control authorities are responsible. However, in cases such as 
this, these players from non-police emergency response organisations will work closely 
with the police (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 128 f.). 
26 The exercise for LÜKEX 2004 was based on a power blackout affecting the regions of 
the federal states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg and lasting for several weeks 
(Grambs et al. 2006). 
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For the purposes of the consequence analyses, no further framework conditions 
are defined regarding the details of the power blackout. However, some of the 
sector analyses do examine specific parameters of the event context where this is 
relevant for a differentiated assessment of the situation or for an appraisal of 
events and measures. This applies, for example, to contextual factors such as the 
time of day (whether the blackout occurred during the day or night), the time of 
year (summer or winter) and regional peculiarities (rural areas, densely populat-
ed areas, topography). 
COSTS 1.2 
Experience of previous national and international power blackouts reveals that a 
prolonged power blackout entails significant costs. These are incurred as a result 
of primary damage to people and property and also as a result of additional 
commercial and economic consequential damage arising due to delays and 
breakdowns in services and within manufacturing. These will extend far beyond 
the actual damaging event. 
However, the damage caused by a blackout is difficult to assess in economic 
terms. For example, a number of factors determine the amount of costs incurred 
as a result of a power blackout. According to Böske (207, p. 46 ff.), the follow-
ing factors determine the amount of the costs associated with a power blackout: 
> Type and extent of consumer groups affected (e.g. households or industry), 
> Frequency and predictability of power blackouts, 
> Duration of the power blackout 
> Extent of the power failure, 
> Regional conditions (e.g. climate, structure of industry), 
> Timing of the blackout (e.g. day or night, summer or winter), 
> Source of the blackout (e.g. a power station or the distribution network). 
However, customary methods only consider some of these parameters. The price 
per kilowatt hour that cannot be supplied is often used as a monetary measure of 
the damage caused by a power blackout (Bliem 2005, p. 6; Böske 2007, p. 45). 
The costs incurred on the generator side are the direct consequence of damage to 
technical equipment and of the amount of electricity that can’t be sold as a result. 
By contrast, costs incurred by consumers are significantly more difficult to quanti-
fy because only some of these costs are incurred as a direct result of the inability 
to supply a quantity of electricity. For example, households incur direct costs 
through damage to equipment and electrical devices and as a result of goods per-
ishing. Non-monetary costs are also incurred through the loss of leisure time. 
Companies incur financial losses due to the interruption to the value creation pro-
cess (Bliem 2005, p. 7 and 8; Bothe/Riechmann 2008, p. 32 and 34). 
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Various methods are used to estimate the costs of a power blackout: 
> Blackout studies determine costs following a power blackout by assessing the 
monetary value of all effects and adding these together. However, focussing 
on one case study makes it difficult to generalise and transfer the findings. 
> Macroeconomic methods use statistical data to make highly simplified as-
sumptions on the costs of lost production and reduced leisure value as a result 
of the blackout. However, direct damage (e.g. to facilities) is not considered. 
> Surveys based on questionnaires or interviews are designed to determine the 
willingness of end consumers to pay to avoid a power blackout (e.g. Carlsson 
et al. 2009). Other surveys consider the compensation requirements of end 
consumers in the event of a disruption to supplies. Disadvantages of such 
methods include the difficulties encountered by end consumers in quantifying 
possible damage and in the response behaviour of those surveyed (Bliem 
2005, p. 6; Böske 2007, p. 45; Bothe/Riechmann 2008, p. 34). 
Previous studies on real or notional power blackouts are generally based on one 
of the above methods and have, for example, arrived at the following assessments: 
> On 14 August 2003 a power blackout in North America spread over eight 
states of the USA and parts of Canada, affected over 50 million people and 
lasted for up to 3 days (Public Safety Canada 2006). The financial conse-
quences were determined by a study based on a survey of end consumers’ 
willingness to pay to avoid a power blackout. The willingness to pay was put 
at one hundred times the price of 1 kWh of electricity. Multiplying this figure 
with the number of people affected and the average length of the blackout 
gave an amount of between 6.8 and 10.3 billion US dollars (ICF Consulting 
2003, p. 2). A blackout study that estimates the costs at 4.5 to 8.2 billion 
US dollars arrived at a similar result (Anderson/Geckil 2003, p. 3).27 
> A macroeconomic analysis was conducted to assess the costs of a possible 
power blackout in Austria. This study calculated the value of a kilowatt hour 
of electricity not supplied by creating a relationship between electricity con-
sumption and value creation, with work time and leisure time considered on 
an equal basis. This produced a value of 8.6 euros per kilowatt hour of elec-
tricity not supplied. Based on this, the cost of a one-hour power blackout in 
Austria was calculated as between 40.6 and 60.1 million euros depending on 
the time of day and the day of the week when a blackout occurs (Bliem 2005, 
p. 2, 7 and 17). 
                                            
27 The derived values are not, however, conclusive and some values differ from those used 
in the calculation. Even without taking additional costs into account, the loss of income 
(set at 4.2 billion US dollars) and the damage to power companies’ equipment (estimat-
ed as at least 1 billion US dollars) exceed the minimum estimate (Anderson/Geckil 
2003, p. 2 ff.). 
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> The economic consequences of a power blackout in Germany have also been 
calculated in a meta study. This study derived the costs of a power blackout 
from 25 international studies, taking into account the current intensity within 
German industry. According to this study, each kilowatt hour lost results in 
costs of 8 to 16 euros. Transferred to a scenario involving a one-hour power 
blackout across Germany on a working day in winter, this would result in 
economic damage of between 0.6 and 1.3 billion euros (Bothe/Riechmann 
2008, p. 33 and 35).28 
Information such as this and previous studies into the costs of a power blackout 
provide an indication of the significant monetary damage that can ensue follow-
ing a power blackout (e.g. Silvast/Kaplinsky 2007, p. 32 f.). It can be assumed 
that a scenario of a power blackout lasting several weeks with a number of sec-
ondary consequences and effects on other critical infrastructures is likely to en-
tail additional direct costs; these would probably rise exponentially after a short 
time (Steetskamp/van Wijk 1994, p. 8). Later costs of rectifying damage and 
successive re-commissioning of all processes within industry and society must 
also be taken into account. Also, it is important not to overlook intangible dam-
age such as the public’s loss of confidence in the power supply companies or in 
the authorities. 
Looking beyond economic aspects, however, it is also necessary to consider the 
social costs of a power blackout that brings disastrous consequences. These in-
clude a failure of the political/administrative system and a collapse of social organ-
isation and solidarity  if the disaster cannot be managed as a »blatant form of 
social change« (Clausen 2008, p. 15). 
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 2. 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the consequence analyses for 
seven critical infrastructure sectors. The sectors considered included three »basic 
technical infrastructures« of »information technology and telecommunications«, 
»transport and traffic«, also »water supply and wastewater disposal«, along 
with four »socio-economic service infrastructures« of »food supply«, »health«, 
»financial services« and a case study on »prisons« (BMI 2009, p. 8) (Figure 8). 
                                            
28 Information on costs can also be found in numerous other sources: According to the 
»Green Paper«, the power blackout in the Münsterland region that lasted for several 
days in 2005 caused damage amounting to around 130 million euros. However, no de-
tails are provided on how this amount was determined (Reichenbach et al. 2008, p. 19). 
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FIGURE 8 SECTORS AND CHALLENGES EXAMINED 
 
Own image 
In a disaster situation such as a prolonged power blackout spanning several re-
gions, the degree of vulnerability and level of resilience of critical infrastructures 
is ascertained by whether people’s elementary needs such as food and drink can 
be satisfied, whether necessary medical care and a minimum standard of hygiene 
can be ensured, and also whether at least rudimentary options in terms of mobil-
ity, paying for essential purchases or services and – very importantly – in terms 
of information and communications can be established (Chapter III.2.1 to 
III.2.6). Finally, public institutions and buildings and their functions within the 
community are jeopardised. For example, if it is not possible to guarantee a 
comprehensive level of public safety and security, people’s confidence in the 
state and its organs would be shaken to the core. In this context, the report ex-
amines the case study of »prisons« (Chapter III.2.7). 
As a supplement to these analyses, the report discusses the question of how indi-
viduals and groups would behave in the event of a (prolonged) power blackout. 
Since there is hardly any scientific literature on the subject, the report develops 
and discusses hypotheses; in some cases this is done by drawing on findings on 
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The individual sector analyses have a largely identical structure. Following an 
introductory outline of the sector’s structural and legal characteristics, the report 
presents the consequences and chains of consequences that could follow as a 
result of a power blackout. 
This presentation of the consequences is largely based on time segments (e.g. 0 
to 2, 2 to 8, 8 to 24 hours). It generally covers a maximum period of 8 to 
10 days and in some cases looks forward to the second week following the 
blackout. The analysis ends at this point because the accumulation of internal 
problems combined with the consequences of breakdowns in interdependent sec-
tors has already led to a catastrophic situation. 
Using a narrative form in some cases (as in the case of the transport sector and 
the supply of food and health provision), examples are provided showing possi-
ble consequences and secondary consequences. Other configurations and effects 
are equally possible and their probability and plausibility need to be considered. 
The course of the presentation follows one strand and therefore provides only a 
snapshot of the area under consideration, i.e. the report does not endeavour to 
offer a systematic or complete approach. 
This method is designed to encourage an insight into various aspects: What are 
the structures of the sector in question? What players are involved and who are 
the people affected? What processes are conceivable and possible? Where do re-
sponsibilities lie? What laws, statutory instruments and plans are used as a basis 
for action? Which resources are available for disaster management (and which 
are not available)? What about the resilience of the individual sectors? Gaining 
insights also means identifying gaps in information and areas where knowledge 
is lacking and also noting these if they cannot be remedied. This was often the 
case. At this point it should therefore be emphasised that some of the results of 
the sector analyses do harbour major uncertainties. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2.1 
As in many other countries (Schulze 2006, p. 114), information technology (IT) 
and telecommunications (TC) are considered critical infrastructures. According 
to the BSI, both the IT/TC sector in itself (the major IT/TC networks with their 
components and operators) and also the IT/TC-based infrastructures of other 
sectors represent critical information infrastructures: »Information technology 
and telecommunications form a separate infrastructure sector but also describe a 
transverse infrastructure on which all other sectors depend.« (BSI n.d.) The 
structures, networks and components of the sector enable location-independent 
communication, fast data transmission and also process control and optimisa-
tion. The most important means for transmitting information include fixed-
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network telephony, two-way radio, radio broadcasting, mobile telephony ser-
vices and the Internet (BSI, n.d.). 
To start with, the following section examines some structural characteristics of 
the »information technology and telecommunications« sector. This is followed 
by statements on the legal bases and political responsibilities. Following this 
there is a discussion on whether the information technology and telecommunica-
tions sector constitutes a special infrastructure. Finally, the knowledge on the 
consequences of a widespread and prolonged power blackout for information 
technology and telecommunications is examined. The chapter ends with a con-
clusion. All statements apply to use by private individuals. The framework con-
ditions and technologies applicable to the authorities and also to emergency and 
support forces are considered in Chapter IV.1. 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 2.1.1 
Different approaches can be used when determining the structure of this sector; 
these include hardware and software or data and media types. 
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
Technically speaking, the IT infrastructure (Patig 2009) comprises hardware and 
software and also the structural facilities for their operation. With hardware, it 
is important to distinguish between computing and storage technology, network 
technology, peripheral devices or terminal equipment and also the equipment for 
operating the hardware. 
It is necessary to differentiate the field of (telecommunications) network tech-
nology still further in order to consider its susceptibility to breakdown/the con-
sequences of breakdowns. In extremely simplified terms, it is possible to distin-
guish between international and national wide area networks (backbone net-
works) and access networks. Often, there are more than these two levels of net-
work hierarchies – access network and wide area network – that need to interact 
and between which relevant switching nodes exist. 
It is also important to remember that data centres are needed to enable the use 
of communications services; these are required not only for processing the rele-
vant communications service but also for purposes relating to, for example, ac-
cess authorities and usage tracking for billing purposes. 
Switching and transmission can be either cable-based (e.g. in the case of fixed-
network telephony) or cable-free (e.g. mobile telephony, directional radio, data 
transmission via satellite). Both transmission methods – which can also be fur-
ther differentiated – are not fully distinct from one other; in some cases they are 
used in combination depending on access and network level. 
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DATA AND MEDIA TYPES 
The information technology and telecommunications services sector can also be 
structured according to data or media type. A distinction is made between voice 
and data services. Data services are divided into texts, static (graphics, photos) 
and dynamic (music, sound, film, animation) media and also data and software. 
The move towards general digitalisation means these previously very strict dis-
tinctions are now much softer. In principle, all information technology and tele-
communications infrastructures (including the Internet) are able to transmit eve-
ry (digitalised) media format. However, the trend towards convergence has not 
progressed to such an extent that it is no longer possible to distinguish dominant 
contours. 
Figure 9, which shows the sub-sectors of the information technology and tele-
communications sector that are considered in further detail in the remainder of 
this chapter, is based on traditional distinctions and does not generally consider 
the overlaps at service level (»convergence«). 
FIGURE 9 STRUCTURES OF THE »INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR« 
 
Own image 
LEGAL BASES AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1.2 
LEGAL BASES 2.1.2.1 
Article 87 f [1] of the Basic Law stipulates that in the field of postal services and 
telecommunications, the Federation must guarantee appropriate and adequate 
services across Germany. It is argued that from these basic rights, it can be in-
ferred that the state must also ensure that people can make use of the basic 
rights. However, since this also largely depends on functional critical infrastruc-
tures, it also becomes evident that the state has an obligation to protect these 
infrastructures (BSI 2005, p. 7 f.) 
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At the level of ordinary law, the first act to mention is the Telecommunications 
Act (TKG). Part VII places special emphasis on preventive obligations on the 
part of operators (e.g. to guarantee emergency phone calls) (Section 108) or as 
regards providing technical protective measures (Section 109 [2]). According to 
these provisions, suppliers who provide telecommunications services for the pub-
lic must »take appropriate technical precautions or other measures to protect 
against breakdowns that cause significant disruption to telecommunications 
networks and to protect against external attacks and the effects of disasters«. 
In addition, the Law Concerning the Transformation of the Deutsche Bun-
despost Enterprises into the Legal Structure of Stock Corporation (PTSG), the 
Ordinance ensuring the Provision of Telecommunications Services (TKSiV) and 
the Ordinance on Civil Protection for Post and Telecommunications Services 
(PTZSV) are also of relevance for managing the consequences of a significant 
disruption to telecommunications. 
The aim of the PTSG is to »ensure the adequate provision of postal and tele-
communications services in the event of a natural disaster or a particularly grave 
accident, within the context of emergency response on the basis of international 
agreements, within the context of cooperation with the United Nations, within 
the framework of alliance commitments and when a state of tension/defence 
exists.« The Act29 applies to the former state-owned enterprises Deutsche Post 
AG and Deutsche Telekom AG and to other companies within this sector (Sec-
tion 2). Among other things, the Act provides for statutory instruments or or-
ders by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) to ensure 
priority access for certain administrative authorities (Section 3 [3]), obligations 
concerning the provision of information (Section 4), participation in contingency 
planning (Section 5), participation in working groups and participation in exer-
cises (Section 6). 
The two aforementioned ordinances provide firmer details for these statutory reg-
ulations. For example, in Section 2, the TKSiV states the minimum level of tele-
communications services that must be guaranteed in the event of a crisis or disas-
ter. This includes: 
1. Switched telephone service connections, including mobile telephone service, 
2. Switched connections in the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) 
3. Establishment of telephone connections including wireless telephone connec-
tions, 
4. Establishment of ISDN basic rate connections, 
                                            
29 In October 2010 the Federal Government submitted a Draft Act on Re-regulation of the 
Post and Telecommunications Safeguarding Law and Amendment of Provisions Relat-
ing to Telecommunications Law (Bundesregierung 2010). Among other things, the Act 
aims to place greater emphasis on cases involving major disruptions to supplies.  
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5. Establishment of fixed connections (analogue, 64 kbit/s, 2 Mbit/s), 
6. Establishment of transmission paths for transmitting sound and television 
signals and 
7. Clearing faults in the telecommunications services listed under 3 to 6 above. 
The administrative authorities who must be guaranteed priority access to tele-
communications services include the following (Section 4): 
> Federal authorities, 
> Land, county and municipal authorities, 
> Disaster control and civil protection organisations, 
> Administrative authorities in the health sector, 
> Emergency and rescue services 
> Offices of the Federal Armed Forces and of forces stationed in Germany, 
> Press and broadcasting operators, 
> Public telephone system service providers, 
> Operators of telecommunications facilities, where this is required for fulfilling 
the obligation pursuant to Sections 2 and 3, and 
> Suppliers of telecommunications services, where this is required for fulfilling 
the obligation pursuant to Sections 2 and 3. 
In addition, emergency numbers of public telephone services must be accessible 
to everyone without restrictions (Section 4 [2]). 
The Law Concerning Amateur Radio Service (AfuG) also deserves mention here. 
Section 2 defines an amateur radio service as a radio service that can be used, 
among other things, to support assistance measures in emergency and disaster 
situations. Section 5 expressly provides for an exemption to the ban on transmit-
ting messages to third parties (who are not amateur radio enthusiasts) in emer-
gency and disaster situations. This does not infer the possible use of amateur 
radio by the state in the event of a crisis; however, the more general standard of 
Section 323 c of the Penal Code (failure to provide assistance) could apply in 
such cases and justify an obligation for amateur radio enthusiasts to provide 
communicative assistance in a disaster situation. 
BSI (2005, p. 33) makes a critical observation that although relatively detailed 
and differentiated regulations exist concerning protection against conventional 
threats in the field of telecommunications, protection against IT-specific threats 
(»cyber-attacks«) is only regulated on a very generalised basis. Moreover, it is 
argued that there is a total absence of corresponding statutory obligations on 
operators in the field of telemedia and multimedia services. This is considered 
particularly problematic for the domain name system, which is a key placement 
service for the Internet; this is because for the Internet, smooth functioning of 
the domain name system is equally as important as the integrity of the telecom-
munications infrastructure. 
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An additional point of criticism concerning the existing legal contingency 
measures is that current laws and ordinances do not give sufficient consideration 
to a scenario involving a prolonged and widespread power blackout. The statu-
tory requirements for crisis prevention are so generalised and unspecific that it is 
not possible to derive any specific requirements for such an emergency. 
POLITICAL MEASURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1.2.2 
The Inter-ministerial Working Group on Critical Infrastructures (AG KRITIS) 
was established on the initiative of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in 1997.30 
Even after this working group was disbanded in the year 2000, the Federal Min-
istry of the Interior remained responsible for the protection of critical infrastruc-
tures. 
At the same time as the AG KRITIS was formed, a Critical Infrastructures Divi-
sion was established within the BSI. One of this division’s tasks was to carry out 
preliminary work for the AG KRITIS and in 2002 it submitted a series of studies 
on individual critical infrastructure sectors; these studies are not, however, avail-
able to the general public. Among other things, the division analyses the criticali-
ty of the different infrastructure sectors – mainly in terms of IT security. Another 
key area of its work involves cooperation with both industry and science. Fol-
lowing reorganisation of the BSI in 2005, a separate research section Security in 
Critical Infrastructures and in the Internet was established; this has both techni-
cally oriented divisions such as the Computer Emergency Response Team of the 
Federal Administration (CERT-Bund) and also a Critical Infrastructures Divi-
sion, which deals more with policy and strategy. 
Following the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, the Critical Infrastructures 
Project Group (PG KRITIS) was established in 2002. The Group included sever-
al divisions of the BMI and also representatives from the BSI, the BBK/its prede-
cessor organisations, the BKA and the THW. The project group was tasked with 
coordinating activities for the protection of critical infrastructures and of prepar-
ing an integrated national concept. 
In 2005 two political documents were published, each under the aegis of the 
BMI; these pooled previous activities and provided a basis for future work. 
These documents were the National Plan for the Protection of Information In-
frastructures (NPSI) and the Baseline Protection Concept for the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures (BMI 2005b and c). While the Baseline Protection Con-
cept does not have a specific IT focus and primarily aims to serve as a tool for 
                                            
30 The following discussion is based on Schulze (2006, p. 155 ff., 185 f., 205 ff.). In this 
context, it is also worth mentioning the fourth report of the Study Commission of the 
German Bundestag on the »Future of the Media in the Economy and Society – Germa-
ny on the Way to the Information Society« (Enquete-Kommission 1998), which also 
addressed the issue of the IT security of infrastructures.  
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heightening the awareness of private commercial operators of critical infrastruc-
tures with regard to the subject and for adopting necessary measures, the NPSI’s 
main focus is on the security of the information infrastructure. Around this time 
the Project Group on Communication and Security (PK KS) was also set up 
within the BMI (Helmbrecht 2006, slide 6); this project group replaced the PG 
KRITIS. The Baseline Protection Concept was updated and enhanced in 2008 
(BMI 2008). It is designed as a guideline for the operators of critical infrastruc-
tures (either private enterprises or authorities), and provides assistance in the 
development and enhancement of their respective risk and crisis management 
systems. 
The Federal Cabinet adopted two implementation plans in relation to the NPSI 
in 2007. The first plan was an internal IT security guideline for the Federal Ad-
ministration entitled Implementation Plan for Ensuring IT Security in the Federal 
Administration (UP Bund), while the second one was the Implementation Plan 
for Critical Infrastructures (UP-KRITIS) (BMI 2007), which sets forth security 
objectives and other steps in cooperation with industry. Among other things, 
four working groups dealing with emergency and crisis exercises, crisis response 
and management, maintenance of critical infrastructure services and national 
and international cooperation were established; some of these working groups 
have already submitted reports. 
In accordance with the TKG and PTSG, the Federal Network Agency assumes 
certain tasks pertaining to the resilience of the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture; these tasks are undertaken within the framework of the Emergency Services 
Access Ordinance (NotrufV) based on Section 108 of the Telecommunications 
Act (TKG) or with regard to registering authorised parties within the telecom-
munications and post sector on the basis of the TKSiV (Bundesnetzagentur 2008 
and 2010a). The Federal Network Agency does not appear to deal with any po-
litical/strategic aspects of critical infrastructures. 
A SPECIAL INFRASTRUCTURE? 2.1.3 
The following section first examines the special characteristics of the »infor-
mation technology and telecommunications sector« on a generalised level. Chap-
ter III.2.1.4 then considers the consequences of a prolonged and widespread 
power blackout in its individual sub-sectors. 
In particular, the »IT/TC« sector differs from other infrastructures due to the 
following factors: 
> (almost) 100 % reliance on electricity, 
> extensive interdependencies with almost all other critical infrastructures and 
> a high level of criticality. 
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With regard to the sector’s framework conditions, it is important to mention: 
> convergence 
> far-reaching changes in underlying socio-economic conditions and 
> fast-moving innovation. 
RELIANCE ON ELECTRICITY AND INTERDEPENDENCIES 2.1.3.1 
It is impossible to imagine information technology and telecommunications 
without a power supply. Although the other infrastructure sectors examined as 
part of the TAB project rely on a power supply, they do not depend on it to such 
a high degree. During a power blackout a doctor may not be able to read health 
fund chip cards within his surgery, operate the surgery’s computer or take any 
X-rays. In many cases, however, he can still examine patients, make diagnoses 
and suggest treatments even if no power supply is available. Similarly, emergen-
cy wells can be used to maintain a limited water supply if the power supply fails 
(even if the electrical pumping systems are no longer able to produce the re-
quired water pressure in the water supply network). With the transport system, 
electrically-driven rail transport stops working, but petrol and diesel-driven traf-
fic or cycle traffic still enable the population to remain mobile. 
By contrast, computer-based information processing and electronic communica-
tions (as, for example, in the case of radio, television, telephone, the Internet) are 
not possible without a power supply. Certain alternatives such as personal and 
direct conversations, pagers or written notices can be used. However, these sub-
stitutes obviously cannot ensure synchronous and direct remote communication 
or indeed prompt communication to the masses. 
As revealed by the dependence analyses conducted by the Swiss Federal Office 
for Civil Protection (BABS 2009, p. 10), a total failure of the power supply sub-
sector that lasted for 3 weeks would lead to »extremely major« (the maximum 
possible rating) consequences for all sub-sectors of the information and commu-
nications technologies sector (ICT) (i.e. telecommunications, the Internet, in-
strumentation, automation and surveillance systems as well as broadcasting and 
media) (Table 2). 
However, the »information technology and telecommunications« sector’s de-
pendence on the power supply is not unilateral, but mutual. The power supply 
system itself (along with other critical infrastructures) also relies on functioning 
information and communications systems. As revealed by the analyses conduct-
ed in Switzerland by BABS (2009, p. 10), the sub-sectors of telecommunications 
and surveillance systems have a »major« direct impact on the power supply sub-
sector (rated »2« on a scale of 0 to 3). Following behind the power supply sub-
sector with 68 points, the sub-sectors of telecommunications and information 
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systems and networks (each with 45 points out of a possible 93) have the highest 
direct impact on all other sub-sectors of Swiss critical infrastructures.31 
TABLE 2 DEPENDENCIES OF THE SUB-SECTORS 





networks Impact on sub-sector  
Power supply – 2 1 
Telecommunications 3 – 3 
Information systems and networks  3 2 – 
Internet 3 3 3 
Instrumentation, automation and 
surveillance systems 
3 3 3 
Broadcasting and media 3 2 3 
on all 31 sub-sectors 68 45 45 
The dependencies of the 31 sub-sectors on each other were rated on a four-stage scale 
from 0 (no impact) to 3 (very major impact) – assuming a total power blackout lasting for 
3 weeks and affecting the whole of Switzerland. 
Source: BABS 2009, p. 10, extract from Figure 4 
CRITICALITY 2.1.3.2 
The criticality of a critical infrastructure refers to its importance in terms of the 
consequences that breakdowns, loss of functions or destruction have for the safe 
supplying of society with important goods and services. BABS (2009, p. 8 f.) 
rated (relative) criticality in three dimensions: effects on other sub-sectors (de-
pendencies), effects on the population and effects on the economy. Thus, while 
including the dependencies outlined in Chapter III.2.1.3.1, it also extends be-
yond these. The analysis is again based on a four-stage scale from 0 (no impact) 
to 4 (major impact). 
                                            
31 An interesting attempt to model such multifarious, complex dependencies between criti-
cal infrastructures and to record these dependencies on an empirical basis was presented 
by Chang et al. (2007). Using the example of the ice storm in Canada in 1998 and the 
associated power blackout that lasted for several weeks in some regions, they examined 
the effects and interactions on the different infrastructure sectors. The empirical anal-
yses aimed to ascertain the degree to which society was affected in individual areas. In 
terms of »impact« (duration and intensity of the consequences), the disruptions to the 
telecommunications sector tended to reveal low to average index values, while very high 
index values were recorded as regards »extent« (size of the area affected and degree to 
which the population was affected) (Chang et al. 2007, p. 356). 
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Here, too, three of five sub-sectors were given the highest criticality ratings: Tel-
ecommunications received the maximum possible rating of 9, while information 
systems and networks and also the Internet each received a rating of 7. Only 
three other sectors (out of a total of 31) received similarly high criticality ratings; 
these were the power supply (9), road transport (8) and banks (7). 
CONVERGENCE 2.1.3.3 
Technological development over the last 50 years has often been described as 
convergence and has resulted in many overlaps between what were, previously, 
largely separate communications systems. This applies in particular to telepho-
ny, data communications and radio broadcasting. It is no longer possible to as-
sign a network infrastructure to a specific service. 
For many years, a broadband cable connection could only be used to dissemi-
nate television and radio; now, however, this technology can also be used for 
telephony and data communications via the Internet. To give a second example, 
modern transmission technologies now allow broadband Internet and even tele-
vision transmissions via what were previously narrowband telephone cables. On 
the one hand, this extensive intermeshing of systems creates greater complexity 
with more operators and thus increased vulnerability in terms of breakdown. 
However, it also offers greater variability in terms of usage, which at the same 
time leads to greater service reliability because in principle, more alternative 
technical options are available for using a service. If the fixed network telephone 
system fails, it is conceivable that mobile telephones or Internet telephony (e.g. 
Voice over IP, VoIP) could be used instead. Further studies are needed to exam-
ine where this »convergence« ultimately leads to a merging of the separate sys-
tems and thus to new »bottlenecks« and »points of contact«. 
PRIVATISATION, DEREGULATION, LIBERALISATION 2.1.3.4 
Alongside the increasing convergence due to extensive digitalisation, this sector 
has also experienced political and economic changes in terms of privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalisation. 
As part of the second reform of postal services, the telecommunications branch 
of Deutsche Bundespost was privatised in 1994 and floated on the stock ex-
change in 1996; the Telecommunications Act (TKG) of 1996 abolished the mo-
nopoly for telecommunications services, especially fixed-network telephony. 
Today, there are almost 3,000 telecommunications suppliers (status: 19 May 
2010, Bundesnetzagentur 2010b) compared with only one state-owned monopo-
list 20 years ago. Up to the 1980s, radio broadcasting only boasted the public 
broadcasting stations of ARD, ZDF and Deutschlandfunk. The cable pilot pro-
ject in Ludwigshafen in 1984 marked the starting point for the registration of 
private television broadcasters in Germany; these were followed by private radio 
broadcasters in 1986. The Working Committee of Land Media Organisations 
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(ALM) today estimates there are around 450 private and public-law television 
channels (status: November 2009; ALM 2009) and 223 private radio services 
(status: 2006; ALM n.d.). 
The consequences of these far-reaching changes are more problematic in terms 
of critical infrastructures because the privatisation of previously state-owned 
sectors/the expansion of a private sector makes it more difficult for the state to 
stipulate direct requirements in terms of contingency measures for a crisis sce-
nario. Even if there is voluntary cooperation between the state and industry, 
which is an important component of the government’s policy on protecting criti-
cal infrastructures (BMI 2005b, p. 8; BMI 2009, p. 3), it makes a difference 
whether such contingency measures have to be agreed and implemented with 
just a few companies or with several hundred companies.32 
PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 2.1.3.5 
Information and telecommunications technology tends to be characterised by 
rapid technological innovation. This also affects the degree to which this sector 
depends on the power supply. Consider, for example, the degree to which the 
development of more efficient batteries has made mobile phones and laptops less 
dependent on a grid-based power supply. Also of relevance in this connection 
are the discussions on increased demand for electricity due to the use of infor-
mation technology (Baer et al. 2002), on energy-efficient information technology 
(»green IT«) and on possibilities for a decentralised, network-independent au-
tonomous energy supply for information technology and telecommunications 
(e.g. by locally generated solar power or fuel cells). 
> Initially, however, advances in digital technology have increased dependence 
on the power supply: whereas an analogue telephone could still be used via 
the analogue subscriber’s fixed-line telephone network terminal even if the 
domestic power supply had failed, the same only applies to a limited degree 
to digital ISDN connections and end terminals. The increasingly popular tele-
phone connections via VoIP modems or DSL routers only work if the power 
supply is functioning (Chapter III.2.1.4.2). 
> The increase in interconnection points – a new level in the network hierarchy 
between feeder distribution interface and house connection – as part of the 
expansion of the DSL network is also problematic because these points rely 
on a power supply. If a power blackout strikes and these points don’t have an 
emergency power supply, the customers who were connected to them would 
                                            
32 On the other hand, the various competing companies offer similar services, meaning 
that where applicable, users can select the supplier whom he knows is particularly well 
prepared for power blackouts because of the contingency measures adopted. However, 
this would require suppliers to publicise their contingency measures; this has not been 
the case to date. 
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immediately lose their telephone and Internet connection.33 This does not af-
fect the continuing dependence of the local switching exchange on a power 
supply/emergency power supply. 
> Developing telecommunications systems into the Next Generation Network 
(NGN) is also considered critical. This technology places greater emphasis on 
»switching-oriented intelligence in end devices at the margins of the network«, 
which rely on a power supply. Subscriber terminals that rely on glass fibre 
technology also require an external power feed (Fickert/Malleck 2008, p. 276). 
CONSEQUENCES 2.1.4 
As far as could be ascertained, there are no current, systematic and scientifically-
backed data surveys on the possible consequences of a power blackout for the 
»information technology and telecommunications« sector. The available budget 
meant it was only possible to conduct limited original research and surveys 
among information technology service providers, telecommunications suppliers 
and other relevant experts. Based on the expert reports produced for the TAB 
and on other sources, the following section collates, systematises and analyses 
the available knowledge. 
The sources used also include individual case studies of past power blackouts. 
Such analyses exist for the widespread power blackout on the east coast of 
North America that lasted for several days in 200334; these are considered at the 
start of this chapter (Chapter III.2.1.4.1) before moving on to an outline of the 
possible consequences of an extensive power blackout for the sub-sectors within 
the »IT/TC« sector. 
Since the sector is almost entirely reliant on a power supply, the presentation of 
the consequences differs from that used for other sectors: Information processing 
and telecommunications continue to function for as long as the power supply is 
guaranteed, even if only to a limited degree (as in the case of an emergency pow-
er supply). However, once the (emergency) power supply can no longer be main-
tained, there is a total breakdown in information technology and telecommuni-
cations. With this sector, it is therefore not possible to present the consequences 
                                            
33 According to Fickert/Malleck (2008, p. 276) some of these interconnection points are 
supplied via the public electricity network and would stop working accordingly in the 
event of a power blackout. With other interconnecting points, pairs of copper wires that 
are no longer required for power supply purposes are used by the nearest feeder distri-
bution interface and can thus benefit from its emergency power supply. However, it is 
not known how widespread this type of power supply is. 
34 No corresponding analyses for Germany are known. However, the collection of per-
sonal reports by the public on their experiences during the »snow chaos in the Münster-
land« does, however, provide some insight (even if somewhat unsystematic) into the use 
or non-use of telephones, the Internet and mass media (Cantauw/Loy, 2009). 
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of a power blackout on the basis of differentiated time gradients, as used in the 
other sector-based analyses. 
POWER BLACKOUT IN NORTH AMERICA (2003) 2.1.4.1 
The largest power blackout in the history of North America began on 14 August 
2003 and affected large parts of the states of Ontario (Canada), New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Vermont, Michigan, Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts (USA) (Bialek 2010; Stefanini/Masera 2008). After one week, on 
22 August 2003, the state of emergency was lifted in Ontario, and the power 
supply was fully restored in the affected regions from 23 August 2003 (Public 
Safety Canada 2006, p. 14). Overall, 62 GW of electrical power (Yamashita et al. 
2008, p. 856) and 50 million people were affected. It is estimated that Ontario’s 
economy suffered losses of 1 to 2 billion Canadian dollars. In the first 4 days, 
retail trade suffered a 40 % decline in sales, while petrol station sales rose by 
30 % (Public Safety Canada 2006, p. 4). 
The following discussion is mainly based on the situation in Ontario, Canada. It 
can be assumed that following a previous major power blackout in 1998 (ice 
storm), the level of preparations in terms of emergency power generator equip-
ment and emergency planning was extremely good (Public Safety Canada 2006, 
p. 22 f.). 
The activation of emergency programmes for the fixed-line telephone network 
meant operations could be largely maintained. However, problems were encoun-
tered with the replenishment of fuel for the emergency generators of the general 
distribution stations and also with the emergency calls system (911). People were 
asked to use the phone (fixed-line and mobile) only in emergencies (Public Safety 
Canada 2006, p. 21 f.). 
Mobile telephone systems were heavily overloaded.35 With regard to energy 
supplies for base stations with battery back-up, some mobile phone companies 
were able to use additional mobile generators that were procured at short notice 
from outside Ontario to re-charge their batteries. By the fourth day after the 
power crisis started, all mobile phone services were functioning normally again 
(Public Safety Canada 2006, p. 22). However, Townsend/Moss (2005, p. 10) 
assume that mobile phone services in the north-east of the United States suffered 
serious disruption as the local antennae and switching stations were only 
equipped with standby batteries with a maximum capacity of 4 to 6 hours. 
Connections to the worldwide Internet were badly affected, however. According 
to analyses by Renesys Corporation (Cowie et al. 2004), although the major 
transmission routes (»backbones«) were hardly affected by the power blackout, 
                                            
35 This experience led to the Canadian Government initiating the launch of »Wireless Pri-
ority Services« (WPS) in 2004. 
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3,175 of 9,700 networks identified in the affected areas experienced connectivity 
failures. With 2,000 of these networks these failures lasted for more than 
4 hours; with 1,400 they lasted for more than 12 hours and some even suffered 
connectivity failures lasting more than 2 days. According to Cowie et al. (2004, 
p. 1 f.), the Internet was simply not yet able to match the reliability of the tele-
phone system. Companies’ large data centres were generally able to continue 
operations (Public Safety Canada 2006, p. 23 f.). 
Press companies endeavoured to provide the public with information and were 
in most cases able to continue operating their technology with the aid of emer-
gency generators. For example, on the first day after the crisis set in, the Toronto 
Star was able to produce a 16-page emergency edition, while the Ottawa Citizen 
was able to continue normal production as it had just purchased new emergency 
power generators.36 The headquarters of Associated Press (AP) 02 in New York 
were temporarily transferred to Washington and Dallas on account of the power 
blackout. 
Although the major television channels were able to continue broadcasting their 
programmes, it was generally not possible to receive programmes in the affected 
areas. The most up-to-date and perhaps most important source of information 
(from the onset of the crisis in the afternoon of 14 August 2003 until the morn-
ing of 15 August 2003) was the radio, which was able to transmit on a continu-
ous basis and could be received via battery-operated radios. Radio broadcasters, 
newspaper publishing houses and television companies generally implemented 
emergency plans and were able to draw on sufficient emergency generators. 
FIXED-NETWORK TELEPHONY 2.1.4.2 
The fixed-line telephone network that is primarily used for voice telephony, fax 
and also as an access network to the Internet – including via broadband – is 
heavily dependent on a mains-operated power-supply; this is especially true for 
the end terminals and for the first hierarchical echelon in the network, the local 
switching exchanges. 
End terminals and subscriber terminals 
Whereas analogue telephones, which are now hardly used, do not rely on an 
external power supply and are supplied with the required low levels of energy 
from the nearest local switching exchanges via the telephone cable,37 the base 
stations for the now popular cordless telephones (based on the DECT standard) 
do depend on an external power supply. A cordless telephone that can still oper-
                                            
36 Deverell (2003) emphasised the important role of the printed media during the power 
blackout in Stockholm in 2001. 
37 In the experience reports on the power blackout that occurred in Münster in 2005, re-
peated mention is made of the fact that analogue telephones were brought back into use. 
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ate because it has a battery is of no use because no connection can be made to 
the base station. 
Provided ISDN telephones can be run using an emergency power supply, they 
can be supplied with power in the same way as analogue telephones via the local 
switching exchange. However, this only applies to one ISDN end terminal per 
ISDN connection, whereas several end terminals are usually connected. 
However, the trend within fixed-network telephony is generally moving towards 
the use of VoIP via DSL routers or cable modems. Although the proportion of 
analogue telephone connections in the total of 39 million fixed-network tele-
phone connections is still around 50 %, it is losing huge ground to VoIP connec-
tions via DSL or upgraded broadcasting cable networks. The proportion of 
ISDN basic rate connections is also stagnating. 11 million DSL broadband ac-
cesses are processed via Telekom AG’s total of 26 million analogue or ISDN 
telephone connections; these DSL broadband accesses are themselves primarily 
designed for VoIP telephone (Bundesnetzagentur 2009, p. 19 ff. – all figures re-
fer to the status in mid-2009). The increasingly popular use of Internet telepho-
ny via services such as Skype has not been considered in these calculations. 
According to the information available, DSL routers and cable modems do not 
have any battery back-up; they therefore all depend on an external power supply 
and would fail immediately in the event of a power blackout. Fixed-network 
telephony and Internet access would be immediately interrupted in such a case. 
Access and connection networks 
The telephone network as such is structured on the basis of hierarchically organ-
ised, computer-based switching exchanges. A rough distinction can be made be-
tween local switching exchanges and trunk exchanges. Both depend on a continu-
ous power supply. End customers’ access lines lead directly to a local switching 
exchange; according to current estimates, there are between 5,000 and 8,000 
such exchanges, each typically supplying 10,000 to 100,000 customers. After the 
end consumers’ end terminals, the local switching exchanges represent the sec-
ond key bottleneck in terms of access to the fixed network during a power 
blackout. Although they have uninterruptible power supply systems, these are 
designed to ensure continuous continued operation in the event of a short-term 
power blackout. The energy they store can be exhausted after just 15 minutes; it 
may, however, last for 8 hours depending on the location and operator (Reiner-
mann 2009, slide 15). Once this point is reached, all customers connected to the 
fixed network are no longer able to access it. 
An even greater number of customers would be affected in the event of a failure 
in trunk exchanges. These are therefore better protected with emergency power 
generators and could maintain operations for between 8 and 48 hours (Reiner-
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mann 2009, slide 15) or even for 3 to 4 days (Hiete et al. 2010, F 29) without an 
external power supply. If a widespread power blackout occurs, however, the 
improved emergency power supply of the trunk exchanges is essentially irrele-
vant because all local switching exchanges fail in the affected area and the trunk 
exchanges do not actually come into play. The improved contingency provisions 
for trunk exchanges are only effective in the (more frequent) scenario of a small-
scale power blackout (e.g. one affecting an area of a city). If the trunk exchange 
is in the area affected by the power blackout but the local switching exchange is 
outside this area, telephone communications can be maintained for a few days 
through the use of emergency power generators. 
EMERGENCY CALLS, EMERGENCY TELEPHONES, PUBLIC TELEPHONE BOXES 
The standardised European emergency number 112 can be dialled free of 
charge from any working telephone (fixed or mobile network). This also ap-
plies to mobile phones without any available call credit or a current contract. 
The emergency number can also always be dialled from telephone boxes 
without the need for coins or a pre-paid telephone card. Emergency calls are 
dealt with on a priority basis in the telephone switching system, meaning they 
are forwarded even if the telephone system is overloaded. 
However, emergency calls only function if the end terminal can make a con-
nection to the telephone network (via the nearest local switching exchange or 
mobile network base station). If a widespread power blackout occurs, this 
will only be possible for a few minutes or hours. 
Some emergency telephones as found, for example, on motorways, in tunnels 
or at railway stations (although to a reducing degree due to the popularity of 
mobile phones) are powered by solar energy independently of the electricity 
grid. Their use would therefore be guaranteed. 
Public telephone boxes are also generally reliant on an external power supply 
and a functioning local switching exchange. They therefore also represent a 
limited alternative in crisis scenarios. 
The emergency power capacities in the fixed-network exchanges can differ ac-
cording to whether a region is mainly rural or urban. These capacities may only 
last for 2 hours in rural areas, for up to 6 hours in small towns and for up to 
48 hours in major cities (Unger 2009, slide 16), and according to Hiete et al. 
(2010, F 29) even for several days. Here, too, switching centres with more users 
are better protected than those with fewer users. 
All telephone customers residing in the area of the power blackout who do not 
have an analogue telephone or ISDN telephone capable of operating on an 
emergency power supply immediately find themselves unable to make telephone 
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calls. Customers with analogue phones or ISDN phones that are capable of op-
erating on an emergency power supply can use these phones only until the unin-
terruptible power supply of the relevant local switching exchange fails, which 
will happen after a few minutes to a few hours. 
It is clear that the obligation to provide »appropriate« technical contingency 
measures to safeguard against breakdowns »that cause considerable disruptions 
to telecommunications networks« as stipulated in Section 109 of the Telecom-
munications Act (TKG) has hardly any effect in the event of a widespread, pro-
longed power blackout. Currently, »appropriate« only appears to apply to pre-
cautions against a short-term power blackout affecting a small area. The fixed 
network’s low level of reliability in the event of a power blackout also became 
apparent during the »snow chaos« in Münster in 2005. 88 % of the 592 resi-
dents questioned (in a study on the consequences for the food sector) were una-
ble to use the fixed network (Gardemann/Menski 2008, p. 46). 
MOBILE TELEPHONE SYSTEM 2.1.4.3 
Mobile telephones only represent a limited substitute for the fixed-line network 
in the event of a power blackout. In contrast to the fixed network, all end devic-
es are equipped with an internal power supply. However, it is likely that the 
base stations (roughly comparable to the local switching exchanges in the fixed-
line network) would stop working relatively quickly, meaning customers in the 
catchment area of these base stations would be unable to obtain a connection. 
These base stations have an uninterruptible power supply and like the local 
switching exchanges in the fixed network, can fail after just 15 minutes; howev-
er, depending on the operator and local conditions, they may be able to bridge 
up to 8 hours.38 
                                            
38 Estimates concerning the emergency power supply of transmission equipment and base 
stations vary considerably. Prognos (2009, p. 81) assumes that »a few« transmission fa-
cilities are equipped with a short-term emergency power supply. According to Hiete et 
al. (2010, F 29 f.), too, »many base stations are not protected against disruptions to the 
power supply; some have uninterruptible power supply (approx. 2 hours), others have 
stationary emergency power generators that can supply emergency power for several 
hours«. Furthermore, Hiete et al. (2010, F 29) assume that today, provision is no longer 
made for uninterruptible power supply or emergency generators when building new 
transmission facilities. By contrast, the Vodafone mobile network is, according to 
Mansmann (2008, p. 89), fully supplied with emergency power. Stand-by diesel ensures 
central network components can bridge a long power blackout. However, small indi-
vidual base stations that ensure additional capacities in major cities could fail immedi-
ately. With the telecommunications companies O2 und E-Plus, the base stations have 
battery back-up and can thus continue to operate for around an additional 2 hours. O2 
is equipping new base stations with fuel cells. The next highest level of the base station 
controller (BSC) is designed to operate independently of the grid for 4 to 6 hours; the 
central switching exchanges (including to other networks via MSC) have emergency die-
sel for several days. If the power blackout threatens a base station that is of strategic 
importance, this would be supplied with power using mobile generators.  
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It is assumed that the central switching exchanges of the mobile telephone net-
works that have emergency power generators can maintain their operations for 
between 8 and 48 hours (Reinermann 2009, slide 16, see also Mansmann 2008). 
Hiete et al. (2010, F 29) even estimate that these mobile services switching cen-
tres (MSC) would only fail after around 4 days. 
The logic of supplying mobile telephone transmission and switching centres with 
emergency power is the same as for the fixed network. The higher the switching 
centre is in the network hierarchy, the better its protection against a power 
blackout. This is designed to minimise a network failure in the event of power 
blackouts affecting small areas, but as already established in the case of the fixed 
network, offers little help in the event of a widespread and prolonged power 
blackout. 
There is, however one difference: in contrast to a fixed-network connection, mo-
bile phone users are mobile. They may find themselves at a location within the 
area affected by the crisis where a base station required for dial-up and an MSC 
(i.e. a »trunk exchange«) are equipped with an emergency power generator. If one 
assumes that such »hotspots« would be maintained in the major cities of the area 
affected by the crisis, then it would be possible to make calls between mobile 
phone users within these zones and with mobile phone users and fixed-line users 
outside the crisis area; use of the Internet may also be possible. However, the pre-
cise underlying technical conditions of such a scenario would have to be examined 
on an individual basis. Telephone calls would also be possible if users moved close 
enough to the »edges« of the area affected by the power blackout so that they fell 
within the transmission range of facilities outside this area. 
In addition to the precarious nature of the power supply, another risk factor is 
that in a disaster scenario, the difficulties within the fixed-line network and the 
increased need for communication mean mobile phone networks become over-
loaded and many telephone calls cannot be connected. Text and other mobile 
data services are affected in the same way.39 
Emergency calls must, however, be given priority treatment during a crisis scenar-
io. Moreover, Section 3 [3] of the Law Concerning the Transformation of the 
Deutsche Bundespost Enterprises into the Legal Structure of Stock Corporation 
(PTSG) provides for privileged access for certain (authority-based) operators. 
This aims to ensure that in a situation where the mobile phone network is oper-
ating but is overloaded with a higher than average call volume, certain preferen-
tial users will still be able to make calls. 
                                            
39 The aforementioned study on the power blackout in the Münsterland reveals that in 
that area, mobile telephones proved very unreliable, even during a power blackout that 
»only« lasted a few days rather than for a longer period. 73 % of those surveyed were 
no longer able to »use their mobile phones« (Gardemann/Menski 2008, p. 46). 
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SATELLITE COMMUNICATION 
Satellite telephones (e.g. that use the Inmarsat system) that are today also of-
fered as mobile hand-held devices and offer several days’ stand-by operation 
and several hours of call time, represent a possible substitute for voice and 
data services in the disaster scenario that forms the basis for this report. They 
enable communication between satellite telephones and also with fixed-line 
and mobile phone users who are still able to be contacted. 
However, the connection is also provided via a base ground station that re-
quires a power supply. If the German ground station can no longer be sup-
plied with power, its functions could be taken over by a different ground sta-
tion in another country. There is a certain technical restriction in that the tel-
ephone must have free »vision« to the satellite. This is not, for example, al-
ways the case in narrow valleys situated high in the mountains (Jost 2005, 
p. 29). Due to the high costs of purchasing and operating a satellite tele-
phone, this means of communication does not represent an alternative option 
for widescale use in a crisis scenario. 
INTERNET 2.1.4.4 
With the Internet, it is important to differentiate between end devices that rely 
on a power supply (desktop computers, servers) and those that have their own 
internal power supply (laptops, web computers, smartphones, etc.). Whereas the 
first category stops working immediately (private households and small compa-
nies are unlikely to have an emergency power supply; medium and large compa-
nies are more likely to have one), battery-operated devices can still be used for 
between a few hours and a few days depending on their charge status and the 
way in which they are used. However, whether such devices permit access to the 
Internet depends on the type of access and on the situation in terms of the access 
and remote transmission network. 
Here, the same essentially applies for the Internet as has already been said with 
regard to the fixed-line network, the broadcasting cable network and the mobile 
phone network, all of which represent possible networks for accessing the Inter-
net: all DSL and cable modem means of access to the Internet are generally lost 
with immediate effect because they do not have battery back-up. Modems or 
mobile phone access devices (for the Internet) that are integrated into laptops 
can function for as long as they are supplied with power by the laptop battery. 
The same applies to smartphones and similar battery-operated mobile devices 
that offer Internet access. 
However, here too, there is still the question of whether the modem reaches a 
working local switching exchange/DSL switching centre (DSLAM) or base station 
in the mobile network. These generally have an uninterruptible power supply that 
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stops working after minutes or a few hours. Consequently, the Internet can no 
longer be accessed even if central remote transmission networks (backbone net-
works) are still able to function because of a good emergency power supply. 
DATA CENTRES 2.1.4.5 
Data centres of large companies, service data centres or Internet server farms, 
web hosters, etc. are considered to be well prepared for power blackouts. It can 
thus be assumed that the data lines between these data centres at their terminal 
points and amplifiers are similarly well protected. Operators of large data cen-
tres generally also have different locations meaning that where necessary, the 
operations of a data centre that is at risk can be transferred to another centre 
along with its business-critical processes. In all cases, the emergency power sup-
ply is designed to end on-going processes in a controlled way, to secure data and 
to establish emergency operations. This does not mean that all contingency 
measures will be implemented in a serious scenario. 
EMERGENCY SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS AND  
EMERGENCY SERVICES NETWORKS 2.1.4.6 
In Germany, the BOS radio communications system is set to change from its 
legacy analogue system to a new digital system based on the TETRA standard. 
TETRA is soon to be introduced on a nationwide basis for 500,000 users with-
in, for example, the police, the fire service, the emergency medical services, the 
THW and the customs authorities. Overall, around 4,300 antenna locations and 
62 switching centres need to be installed (Hiete et al. 2010, F 28). 
In terms of dependence on the power supply, the switch to TETRA would ap-
pear to represent a step backwards. Whereas the old analogue BOS radio relay 
stations had an uninterruptible power supply that could last for 4 to 8 hours, the 
base stations of the new TETRA system are only designed to allow battery-based 
bridging of 2 hours (Hiete et al. 2010, F 30). The emergency services radio net-
work appears to be ill-prepared for a widespread and prolonged power black-
out. Although mobile, network-independent radio stations could be used, it is 
not known how many such alternative stations the TETRA operators have. 
»Normal« government communications and communication by the federal ad-
ministration is via specially secured networks including in particular the IVBB, the 
IVBV and the Federal Administration Network (BVN). These are to be consoli-
dated into a joint, more efficient and more secure network infrastructure known 
as the »Federal Networks« (NdB) under the aegis of the BMI. As with the BOS 
radio network, this is a private data and telecommunications network that is spe-
cially protected against external attack. The key networks and network resources 
of IVBB and IVBV are equipped with emergency power generators that generally 
offer a capacity of 2 to 3 days. A bridging capacity of 72 hours is planned for the 
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NdB network infrastructure. However, it should be noted that it will also depend 
on the emergency power supplies of the individual authorities in the network as to 
whether they can use the NdB. It is assumed that most of the larger authorities 
and institutions in Berlin and Bonn will have emergency power generators with a 
similar capacity to the network infrastructure. 
RADIO BROADCASTING 2.1.4.7 
Most end devices and especially television receivers in private households de-
pend on an external power supply. Since private households are unlikely to have 
an emergency power supply, it generally becomes impossible to receive television 
immediately a power blackout strikes. 
There are a far higher number and variety of radio devices, ranging from car 
radios to radio alarm clocks and mobile telephones with radio reception. Many 
of these devices have batteries that permit radio reception in the first and often 
particularly critical hours after the onset of a crisis. This also corresponds to the 
experiences during the power blackout in Canada in 2003, when the radio 
proved to be the most important source of information during the first 12 hours 
(Chapter III.4.1; Public Safety Canada 2006, p. 23).40 
Public-law radio stations must fulfil a statutory supply requirement as regards 
emergency communication and information. Consequently, radio stations have 
emergency studios allowing them to continue reduced production operations for 
several days. The same safeguards are in place for (terrestrial) transmission tech-
nology (Prognos 2009, p. 82). Since editorial research capabilities depend on 
means of communication such as telephones and the Internet, such capabilities 
may be restricted if, for example, reporters at local level want to send infor-
mation to the transmitting studios or if the editorial team wants to communicate 
with individuals at local level (officers, emergency forces, citizens). 
THE PRESS 2.1.4.8 
Press and printing companies are major consumers of energy. Newspaper rotary 
printing presses alone require electricity volumes equivalent to those used by a 
few hundred to a thousand households. Since the print process between copy 
deadline and sale spans a window of only a few hours and is extremely time-
                                            
40 The somewhat anecdotal reports by residents of the Münsterland on the power black-
out in 2005 confirm the importance of radio (Cantauw/Loy 2009), whereas Prognos 
(2009, p. 38) assumes (albeit without quoting further sources) that people now have 
very few network-independent radios. In an empirical study on the consequences of the 
power blackout in the Münsterland in the autumn of 2005 for the food sector, ques-
tions were included on the use of means of communication; however, the specific use of 
radio devices was not examined (Gardemann/Menski 2008, p. 46 and p. 2 of the ques-
tionnaire in the appendix). 
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critical, newspaper printing shops generally have emergency power generators 
that at least enable emergency operations to be maintained. It can be assumed 
that similar precautions are taken for editorial systems, which exhibit many sim-
ilarities with large data centres. This is confirmed by experience from the major 
Canadian power blackout in 2003 (Chapter III.4.1). 
The extent to which newspaper publishing houses and major printing works 
could maintain emergency operations for several days and weeks depends on the 
extent to which replenishments of diesel for the emergency power generators can 
be ensured. 
CONCLUSION 2.1.5 
The consequences of a widespread, prolonged power blackout for information 
technology and telecommunications must be considered dramatic. In particular, 
telecommunications and data services would fail after a few days; in some cases, 
this would happen after just a few hours or even immediately. 
VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 
Where all components are closely interlinked and totally reliant on electricity, this 
will lead to a rapid failure (i.e. immediately or at most after minutes or hours), 
especially for the public voice and data services used by the public. It is therefore 
clear that contingency measures for a power blackout are geared towards short-
term, small-scale blackouts, not ones extending over several regions and lasting 
for several days and weeks. 
The complex topology of information and communications networks with their 
many end terminals, switching centres, network components and network hier-
archies results in varying levels of dependence on an external power supply (Ta-
ble 3). With a fixed network telephone system the (digital) end device and sub-
scriber terminal are the first to stop working, followed by the first switching hi-
erarchy of the local switching exchanges. With mobile networks, the end devices 
that can function for a few days if charged and used under moderate conditions 
would be less affected compared with the base stations that allow users to dial 
into the networks. The variety of devices, networks, configurations and architec-
tures makes it difficult to make a precise estimate as to the exact point when a 
respective component is likely to fail. Ultimately, however, this is not important 
because in any communications network, the weakest component or first com-
ponent to fail will cause the service as a whole to stop functioning. 
The findings regarding voice and data communications for private households 
do not apply in the same way to companies and authorities. Here, the current 
status of available information only makes it possible to conclude that it is nec-
essary to consider the emergency power supply for information technology and 
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telecommunications in commercial and public sectors on a case-by-case basis. It 
is not possible to make a blanket statement, applicable to all devices and net-
works, on which areas are well prepared for a power blackout and which are 
less prepared or not prepared at all. 
TABLE 3 FAILURES IN THE »INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS« 
 SECTOR, CATEGORISED BY TIME FRAME 




Fixed-line network  
(with analogue terminal) 
** ** **** 
Fixed-line network (DSL connection, VoIP) * ** **** 
Mobile phone *** ** **** 
Satellite radio *** **** **** 
BOS *** ** ** 
Internet * ** **** 
Emergency services networks (BOS) *** *** *** 
Television * *** *** 
Radio (battery-operated radio, car radio) **** **** **** 
* immediately; ** within hours; *** within days; **** within weeks 
Note for readers: With regard to onset of failure at the respective level, it should be noted 
that the weakest component determines the duration. This is highlighted. 
Own image 
Private, specialised and non-public data networks must be distinguished from 
public networks. Examples include the payment transaction networks of the 
banks which are well protected against power blackouts (Chapter III.2.6) or the 
German Research Network (DFN), which is guaranteed to continue functioning 
for a few hours or minutes and therefore offers the same level of safeguarding as 
its »customers«, i.e. university research centres and scientific institutes. With this 
type of private network, the customers (i.e. the Association of Banks or the 
German Research Network) can stipulate the required level of emergency power 
supply to the service providers (Telekom or other telecommunications suppliers). 
The federal communications networks such as the IVBB or the IVBV are also 
private. These networks can generally be operated for at least 48 hours with the 
aid of emergency power generators. 
By contrast, the antenna locations of the new digital BOS network for the police, 
emergency medical services, fire services and the THW can only continue to 
function for 2 hours using a network-independent power supply. Essentially, 
two (electronic) means of communication – i.e. amateur radio and satellite radio 
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– remain whose low levels of power consumption and ability to divert to trans-
mission locations outside the affected area mean they can continue to function 
even during a widespread and prolonged power blackout. It is clear that these 
two radio technologies can only replace customary communications flows to a 
minimal degree. 
MASS MEDIA 
The sector of printed (newspapers) and electronic mass media (television, radio) 
must be considered separately from voice and data communications and is espe-
cially important for communicating with the public in times of crisis. Public-law 
broadcasting stations are extremely well prepared for a power failure. The same 
cannot be said for the receiving devices in households. Although broadcasting 
stations are able to transmit, citizens are unable to receive television pro-
grammes without electricity. Consequently, radio – which can be received via 
the millions of battery-operated devices owned by the public – becomes one of 
the most important channels for informing the public in the event of a crisis. 
Newspaper publishers and printing shops may offer a certain level of operating 
capability with the aid of an emergency power supply and be able to contribute 
towards keeping the public informed. However, estimates of these capabilities 
vary and require further research. 
TRANSPORT AND TRAFFIC 2.2 
The analysis of the »transport« sector is based on the four key modes of 
transport: road, rail, air, water. 
All sub-sectors are heavily dependent on the power supply. This applies to both 
the means of transport and also the infrastructures, as well as to the manage-
ment and organisation of the respective transport modes. One of the main rea-
sons for the recent increased dependence on the power supply is the sharp rise in 
the use of modern information and communications technologies, especially in 
vehicles and for traffic management purposes, not forgetting the operation of 
various building structures such as underground car parks, tunnels or bridges. 
STRUCTURE 2.2.1 
ROAD 
Germany’s road network has a total length of around 231,000 km. This in-
cludes the federal motorways (approximately 12,600 km), the federal highways 
(approximately 40,700 km), the country highways (approximately 86,600 km) 
and the district roads (approximately 91,500 km). There are more than 
330 road tunnels with a total length of over 250 km. 
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Roads handle all individual motor traffic and a large proportion of goods traffic 
and local public transport. Every day in Germany, more than 28 million people 
use buses and trains and cover more than 90 billion person-kilometres (VDV 
website). The segments of local public transport that use rail networks rather 
than roads (e.g. trains of DB AG, underground trains) are discussed in Chap-
ter III.2.2.3.2. 
The »roads« sub-sector (Figure 10) fulfils a number of functions in fields such as 
leisure, business transport, commuter transport, the supply of goods and emer-
gency/rescue services. 
FIGURE 10 STRUCTURES OF THE TRANSPORT MODE »ROAD« 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 89 
RAIL 
In Germany, the rail network of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG) has a length of 
around 38,000 km and moves passenger trains41 and around 5,400 goods trains 
of DB Schenker Rail (the logistics company of DB AG) on a daily basis. In addi-
tion, around 300 additional (private) railway companies that do not belong to 
DB use its railway network. These companies have their own electric and diesel-
powered trains. The Connex Group is one of the largest private railway compa-
nies for passenger transport. A key player in the field of goods transport is 
                                            
41 According to its own figures, Deutsche Bahn AG carries around 5 million passengers 
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Rail4Chem Eisenbahnverkehrsgesellschaft. The DB network also includes other 
infrastructures (Table 4). 
TABLE 4 INFRASTRUCTURES OF THE DB NETWORK 
Infrastructure Number 
Passenger railway stations 5,718 
Tunnel structures 770 
Bridges 27,107 
Railway control centres* 4,479 
Points/junctions 69,311 
Level crossings 18,051 
Filling stations (for diesel locomotives and buses) 188 
* A railway control centre is a railway facility from which equipment in and on the track 
system (e.g. points and signals) can be set on a central basis for train journeys and for 
shunting purposes. 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 105 
In the field of passenger transport, DB AG has a total of 415 diesel locomotives 
and 3,969 diesel railcars available for regional and city transport, while the 
Connex Group has around 118 diesel locomotives. Overall, therefore, these two 
large companies alone have at least 4,500 diesel locomotives/railcars available 
that could be used in the event of a power blackout. In the goods transport sec-
tor, DB’s subsidiary Rail Deutschland uses over 1,143 diesel locomotives. Trac-
tion current for rail transport is supplied by 55 power stations and converter 
stations. These are used to feed the railway system’s own 110 kV network. DB 
does not operate many power stations of its own and purchases most of its trac-
tion current from third parties. 
Points, signal equipment, safety systems and maintenance plants along with re-
tail and trade in and around train stations and also administrative buildings are 
not supplied with electricity from the traction current network; they are supplied 
on a decentralised basis via around 100 different 50 Hz lighting mains and pow-
er mains. The 50 Hz lighting/power current is mainly taken from the local public 
network; only a small proportion is produced by DB AG itself. If the public grid 
fails, the above systems and infrastructures are affected immediately. 
Centralised control of the 110 kV/16.7 Hz high-voltage network could prove a 
weakness. This is where energy-use planning and network operations manage-
ment for DB Energie’s high-voltage network takes place and fluctuations in de-
mand of up to 300 MW are balanced out within a few seconds. Disruptions to the 
centre could thus affect the planning and coordination of power distribution and 
thus affect optimum operation of the traction current network (BBK 2005a). 
 2.  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 93 
 
DB Energie has over 188 filling stations in Germany to enable the operation of 
diesel rail vehicles and in some cases also buses and lorries. 
In contrast to above-ground railways, underground railways are generally rail 
transport systems that are designed as separate systems that have no junctions 
and that are independent of other urban transport systems.42 They form closed 
systems that are immediately affected by a power blackout. Germany’s under-
ground rail system transports several million people each day. 
The »rail« sub-sector (Figure 11) fulfils primary functions in the fields of com-
muter transport, business transport, leisure and supplies. 
FIGURE 11 STRUCTURES OF THE TRANSPORT MODE »RAIL« 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 108 
AIR 
The »air« sub-sector can be sub-divided into airfields43, aircraft and air-traffic 
control (Figure 12) 
                                            
42 Many German cities and conurbations have systems similar to underground railways 
whose routes also in some cases run on independent railway structures outside of the 
tunnel system. 
43 Airfield is the generic term for all land designed for enabling safe aircraft take-offs and 
landings. According to the Aviation Act (LuftVG), a distinction is made within airfields 
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The functions of the sub-sector »air« primarily involve the fields of tourism/ 
business traffic44 and supplies. 
FIGURE 12 STRUCTURES OF THE TRANSPORT MODE »AIR TRAFFIC« 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 123 
Germany currently has 38 airports, including 32 international passenger air-
ports. The airports are run as private enterprises, although the public authorities 
(Federation, Länder and parishes) do have a financial stake in some cases. Fig-
ure 13 below shows the structures of an airport. 
FIGURE 13 STRUCTURES OF AN AIRPORT 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 124 
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EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY AT FRANKFURT AM MAIN AIRPORT 
At airports, air traffic control facilities and the navigation lighting for the 
runways are especially important. Runway lighting is guaranteed via short-
break emergency generators, thus ensuring maximum availability. UPS sys-
tems protect air-traffic control facilities, with special batteries storing power 
for an emergency. 
Around 50 emergency diesel units with special starter batteries are distributed 
across the area of Frankfurt Airport. They safeguard the supply of electricity 
to consumers in the various applications and facilities. Overall, these emer-
gency power generators provide electrical power of 53 MW. Separate 24 V 
control batteries safeguard system control, monitoring and reporting, while 
400 V UPS batteries guarantee the supply of power to computer systems. 
Additional batteries store the necessary reserve energy for the central control 
room and its computer systems. In addition to the internal power supply, the 
airport’s air conditioning equipment is also monitored and controlled from 
here. 
Source: www.batterieportal.com; amended 
The non-military airports in Germany must meet the requirements of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) on emergency power supply (EBP 
2010, p. 121). To be able to ensure ground operations45, the major airports have 
efficient standby power supply systems and fuel stores. Depending on their size 
and the amount of energy required, airports are thus able to at least maintain 
ground operations for some weeks (EBP 2010, p. 122). 
However, this maintenance of ground operations at airports does not permit 
regular air traffic during the power blackout. 
WATER 
The federal waterways network encompasses 7,350 km of inland waterways, of 
which around 75 % are rivers and 25 % canals. There are also around 
23,000 km2 of sea lanes. Facilities on the federal waterways include 450 sluice 
chambers and 290 weirs, 4 ship lifts, 15 canal aqueducts and 2 surface dams. The 
main network of around 5,100 km includes the main waterways of the Rhine 
(and its tributaries), the Danube, the Weser and the Elbe and the connecting canal 
systems to the Oder and to the Danube (BMVBS 2010). The German federal wa-
terways are a key element of the »wet« Trans-European Network (TEN). 
                                            
45 In this context, ground operations include ensuring the ability to carry out take-offs and 
landings and also ensuring passenger and baggage handling. 
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Each year, goods quantities of up to 240 million tonnes are transported over a 
distance of 65 billion tonne kilometres. This represents around 75 % of railway 
goods transport and around 14 million lorry journeys. Around 1.5 million contai-
ners (TEU)46 are transported on inland waterways. Approximately 400,000 jobs 
depend on inland water transportation and ports. The »White Fleets«47 and riv-
er cruise ships are assuming increasing economic importance (BMVBS 2010). 
Germany has over 100 modern, public sea and inland ports. 56 of 74 city regions 
in Germany have a connection to an inland waterway (BMVBS 2010). The most 
important German sea ports are Hamburg, Bremen/Bremerhaven, Wilhelmsha-
ven, Lübeck and Rostock, while the most important German inland ports are 
Duisburg, Cologne, Hamburg, Mannheim, and Ludwigshafen. The port at 
Duisburg is the largest inland port in Europe (EBP 2010, p. 135). 
In 2007, around 312 million tonnes of goods were transhipped in Germany’s 
North Sea and Baltic Sea ports. Of this volume, around one-third was accounted 
for by container transport (15.2 million TEU48). In terms of passenger sea 
transport, around 30 million ferry guests arrive at/depart from German sea ports 
each year. 
THE PORT OF HAMBURG 
The Port of Hamburg is the largest sea port in Germany and the third largest 
in Europe (after Rotterdam and Antwerp). 
It offers 320 berths for seagoing vessels on 35 km of quay walls, including 
38 large-ship berths for container carriers and bulk carriers, 97 berths on pile 
moorings and 60 landing wharves including ferry wharves of the company 
HADAG Seetouristik and Fährdienst AG. 
In terms of land area, the port has 137 km of public roads, 156 km of em-
bankments and 314 km of port rail tracks. There are three road and pedes-
trian tunnels and 147 bridges, including 53 fixed railway bridges, 52 fixed 
road bridges, 5 pedestrian bridges, 9 other bridges and 11 moveable bridges. 
The transport mode »water« (Figure 14) fulfils primary supply functions. It is of 
less importance for leisure and business transport (e.g. ferries or cruise ships) 
(EBP 2010, p. 136). 
                                            
46 TEU = Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit; a container 20 feet long 
47 »White Fleet« refers to the passenger ships of several German passenger ship companies 
(on inland and coastal waters). 
48 Of this figure, around 10 million TEU are transshipped at the Port of Hamburg. 
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FIGURE 14 STRUCTURES OF THE TRANSPORT MODE »WATER« 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 137 
LEGAL BASES 2.2.2 
In a disaster scenario, means of transport play a key role in managing the asso-
ciated consequences and damage. The Traffic Services Act (VerkLG) is therefore 
of paramount importance. 
The Act aims to ensure sufficient transport services49 in the event of, for exam-
ple, a natural disaster or particularly grave accident; this is, among other things, 
ensured through administrative assistance by the Federal Government. This in-
cludes transporting people and goods, making means of transport and transport 
systems available, and also use of the traffic infrastructure including communi-
cations and information systems. Bodies that can be obliged to provide services 
include transport companies and transport infrastructure companies (excluding 
mountain railways), shipping companies that sail under the German flag, and 
other owners of means of transport or transport infrastructures where these 
form part of a company’s operations. Traffic services may only be requisitioned 
under the Act for a certain time and for a maximum of three months. Federal 
authorities who are authorised to issue requests include the BBK, the Federal 
Office for Agriculture and Food (BLE) and the THW. However, the Traffic Ser-
vices Act can only be applied following a decision by the Federal Government. 
                                            
49 Under the provisions of the Traffic Services Act (VerkLG), Deutsche Bahn AG has, for 
example, been assigned duties in the event of a crisis or state of defence; these duties are 
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ROAD 
With the exception of the law relating to ensuring the provision of services, there 
are hardly any statutory rules governing the safeguarding of critical infrastruc-
tures in the field of road transport. The law relating to the conveyance of per-
sons is the only area to reveal associated provisions – as for example in the Law 
on the Conveyance of Persons (PBefG) where »security and efficiency of opera-
tion« and »technical suitability« are requirements for a licence (Section 13). 
Moreover, companies must conduct their operations in accordance with the 
»state of the art« (Section 21 [1]). It can be assumed that this also includes 
measures in the event of a power blackout (EBP 2010, p. 85). 
RAIL 
According to Article 73 No. 6a of the Basic Law (GG), the Federation has exclu-
sive legislative competence for railway transport and for railway infrastructures 
that are fully or partly owned by the Federation (railways of the Federation). 
Section 4 of the General Railway Act (AEG) specifies safety and security obliga-
tions concerning control and safety systems and also the supplying of traction 
current (BBK 2008a, p. 123). The duties of the Federal Administration of Rail-
way Traffic (BEVVG) are performed by the Federal Ministry of Transport, 
Buildings and Urban Affairs (BMVBS) (Section 1 [1] of the Act on the Federal 
Administration of Railway Traffic (BEVVG)). The Federal Railway Authority 
was established to fulfil these duties. It is the safety authority for railways in 
Germany. 
Railways that are headquartered in the Federal Republic but that are not owned 
by the Federation are supervised by the federal state in which they have their 
registered office. The respective Land government can assign railway supervision 
to the Federal Railway Authority either in full or in part (Section 21 [1] of the 
General Railway Act (AEG). Most federal states have made use of this option. 
Finally, there are a number of safety/security-related standards which give the 
state opportunities to intervene in matters relating to supervisory functions (BSI 
2005, p. 117). 
AIR 
According to Article 73 [6] of the Basic Law (GG), the Federation has exclusive 
legislative competence for air transport. According to Article 87d [1] of the Basic 
Law, air transport is administered by means of direct federal administration. 
According to Article 87d [2] of the Basic Law, duties pertaining to air transport 
administration may be assigned to the Länder under a federal law with the con-
sent of the Bundesrat. The Länder then regulate administrative organisation 
themselves. However, they remain under federal supervision both in terms of the 
legality and also the expedience of implementation (BSI 2005, p. 108). 
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Airfields may only be established or operated with the approval of the Länder 
aviation authorities. Among other things, aspects relating to public safety and 
order must be considered (Section 6 [2] of the Air Transport Act). As the su-
preme air transport authority, the BMVBS ascertains if the licenses for airports 
serving general transportation purposes affect the Federation’s public interests. 
The technical facilities and also operational processes are examined with regard 
to their compliance with national and international provisions. Every airfield 
must draw up an air security plan and submit this to the Federal Aviation Office 
(Section 16 [3] of the Aviation Security Act (LuftSiG). This must include 
measures to secure the airport. Corresponding precautions must be taken. Air-
port operators must immediately report any incidents that significantly impair 
operation of the airport to the licensing authority. 
Within aviation, responsibility for emergency response lies with the air transport 
and aviation security authorities. They also deal with operational risks including 
a power blackout (EBP 2010, p. 86). 
WATER 
There are no statutory provisions explicitly relating to safeguarding of the ship-
ping infrastructure (BSI 2005, p. 87). Within the federal Länder, however, spe-
cial safeguards relating to the handling of hazardous goods are provided for at 
ordinance level.50. According to these provisions, corresponding precautions 
must also be taken to safeguard against a power blackout. 
CONSEQUENCES 2.2.3 
ROAD 2.2.3.1 
0 TO 2 HOURS 
Individual motor traffic 
Serious disruptions occur immediately, especially in urban areas, as traffic lights, 
traffic management systems and road lighting stop working. There is a marked 
increase in traffic accidents – resulting in injuries and some fatalities. Increasing-
ly congested roads (due to accidents and also due to the high volume of traffic) 
make it difficult for the police and emergency medical services to reach accident 
sites. In addition, the breakdowns in the telephone networks make it very diffi-
cult to alert the rescue services (Chapter III.2.1). Broken-down pumps mean ve-
hicles can no longer be filled up at petrol stations (Beck/Vannier 2008). 
                                            
50 Example: Land Port Ordinance of Brandenburg sections 31 ff., Ordinance on Hazard-
ous Goods in Ports of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern sections 13 f, General Port Ordi-
nance of North Rhine-Westphalia sections 30 ff. 
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Immediate problems are experienced in underground car parks: barriers block 
exits, ventilation, lighting and lifts stop working. With some modern buildings, 
however, underground car park components are connected to an uninterruptible 
power supply and to an emergency power system; no immediate problems are 
therefore encountered in such buildings. In car parks without an emergency 
power supply the barriers are opened after protestations from customers. 
Initially, long-distance transport on motorways is hardly affected by the power 
blackout. Although traffic management systems stop working, this does not gen-
erally restrict the functioning of the motorways. Problems are, however, encoun-
tered with motorway tunnels. Some tunnels are closed because lighting and ven-
tilation systems stop working.51 The resultant diversions trigger initial traffic 
jams and bottlenecks in the subordinate road network. The power blackout also 
affects car drivers who need to fill up with fuel within the area affected by the 
power blackout and who leave the motorway to use motorway petrol stations. 
As the petrol station fuel pumps are not working, cars become stranded when 
they continue their journey. Some people decide not to continue their journeys 
and to wait until power is restored (EBP 2010, p. 90). 
Local public transport 
With local public transport, both electric buses that are in contact with an over-
head power line and also trams come to an immediate standstill. Electric buses 
that are fitted with a diesel-operated auxiliary engine can continue driving and 
do not further impede the traffic flow. The drivers of vehicles that have come to 
a standstill contact their headquarters to find out the reason for the blackout. As 
soon as it becomes clear that no statements can be made regarding the duration 
of the blackout, the drivers open the doors and allow the passengers to alight. 
Depending on where the bus comes to a standstill, there may be an increased 
accident risk (EBP 2010, p. 90). Diesel-driven buses can continue their journeys. 
Their tanks permit operation for up to 24 hours. However, the increasing prob-
lems on the roads make it very difficult for these buses to keep to their timeta-
bles. 
Major tensions develop at the headquarters of the local passenger transport op-
erators. Depending on the means of communication that are still available, the 
relevant departments try to find out information on the duration of the power 
blackout. 
                                            
51 Small tunnels (less than 400m) are less critical in terms of ventilation and lighting. Here, 
there are no specific rules regarding power supply. According to the »Guidelines for 
Equipping and Operating Road Tunnels« (RABT), tunnels longer than 400m must be 
equipped with an uninterruptible power supply designed to last at least 15 minutes. The 
tunnels are blocked off if a power blackout strikes. For new tunnel constructions, this 
applies from a length of 80m (EBP 2010, p. 91). 
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Goods traffic 
Goods traffic on roads in urban areas experiences similar problems to those en-
countered by individual motor traffic. Long-distance goods traffic is not initially 
directly affected by the power blackout. In the vast majority of cases, the larger 
tank volumes mean vehicles are able to travel through the affected region and fill 
up outside the area in question. Problems are encountered if tunnels are closed. 
With regard to deliveries in the area affected by the power blackout, problems 
are encountered with loading and unloading vehicles (e.g. loading ramps aren’t 
working, gates won’t close or open, scanners stop working). 
2 TO 8 HOURS 
Individual motor traffic 
With individual motor traffic, the traffic problems in urban conurbations in par-
ticular only start to gradually ease towards the end of this time frame; the rate at 
which problems ease depends on the time of day. Drivers attempt to cope with 
the traffic lights and traffic management systems that have stopped working. 
Traffic accidents do, however, continue to occur, especially at critical spots. A 
large number of the people whose workplaces are affected by the power black-
out cannot/can no longer work and return home. Increasing numbers of parents 
try to contact their children and arrange to collect them by car. The volume of 
traffic therefore remains high. 
In some underground car parks without an emergency power supply, people 
who wish to exit a car park use force to dismantle or open the barriers that have 
not yet been opened by car-park staff (EBP 2010, p. 93). 
Long-distance transport on motorways remains hardly affected by the power 
blackout. However, tunnels that have been closed remain blocked off.52 The 
number of people at motorway service stations who can’t continue their jour-
neys because their fuel tanks are empty or nearly empty tends to increase. Mo-
bile phone and fixed-line networks become less and less available during this 
phase. It is now virtually impossible for people to arrange to be picked up by 
relatives or friends (EBP 2010, p. 92). 
Local public transport 
Public transport continues to experience major problems. The urban transport 
operators try to tow away stranded buses and trams using traction-powered 
equipment. This is a complex task with trams because points can no longer be 
                                            
52 The provisions for tunnel closing systems (electronically controlled traffic signs, traffic 
lights and barriers) under the »Guidelines for Equipping and Operating Road Tunnels« 
(RABT) require an operating time of at least 60 minutes (FGSV 2006, p. 44). 
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set by electrical means and have to be set manually. Diesel-powered buses can 
continue to operate. During this phase the transport operators will consider an 
emergency transport plan that includes restricting bus journeys to especially im-
portant routes. 
Goods traffic 
Goods traffic also has to contend with problems in cities. Increasing numbers of 
lorries are forced to return to their departure points because they are unable to 
deliver their goods. This applies if the delivery infrastructure at the destination 
(e.g. loading ramps, roller shutters, cold-storage rooms) is dependent on a power 
supply but does not have an emergency power supply and therefore stops work-
ing. 
8 TO 24 HOURS 
Individual motor traffic 
Individual motor traffic in urban areas starts to reduce. More members of the 
public remain at home as workplaces are also affected by the blackout. People 
also try to cope with the consequences of the power blackout that are becoming 
increasingly evident within their own homes (e.g. freezers start to thaw, other 
kitchen equipment stops working, disruptions to the water supply). Accidents 
continue to occur because the public has not yet become accustomed to road 
traffic without traffic lights and lighting. Many roads and junctions remain 
blocked. Petrol stations remain closed. Most vehicle owners have taken their 
cars from underground car parks. 
Apart from the tunnels that remain closed, long-distance traffic on motorways is 
still not really affected. However, the situation of the people who are »stranded« 
at motorway service stations and petrol stations (and who have not been collect-
ed by relatives and friends) becomes increasingly precarious because most com-
munication connections are disrupted and service station operations can only be 
maintained to a limited degree (heating, sanitary facilities, food, etc.). Some peo-
ple attempt to organise themselves or to purchase fuel. 
Local public transport 
The situation with local public transport remains unchanged. Stranded buses and 
trams continue to block traffic routes. Increasing attempts are made to tow these 
vehicles away. However, this becomes increasingly difficult because of the way the 
power blackout has affected the communications infrastructure. A few diesel-
powered buses continue to operate. Emergency traffic plans have not yet been 
implemented (EBP 2010, p. 93). 
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Goods traffic 
Goods traffic in urban areas continues to fall in the same way as individual mo-
tor traffic. As before, transit traffic by lorries with sufficient fuel in their tanks is 
not affected to any considerable degree. 
24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
Individual motor traffic 
Individual motor traffic now reduces significantly. This is firstly due to the lack 
of fuel, because hardly any petrol stations in Germany have an emergency power 
supply. In addition, many workplaces and educational establishments and also 
static trade operations remain closed. The number of accidents thus falls signifi-
cantly (EBP 2010, p. 94). More people switch to using bicycles. Increasing num-
bers of cycle trailers are used to transport loads. The emergency power supplies 
of modern underground car parks now stop working as well and the car parks 
are closed. Long-distance transport on motorways is still hardly affected by the 
power blackout. Individual road tunnels are opened again to facilitate the flow 
of traffic (EBP 2010, p. 95). 
Local public transport 
Stranded trams and buses are gradually recovered. It is still not possible to use 
electrically operated vehicles. The transport operators implement an emergency 
transport plan using diesel-powered buses. 
Goods traffic 
Goods traffic in urban areas also falls sharply. Increasing numbers of lorries 
with sufficiently large fuel tanks are used to bring deliveries of essential goods to 
the affected areas.53 
A LOOK AT WEEK 2 
There is little traffic on the roads. Underground car parks remain closed. Most 
people remain at home or – if homes can no longer be heated – some go to col-
lective accommodation centres or meeting points set up in sports centres or 
community centres (Prognos 2009, p. 39 ff.). Trips that have to be made are 
done on foot or by bike. Other people move to regions that are not affected by 
the power blackout and stay with relatives and friends. Private long-distance 
traffic on motorways falls sharply. Motorways are still used for transit purposes, 
but the risk of getting stranded on open stretches of roads deters many people 
from unaffected areas from undertaking journeys. If motorway tunnels remain 
                                            
53 If a power blackout occurs in winter, it is necessary to determine supply axes that will 
be cleared of snow on a priority basis in the event of a snowfall. 
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closed, diversions are signposted and recommended diversions are broadcast 
over car radios. Selected key road tunnels are opened for traffic, even if ventila-
tion and lighting are still not working.54 
Public transport is restricted to a few diesel buses that mainly operate on inner-
city routes. Public transport comes to a total standstill in places where it is not 
possible to ensure an emergency power supply through the use of diesel. 
Goods traffic focuses on delivering essential goods to key points and is organised 
by the civil protection authorities and organisations. 
CONCLUSION 
With road traffic, the failure of traffic lights, lighting and traffic management 
systems and also the increased volume of traffic results in many accidents with 
injuries and fatalities in the first few hours. Roads become congested, numerous 
junctions are blocked. Delivery bottlenecks occur and problems are encountered 
in delivering all types of goods. In a few isolated cases people may react by pan-
icking (e.g. in a traffic jam in a tunnel where the lights have gone out). General-
ly, however, it can be assumed that people will initially react in a calm way, not 
least because the power blackout is not expected to last long (EBP 2010, p. 103). 
After this, people start to actively attempt to deal with the situation. They switch 
to alternative means of transport, form transport cooperatives and arrange for 
goods and in some cases also fuel to be brought in from unaffected areas. 
As the power blackout continues the use of means of transport is increasingly 
restricted. Most petrol stations cease working on a permanent basis. In the first 
week, individual motor traffic is mainly the result of people from outside the 
area travelling to the affected region and delivering essential supplies to relatives 
and friends or even collecting them. Petrol stations located at the edges of the 
affected area that still have a power supply are used more heavily. The loss of 
buses and trams and especially the restrictions faced by individual motor traffic 
mean increasing restrictions on basic mobility. 
Underground car parks are closed after a few days. Tunnels whose safety (espe-
cially ventilation) cannot be guaranteed are initially closed. They are opened and 
made secure once it can be seen that the power blackout will last for some time 
and that the tunnels are required to keep key traffic and supply routes open. 
Due to the somewhat chaotic situation during the first hours, some goods that 
are being transported by road experience delays in reaching their destination. 
                                            
54 This is especially probable in tunnels where traffic running in different directions is sep-
arated; this is because the fact that traffic only travels in one direction means that a flow 
of air is created in each pipe of the tunnel and electric ventilation is not therefore abso-
lutely necessary. Moreover, the risk of accidents in tunnels is reduced due to the decline 
in the volume of traffic (EBP 2010, p. 96). 
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When they do arrive, there are problems with loading and storage because infra-
structures such as airlocks, loading ramps, roller shutters or cold storage rooms 
have stopped working. 
As long as it remains unclear that a prolonged power blackout has set in, the 
companies responsible for road traffic such as urban transport operators will 
endeavour to resolve any problems arising on an independent basis. Lorries and 
towing vehicles are used during the first few days to tow away stranded trams 
and electric buses. Diesel buses can be used to implement a rudimentary emer-
gency local public transport plan. These can only continue operating if supplies 
of the corresponding fuel can be ensured. 
RAIL 2.2.3.2 
0 TO 2 HOURS 
Passenger and goods traffic on the rail network is disrupted immediately: trains 
come to a standstill on open routes, on bridges or in tunnels. Trains drawn by 
diesel locomotives or railcars can still travel to the next station, but many are 
blocked by an electrified train that has come to a stop. Because it is initially un-
clear how long the power blackout will last, managers don’t initially order any 
evacuations. However, towards the end of the first 2 hours – and also because 
the mobile phone network is gradually breaking down – passengers in some 
trains become agitated, especially if the train has come to a standstill at an unfa-
vourable location (e.g. in a tunnel, on a bridge or in an open field). 
At train stations within the affected area, reduced operation is ensured firstly via 
uninterruptible power supply and later via emergency power systems. Most 
lighting and electric doors and gates still work. However, escalators, announce-
ment boards, heaters, ticket offices and ticket machines and also computers in 
offices all stop working (EBP 2010, p. 109). 
Diesel locomotives can still be used to perform work in shunt yards. However, 
railway control centres and points require electricity. Where systems allow, a deci-
sion is made to switch to manual settings. Communication is restricted. Light 
sources also fail. Container terminals where containers are loaded from rail to 
road are affected in a similar way to shunt yards because they are also dependent 
on the public electricity grid: cranes and ticketing systems55 stop working, mean-
ing containers can no longer be properly transhipped (EBP 2010, p. 109).  
Despite the power blackout, most operations control centres that are responsible 
for controlling railway traffic, railway control centres that are used to set points 
and external facilities such as signals or track vacancy detection systems are ini-
tially still able to function with the aid of an uninterruptible power supply and 
                                            
55 Means of recording the various goods on IT systems and tracking their transport. 
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subsequently via emergency power systems. In the first few hours after the pow-
er blackout, train staff are still able to communicate with the control centre via 
the railway’s mobile network (GSM-R). Initially, the track network and points 
are not affected by the power blackout. By contrast, fans and signals stop work-
ing in railway tunnels. Some tunnels are closed as a result. 
Underground trains come to a standstill. Uninterruptible power supply and 
emergency power generators initially ensure ventilation and lighting in under-
ground railway stations. Nevertheless, people do exhibit signs of unrest and start 
to panic in some cases. Passengers leave trains that have come to a standstill and 
are evacuated via the emergency lift shafts (EBP 2010, p. 110). 
2 TO 8 HOURS 
Most stranded trains have been evacuated. As there are a large number of trains 
in the affected area and police, emergency medical services and the THW are 
carrying out operations throughout the affected area, the numerous passengers 
who have left the trains can’t be properly looked after.56 Moreover, roads don’t 
run alongside every train track. Some passengers are therefore forced to walk a 
long distance and/or rely on help from neighbouring communities. Contact with 
family and friends is severely restricted due to the increasing disruption to the 
mobile phone network (Chapter III.2.1). 
Initially, there is no change in the situation regarding stranded goods trains. 
However, any perishable goods that are being transported may suffer, depending 
on the time of year. Hazardous goods that are being transported and that be-
come stranded represent a particular risk (EBP 2010, p. 111). 
The situation at railway stations starts to ease again towards the end of this pe-
riod. DB AG is still unable to make any announcements on how long the power 
blackout will last. There are no signs of increased uncertainty. People waiting in 
the stations try to make contact with passengers in the stranded trains. 
Initially, there is no change in the situation at shunt yards and terminals because 
it is not possible to predict how long the power blackout will last. DB AG starts 
to prepare available diesel locomotives to recover stranded trains. 
Operating control centres, railway control centres and external facilities can still 
function with the aid of emergency power systems, but there is an increasing risk 
that they will stop working. During this period, the track network is only affect-
ed in winter time. In winter, parts of the network such as points may start to 
freeze if they can no longer be heated. There is no change in the situation on 
bridges and in tunnels. 
                                            
56 Although DB AG has a number of buses, it is unclear whether these could actually be 
used due to the restricted communications capabilities (coordination) and to the traffic 
problems that arise. 
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Generally speaking, it is no longer possible to communicate with stranded trains 
using either the railway’s mobile phone network or the public mobile phone 
network.57 
8 TO 24 HOURS 
Some of the stranded trains have been evacuated and the passengers concerned 
have received first aid or have been transported using buses. Diesel locomotives 
are able to tow away the first trains. However, problems are encountered when 
parking trains on sidings. Points work has to be carried out manually because 
electric points have stopped working. Yet the required coordination is severely 
restricted because of the disruptions to means of communication (EBP 2010, 
p. 112). 
Passenger train stations are almost empty. People in the stations have been in-
formed that the power blackout could last some time and are no longer waiting 
for passengers. Shops in train stations are closed. Many of the stations are also 
closed. 
In shunt yards and terminals an attempt is made to recover stranded trains using 
diesel locomotives. Corresponding point setting operations are carried out man-
ually. Most operations control centres, railway control centres and external fa-
cilities have stopped working. Some railway control centres can be operated 
manually. 
The underground rail networks affected are still unable to function. Points of 
entry to the stations are closed. 
24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
Stranded passenger trains are gradually recovered with the aid of diesel locomo-
tives. It becomes impossible to operate even a reduced timetable because of the 
breakdowns at operations control centres and railway control centres, and also 
because trains are still blocking some routes. However, an attempt is made to 
operate a restricted level of goods transport in order to supply the people in the 
affected area with essential goods (EBP 2010, p. 112). Once the stranded goods 
trains have been recovered with the aid of diesel locomotives, trains are used to 
transport essential goods to the areas affected by the power blackout. In some 
cases diesel locomotives are used to transport goods on fixed routes, allowing 
points to be bolted down. 
                                            
57 Requirements for batteries in the GSM-R devices installed in trains only call for an op-
erating period of one hour (stand-by), whereby the device can actually be used for 
15 minutes (EBP 2010, p. 111). 
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Operations in shunt yards and terminals are largely suspended. Some railway 
control centres can still be operated manually, but this only enables a very low 
volume of rail traffic to be handled. Operations control centres and external fa-
cilities are still not working (EBP 2010, p. 113). Locally, tunnels that were 
closed are re-opened once it becomes clear the power blackout is likely to last 
for a long time; this allows journeys to be continued with special precautionary 
measures. The few trains that do still operate in the region affected by the power 
blackout must manage without modern means of communication. Satellite tele-
phones are unlikely to be used on a large scale. 
Points of entry to the stations and underground railway stations remain closed. 
Operators use notices at the entrances to underground railway stations to in-
form the public that the stations will be closed for an indefinite period (EBP 
2010, p. 113). 
A LOOK AT WEEK 2 
Working in consultation with the relevant Länder departments, DB AG specifies 
main supply axes that can be used to bring key goods by diesel locomotive from 
unaffected areas into the regions affected by the power blackout. The numerous 
restrictions (loss of operations control centres, railway control centres, safety 
signals, restricted passability of tunnels, bolted-down points) mean goods 
transport can only take place on an extremely limited basis. Where possible, a 
very restricted passenger transport service is resumed on fixed routes. Some pas-
senger train stations therefore re-open. However, shops remain shut and ticket 
machines are still not working. 
In shunt yards and terminals an attempt is made to reload goods that have been 
delivered to supply the population onto lorries. However, this work is very time-
consuming because railway control centres and points have to be activated man-
ually (EBP 2010, p. 114). Some railway control centres can still be operated 
manually, but this only enables a minimum volume of rail traffic to be accom-
modated. Operations control centres and external facilities are still not working, 
but this does not affect minimum goods transport operations. 
Most of the tunnels on the supply routes have been re-opened. Corresponding 
journeys are regulated using written movement commands. 
Points of entry to the stations and underground railway stations remain closed. 
CONCLUSION 
Rail traffic, operational control centres, railway control centres, safety signals 
and points depend on the public electricity network. Although DB Energie has 
long-term procurement contracts with power stations to feed traction current 
(electricity to operate trains) directly into the rail network, power stations in 
unaffected areas would be unable to compensate for the loss of electricity in the 
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event of a prolonged and widespread power blackout. Even if this were partially 
possible, massive restrictions would set in once uninterruptible power supplies 
and emergency power systems stopped working (EBP 2010, p. 120). 
Electrically powered rail transport comes to an abrupt standstill. As a result, 
hundreds of trains and underground trains are stranded and tens of thousands of 
people are trapped to start with. Some cases of slight injury result from panicked 
reactions and unrest. In addition, passengers who have embarked on a long walk 
from a stranded long-distance train exhibit signs of exhaustion. If the weather is 
cold, many passengers show signs of hypothermia after a few hours (caused, 
among other things, because heating in the trains has stopped working). From 
the outset, there are massive restrictions on the use of tunnels and on the func-
tioning of operational control centres, railway control centres and safety tech-
nology. Individual tunnels are closed, railway control centre functions are per-
formed manually where possible. 
Use of most routes for passenger transport purposes remains restricted. For 
commuters who travel to work by train or underground train, the power black-
out means a huge restriction in mobility. Switching to the car is at most only an 
option at the start of the blackout (shortage of fuel). However, many people are 
unable to work after a few days, meaning there is actually less demand in this 
respect. 
Immediately after the power blackout train stations are able to maintain basic 
operations because of their emergency power supplies; however, they are forced 
to close after around 1 day. With some above-ground train stations this can 
cause problems due to technical and structural factors. Station shops close in the 
first hours after the blackout. Perishable goods become unusable after a few 
hours (loss of refrigeration). 
Goods can’t be transported on for further processing. It is no longer to possible 
to process large volumes of transport operations in the area affected. This causes 
economic damage throughout Germany, and also in parts of Europe. 
AIR 2.2.3.3 
0 TO 2 HOURS 
For as long as air-traffic control doesn’t prohibit passenger aircraft take-offs and 
landings, the power blackout has only a minor impact on flight operations. The 
emergency power supply ensures ground operations can continue. There are de-
lays in passenger handling and in processing arriving and departing aircraft. The 
power blackout has an impact on retail business. For example, normal levels of 
lighting and cash register systems are not available. The consequences of the 
power blackout are also felt by the airport administration in this early phase. IT 
systems can still be closed down properly using uninterruptible power supply, 
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keeping system crashes and data losses within limits. However, administrative 
tasks are already restricted. 
The power blackout initially has only a minor impact on flight operations at 
cargo airports. Although logistics delays set in, basic functions can still be main-
tained. Areas which – as previously described – do not form part of ground op-
erations experience initial difficulties in terms of functionality. 
The airport control towers of Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), the company in 
charge of air-traffic control in Germany, are supplied by the emergency power 
systems. Their operation can therefore be ensured for the time being, at least.58 
Air traffic control tries to obtain information on the size, causes and expected 
duration of the power blackout in order to ascertain possible restrictions on air 
traffic (EBP 2010, p. 126) 
The crisis units of the affected airports meet together. In addition to airport 
managers, these units also include representatives from the competent authori-
ties of the federal states in which the relevant airports are located. 
2 TO 8 HOURS 
Flight operations reduce significantly during this phase. Although the airports af-
fected by the blackout are still essentially able to guarantee flight operations, after 
just a few hours there are hardly any flight movements (EBP 2010, p. 126 f.).59 An 
increasing number of flights have to be cancelled. Areas that don’t form part of 
ground operations (e.g. catering at passenger airports, where it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to refrigerate food and drinks) are directly affected by the power 
blackout. Initial falls in sales are recorded (EBP 2010, p. 126 f.). 
The crisis units of the airports coordinate the necessary measures. There is a 
marked increase in a need for information among staff, passengers and other 
people at the airport. There is no panic. Air carriers start to take action and di-
vert an increasing number of flights to airports not affected by the blackout. It is 
unclear whether and how passengers will subsequently reach their destinations 
because rail travel is also badly affected. 
Air traffic control has decided the degree to which flight movements will be re-
stricted in the affected area. It continues its attempts to obtain reliable infor-
mation on the power blackout. Due to the increasing failure of information and 
communications technologies, it becomes difficult for the DFS control towers at 
                                            
58 Various Deutsche Flugsicherung control centres are responsible for air traffic over Ger-
many. DFS also operates control towers at various German airports: Berlin-Schönefeld 
Berlin-Tegel, Bremen, Dresden, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Co-
logne/Bonn, Leipzig/Halle, Munich, Münster/Osnabrück, Nuremberg, Saarbrücken, 
Stuttgart. 
59 In some cases DFS has already prohibited all take-offs and landings. 
 2.  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 111 
 
the airports to be involved in the crisis management process. Flights across Ger-
man airspace and also take-offs and landings at airports not affected by the 
blackout are still possible (EBP 2010, p. 127). 
8 TO 24 HOURS 
Reduced operations are still possible at passenger and at cargo airports. There 
are significantly fewer take-offs and landings. Shops and restaurants at passen-
ger airports are closed. The airport operators endeavour to inform staff and pas-
sengers about the state of developments because they, too, now have very few 
communications links that are functioning. 
Air traffic control still tries to obtain the broadest possible picture of the situa-
tion. Since it is not possible to predict how much longer the power blackout will 
last, no further measures are decided for the moment. 
24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
Almost all restaurants and shops at passenger airports shut and heavy sales loss-
es are incurred. Airport administration is heavily affected by the power black-
out, and certain computer-based work processes are no longer possible. Com-
munication with the outside world has come to a virtual standstill. The power 
blackout also affects hygiene conditions (lack of refrigeration facilities for food, 
no electricity in toilets, in waiting areas and administrative buildings, reduced 
water supply and limited wastewater disposal capability). 
Due to the cancelled flights there are considerably fewer people within the air-
port. However, many passengers (especially foreign passengers) are still waiting 
for an opportunity to reach their destinations via replacement flights. For the 
airport managers, informing staff and passengers becomes a major challenge. 
Problems are encountered with airport staff. Gradually, increasing numbers of 
employees find they are no longer able to get to work (schools closed, safeguard-
ing own home, transport problems). Nevertheless, some employees who are in-
dispensable to operations must remain at the airport on a constant basis (i.e. 
even overnight). Corresponding infrastructures (e.g. camp beds) are available in 
principle (EBP 2010, p. 128). 
Once it can be seen that the power blackout will last for some time, flights are 
organised into the affected area in consultation between DFS and the responsible 
authorities in a bid to help provide the population with supplies (EBP 2010, 
p. 128 f.). 
A LOOK AT WEEK 2 
Only staff who are absolutely essential for ground operations remain at the af-
fected airports. Shop employees, airline staff working at check-in desks and also 
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security personnel are no longer working. For both passenger and also cargo 
airports, ground operations can be maintained for as long as the emergency 
power systems have/are supplied with sufficient fuel. The only take-offs and 
landings are ones for relief flights (EBP 2010, p. 129). Some airports are totally 
closed. Such a decision is made by DFS in conjunction with the competent de-
partment of the Land administration and the airport operator. 
CONCLUSION 
For the entire duration of the power blackout, emergency power systems pro-
duce the electricity required to maintain ground operations at the airport (espe-
cially all basic security-related functions) (EBP 2010, p. 131). The fuel available 
on the site can be used to power these generators. In terms of administration, 
information and communications technologies can still be shut down using the 
uninterruptible power supply, but will then gradually stop working. Car park 
barriers and lighting are no longer working, thus restricting car park usage. In 
some cases damage results from abandoned maintenance work, inadequate heat-
ing and low temperatures (frost damage). 
Ground operations are ensured using the airport personnel planned for such 
incidents. However, due to the difficult transport conditions, there is likely to be 
a reduction in available personnel resources at the airport; employees must 
where necessary remain at the airport for a longer period/overnight. Travellers 
who arrive at the airport and those who are waiting for flights must be looked 
after for longer. Possibilities for onward transport are also investigated; where 
necessary, passengers arriving at the airport must be turned away. 
Throughout the power blackout, crisis units endeavour to consult closely with 
DFS and the authorities to maintain ground operations at the airports and to 
involve the airports in efforts to manage the incident (relief flights). 
As the blackout continues, the economic consequences grow because of the dis-
ruption to retail trade within the airports. The affected airports suffer extensive 
financial losses due to lost landing and take-off fees. The airlines also incur sig-
nificant economic damage because of the losses in passenger and cargo 
transport. The power blackout also has tangible consequences because the air-
port operators in particular and also service providers based at the airport are 
major providers of employment for the surrounding regions.60 
                                            
60 Frankfurt Airport alone employs over 70,000 people within the airport itself. There is 
also a considerably larger number of people whose jobs are indirectly dependent on the 
airport (www.ausbau.fraport.de/cms/default/rubrik/5/58 28.arbeitsplaetze.htm). 
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WATER 2.2.2.4 
0 TO 2 HOURS 
Sea ports obtain their electricity from the 110 kV grid and are therefore immedi-
ately affected by the power blackout. Loading and unloading of ships has to be 
suspended because the gantry cranes61 used at the terminals cannot be operated 
without electricity. The power blackout brings the transhipment of goods and 
ferry operations to a complete standstill. The same applies to the pumping of 
liquid goods (e.g. oil products) and to the conveyor belts for bulk goods (e.g. 
coal) (EBP 2010, p. 139; Prognos 2009, p. 66). 
In the harbour area, diesel-powered quayside railways62 can still transport 
goods, but it is virtually impossible for goods to be transported any further on 
the railway network because it, too, is affected by the power blackout and all 
trains that depend on overhead lines come to a standstill. Lorries carrying goods 
can still reach and also leave the ports. However, heavy delays are encountered 
even here. Although the loading process can still be controlled for a certain time 
with the aid of an uninterruptible power supply and emergency power systems, 
normal operation is no longer possible because the cranes in particular are no 
longer working. Handling slows down and huge lorry jams build up.63 Conse-
quently, port managers immediately stop the transport of further goods in the 
port. They make contact with the corresponding companies. The fire services 
and police are informed as a precautionary measure. This becomes increasingly 
difficult due to the failures in information and communications technologies 
(EBP 2010, p. 139 f.). 
The inland ports are also connected to the public grid and are thus immediately 
affected by the power blackout. The consequences are similar to those for sea 
ports, although the dimensions in terms of the size of the facilities and the vol-
umes of goods transhipped are considerably smaller. 
Seagoing vessels that are en route to the ports affected by the power blackout 
are informed of the situation by the port’s operations control centre. Initially, it 
is still possible to communicate via radio and satellite telephone. To avoid han-
dling bottlenecks, ships travelling in the North Sea or Baltic Sea anchor in the 
roadstead64 and await the end of the blackout there. The power supplies of the 
ships themselves are ensured through separate generators. In principle, they can 
                                            
61 A gantry crane is a stationary, but moveable crane. 
62 The quayside railways connect the transhipment terminals with the railway track net-
work. 
63 For example, 150 lorries with containers arrive at the Port of Hamburg every hour (EBP 
2010, p. 139). 
64 A roadstead is an anchoring site or a mooring area in front of a port, within its break-
waters or before the mouth of a waterway. 
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still enter and exit the ports. However, the radar system that manages/controls 
the ships suffers breakdowns, making visual navigation necessary in some cases. 
Overall, there is a considerable slowdown in shipping into and in front of ports. 
Since loading and unloading of ships is immediately interrupted, these ships are 
unable to leave the ports again as planned. As there is not yet any indication that 
the power blackout will be a prolonged one, the shipping companies accept de-
lays and mark time. Although the power blackout does not initially pose prob-
lems for the actual goods (e.g. special refrigeration containers will continue to 
cool for up to 36 hours), the delays do already cause financial damage (EBP 
2010, p. 140). 
Inland water vessels cannot be loaded and unloaded, either. Obstacles are also 
encountered entering and leaving ports. The skippers in question are informed of 
the problems and endeavour to reduce their speed. Inland ports offer very few 
opportunities for ships to anchor and await the end of the blackout (EBP 2010, 
p. 140). 
2 TO 8 HOURS 
Sea ports are no longer able to continue with either the transhipment of goods 
or ferry operations. Working in consultation with the competent water and 
shipping administrations, the harbour authority managers decide which ships 
can still enter the ports and which should anchor in the roadsteads in the North 
Sea and Baltic Sea. The managers continue to assume that the power blackout 
will last for a limited time and initially wait for the blackout to end. 
Bottlenecks increase at the interfaces (loading and unloading stations) to road 
and rail transport. 
The situation at the inland ports is similar to that faced by the sea ports. Some 
ports instruct inland water vessels to approach ports outside the affected area 
because waiting capacities at the ports are exhausted. Inland water vessels that 
could be processed have been able to leave the ports and continue on to areas 
not affected by the power blackout. All other ships (those that were being load-
ed or unloaded at the time of the power blackout and those anchored in the 
roadstead) continue to wait (EBP 2010, p. 141). 
8 TO 24 HOURS 
There has been little change in the situation at the sea ports. Transhipment of 
goods remains at a standstill. The bottlenecks at loading and unloading stations 
are no longer increasing at such a fast rate because goods trains can no longer 
reach the port and while the mobile phone network was still functioning, many 
lorries were instructed by freight forwarders not to enter the ports. 
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At the inland ports, too, ships continue to await the end of the power blackout 
(EBP 2010, p. 141). 
24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
Once it becomes increasingly clear that the power blackout will be a prolonged 
one, the ports take measures that have been drawn up for such cases. Dealing 
with perishable goods that can no longer be sufficiently refrigerated or with haz-
ardous goods becomes especially critical. The task of securing the respective 
harbour area assumes increasing importance. There is an increased risk of theft 
because security measures that depend on electricity (e.g. electric gates and fenc-
es or surveillance cameras) no longer work. 
The port authorities and the competent administrative body inform the ships 
anchored on the roadstead that transhipment of goods will not be possible for 
an indefinite period. Across Europe, people start to make plans on how to divert 
flows of goods. This is especially problematic for container transhipments.65 
Organising onward transport is also extremely complex in logistical terms. 
Since the extent of the power blackout can now be predicted, inland water vessels 
that are waiting to enter the ports continue their journey either upstream or 
downstream so that goods can, where possible, be transhipped there (EBP 2010, 
p. 142). 
A LOOK AT WEEK 2 
The sea ports affected by the power blackout can no longer carry out regular 
operations.66 Where possible, the goods that are being transported by sea are 
diverted to other ports in unaffected regions and are transhipped at these ports. 
The consequences of the power blackout are therefore also felt at ports of the 
North Sea and Baltic Sea that are not affected by the blackout. 
The sites of the inland ports affected and whose operations remain suspended 
are secured as well as possible. Almost all waiting ships have left the ports and 
have been diverted to other ports not affected by the power blackout (EBP 2010, 
p. 142 f.). The shipping companies endeavour to divert their ships to other 
                                            
65 For example, the capacities of the Port of Hamburg (10 million containers per year) 
could not be taken over by the other European sea ports at short notice. 
66 In the case of the Port of Hamburg, it could be possible for emergency operations to 
maintain basic functioning of the port (refrigeration of containers, functioning of securi-
ty facilities, handling of fewer ships, enabling these ships to leave the port). Hamburg 
has its own power stations that can be operated with gas or coal. If this type of opera-
tion were possible, then Hamburg and the port could be supplied with electricity on a 
temporary basis (EBP 2010, p. 142). However, the continuing disruptions to road and 
rail transport make it impossible for onward transport of containers to proceed as 
planned. 
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ports. Ships that are still anchored in the roadstead because they cannot travel to 
alternative ports experience problems in keeping themselves supplied with 
(fresh) food and where applicable also with fresh water. 
CONCLUSION 
The infrastructures in German ports that are required for transhipping goods 
and containers and also for conveying people and for ferry operations either 
stop working immediately (e.g. cranes, conveyor belts) or after a few hours (e.g. 
IT and means of communication). If a network that feeds the ports fails, it is not 
possible to use emergency power systems to generate the electricity required for 
normal operations (EBP 2010, p. 139). The resulting standstill at the ports has 
huge implications for goods transport in particular. 
In the ports themselves, damage occurs on quay walls and to pipes and there is 
also widespread damage to rivers if the ships back up, attempt incorrect ma-
noeuvres and/or anchor up for a long time. Water pollution may result if ships 
anchored in the roadstead discharge their wastewater directly into the sea or 
inland water courses. If pollutants escape because goods can no longer be stored 
correctly, this can result in environmental pollution and in risks to health (EBP 
2010, p. 143). 
Sea ports represent central hubs for goods transport in particular. The backlog 
of goods means shortages of certain products will develop as the power blackout 
continues (EBP 2010, p. 148). Whereas the loss of inland ports has a mainly 
regional effect, the loss of sea ports is felt throughout Germany and even across 
Europe. For example, the loss of the Port of Hamburg – which alongside Rot-
terdam and Antwerp is one of the biggest container ports in Europe – will have 
far-reaching consequences for value creation within the national economy, for 
the flow of goods across regions and for logistics chains.67 Normal processes 
and smooth interaction of the supply chains and of production that depends on 
such supply chains will not be fully restored until long after the end of the power 
blackout. 
WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 2.3 
Water is a non-substitutable foodstuff and guarantees minimum standards of 
hygiene; as such, it is an indispensable resource for meeting basic human needs. 
                                            
67 A considerable number of jobs are directly or indirectly attributable to economic pro-
cesses at ports. For example, at the Port of Hamburg alone, around 100,000 jobs de-
pend on container transport (www.hafen-hamburg.de/de/content/hpa-investiert-
langfristig-wettbewerbsf%C3%A4higkeit-des-hamburger-hafens-westerweiterung-
eurogat). Nationwide, 276,000 jobs are indirectly linked to the Port of Hamburg (EBP 
2010, p. 148 ff.). 
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At the same time, water is also of major importance for trade, the retail sector, 
industry and public institutions. For example, when used as a coolant, extin-
guishing agent and processing agent and also as a raw material, it is an essential 
input and production factor. 
Water infrastructure systems (i.e. water supply and wastewater disposal systems) 
are complex technical systems that permit the simultaneous provision of differ-
ent services. Among other things, such infrastructure systems are used to provide 
drinking water and fire-fighting water and also to divert drain water and rain 
water from private and public areas, for community sanitation and for water 
pollution control. The water infrastructures established within Germany over 
the last century generally involve systems with a centralised structure. Distribu-
tion and discharge is organised via widely ramified pipe networks. The dimen-
sions of the supply pipe network are based on demand, which is determined by 
drinking water consumption and required reserves of fire-fighting water. 
WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER DISPOSAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2.3.1 
In 2007, around 5,100 million cubic metres of water were available for the pub-
lic drinking water supply in Germany (this figure excludes 52.3 million cubic 
metres from other countries). On average, each inhabitant consumes 122 litres 
of drinking water per day, although consumption varies widely between the fed-
eral states. The proportion of the population supplied with water through the 
public drinking water supply is 99.2 % (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). 
The total volume of water removed from the natural environment each year is 
far higher than the quantity made available for the public drinking water supply. 
Figure 15 provides an overview of usage with a corresponding breakdown by 
segment. 
As services of general interest, water supply and wastewater disposal are the re-
sponsibility of local self-government. They require an infrastructure that in-
cludes both technical facilities such as water works and distribution networks 
and also organisational concepts, safety and risk concepts, employment of staff, 
tariff arrangements and service offerings. The local authorities are given freedom 
to design the institutional and organisational structures. They may use the ser-
vices of private companies. In most cases, water supply and wastewater disposal 
are organised by separate bodies. 
The following section examines both direct consequences of the power blackout 
on the infrastructure itself (Chapters III.2.3.3 and III.2.3.4) while also providing 
examples of resulting (i.e. indirect) effects of the power blackout on dependent 
systems. Direct consequences for the public are also considered (Chap-
ter III.2.3.5). Prior to this, the functions and technical elements of the water 
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supply and wastewater disposal infrastructure are presented, with particular 
emphasis on their reliance on electricity; an overview of statutory provisions is 
also provided. 
FIGURE 15 WATER USAGE FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (2007) 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009; the figures relate to the total volume removed 
from the natural environment (40.5 billion cubic metres) 
WATER SUPPLY 2.3.1.1 
Water suppliers are tasked with supplying high-quality water to private house-
holds, industry, service providers and public institutions (Mutschmann/Stimmel-
mayr 2007). This requires an infrastructure that includes technical facilities such 
as water works and distribution networks (Figure 16). 
PUMPING 
In Germany, the majority of drinking water (61.9 %) is obtained from ground-
water (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Water works use different types of electric 
pumps to pump the water (BOKU 2008). Constant monitoring and control (e.g. 
of pressure, engine speed and throughput) is necessary to ensure continuous 
pumping of water (Ebel 1995; Grombach et al. 2000; LfU Bayern 2010). This is 
done via remote control systems or using local process, measuring and control 
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FIGURE 16 OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS IN THE WATER SUPPLY 
 AND THEIR DEPENDENCE ON ELECTRICITY 
 
Own image 
Dependence on electricity 
Pumps and process, measuring and control technology constitute integral com-
ponents of pumping installations and obtain their electricity from the public 
grid; emergency power generators are often available to bridge power blackouts. 
WATER TREATMENT 
Water treatment involves processing the natural water to create drinking water, 
taking into account the provisions of the Drinking Water Ordinance (TrinkwV). 
This includes cleaning, softening, desalination, iron removal, demanganisation 
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and sterilisation on the one hand and on the other hand adjusting properties such 
as the pH value. 
The processes used generally depend on the quality of the natural water. Treat-
ment includes physical, chemical and biological processes such as the use of 
grills and sieves, sedimentation, oxidation and neutralisation (Mutschmann/-
Stimmelmayr 2007). 
Dependence on electricity 
Electric pumps that feed the water through the individual processing stages form 
an integral part of the water treatment process. Monitoring and control equip-
ment is also essential. Electric components are also used in the sedimentation 
tanks and sand filter detention basins and in the mechanical flocculation plants, 
agitators, sludge rakes and flotation plants, air compressors and scum rakes. 
Membrane filter systems and electrodialysis filters also require electrical power 
(Grombach et al. 2000). Processing media for water treatment are transported for 
use via conveyor belts, pumps and hydraulic systems in combination with dosing 
systems (Ebel 1995). If ozone is used for disinfection purposes, the necessary 
ozone generators require large quantities of electrical power. 
WATER DISTRIBUTION 
The water distribution system acts as the link between the water works that 
treat the water and water consumers; it includes the distribution and storage of 
water and also maintenance of operating pressure. 
Distribution as such takes place via a fixed system of installed pipes, the struc-
ture of which varies greatly between the different regions in Germany (e.g. rami-
fied or interconnected network structure). The piping network is operated using 
a pressure of between 4 and 6 bar, with either elevated tanks and/or pumps used 
to maintain this pressure. 
Water storage plays a major role in the distribution process because it ensures a 
constant supply despite peak loads or temporary malfunctions (Grombach et al. 
2000; Sattler 1999). Water is stored in elevated tanks or in water towers, which 
must be designed to ensure they do not impair drinking water quality. Generally, 
the dimensions of water storage facilities are designed for daily equalisation, 
meaning that if power failures occur, the period for which supplies can be main-
tained depends on the fill level at the moment the blackout occurs (Finkbeiner 
2009). 
Dependence on electricity 
Electric pumps are a key component of the distribution network. Monitoring 
and control equipment is especially important in an extensive network. For ex-
ample, the remote control systems require electrical power for data storage and 
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for process, measuring and control technology (Sattler 1999). They also depend 
on public telecommunications networks, which are no longer available after a 
certain time during a power blackout (Chapter III.2.1). 
WATER CONSUMERS 
Water consumers include industry, private households and public institutions. 
The composition of private consumption is shown in Figure 17. 
Extraction of drinking water from the distribution network requires a pipeline 
pressure that even allows extraction in buildings located in elevated positions or 
on higher storeys of buildings; 1 bar represents a height of around 10 m. 
FIGURE 17 COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
 
Source: DVGW 2008b 
Dependence on electricity 
Electricity is vital for operating the pumps in booster stations such as those used 
in high-rise buildings. Beyond this, electricity is only required to prepare the wa-
ter for further use (e.g. heating by means of continuous-flow heaters). 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Water works require moisture proofing due to the high humidity levels. Drying 
agents and moisture condensation processes are used, and also fans in some cas-
es. Water works also require corrosion protection; the external current cathodes 
require electrical power. Increasing automation of water works requires the use 
of remote control, information and communications technology to ensure the 
primary processes can also be monitored and controlled from a distance. This 
creates an increasing dependence on electricity (Ebel 1995). 
Personal hygiene 36 %
Toilet flushing 27 %
Laundry 12 %
Washing up 4 %
Cleaning and garden 6 %
Eating and drinking 6 %
Small businesses 9 %
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WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 2.3.1.2 
Wastewater is disposed of by collecting and discharging the wastewater, via the 
sewage system, into central treatment plants and by discharging the cleaned 
wastewater into surface waters. The wastewater to be disposed of also acts as a 
transport medium; consequently, faecal transport in the sewage system requires 
a functioning water supply infrastructure (Chapter III.5.2). Figure 18 provides 
an overview of the technical elements. Germany has around 10,000 sewage 
treatment plants that treat an annual wastewater volume of around 10 billion 
cubic metres; this is almost exclusively based on biological processes. The pro-
portion of households connected to the wastewater system is around 96 %. 
FIGURE 18 OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL ELEMENTS IN WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 
 AND THEIR DEPENDENCE ON ELECTRICITY 
 
Own image 
COLLECTION OF WASTEWATER 
In 2007, Germany’s public sewage network had a length of approximately 
541,000 km. At 44 %, combined storm and sanitary sewage systems account for 
the majority of the network, followed by separate sewer systems (35 %) and 
rainwater sewage systems (21 %) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). These also 
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used where special underlying conditions apply (e.g. very flat ground and/or low 
population density). The different drainage systems have advantages and disad-
vantages that make them more or less suited to different underlying conditions. 
In the case of combined storm and sanitary sewage systems, rainwater can be 
used to flush the sewers and remove deposits. 
Dependence on electricity 
In gravity sewer systems, the relevant power-dependent systems include pump 
facilities and measuring equipment (e.g. to measure flow rate). In pres-
sure/vacuum systems, electrical power is essential for maintaining the transport 
of wastewater. 
FIGURE 19 PLAN OF A WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
 
Source: Landesabteilung Umwelt, Bozen/Südtirol, www.provincia.bz.it/umweltagentur/ 
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WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS  
Wastewater treatment plants (also known as sewage treatment plants) are de-
signed to treat wastewater with a view to returning it to natural watercourses. In 
Germany, wastewater is cleaned using three stages – mechanical, biological, and 
transportation. The main functions of a wastewater treatment plant are shown 
in Figure 19 and the corresponding functions are outlined in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 FUNCTIONS OF A WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
No. Function No. Function 
0 & 1 Collected wastewater is fed into the 
sewage treatment plant via a pump
11 Digestion tank for anaerobic sludge 
stabilisation
2 First mechanical cleaning stage: 
raking and/or screening plant
12 Thickener (separation of water) 
3 Sediments and fats are siphoned off in 
the sand filter
13 Mechanical dewatering of the sludge 
4 Organic substances are separated off 
in the primary sedimentation tank; 
after this process, one-third of the pol-
lution load has already been  
removed 
14 Composting 
5 & 6 Trickle filter (5) or activated sludge 
tank (6): degradation of organic  
substances 
15 Substrate for co-incineration or  
agricultural use 
7 Secondary sedimentation tank:  
siphoning off of sludge 
16 Transport of the gas 
8 Discharge into watercourse 17 Storage of the gas
9 One-third of sludge returned to 5 or 6 18 Combustion
10 Pre-thickener: sludge is thickened 19 Power generation 
Source: Landesabteilung Umwelt, Bozen/Südtirol, www.provincia.bz.it/umweltagentur/ 
wasser/1265.asp, accessed on 8 April 2010. 
Sewage treatment plants can supply their own electricity and heat by producing 
biogas and converting it into electricity; to date, this process has mainly been used 
at large municipal plants. In Germany, around 1,200 sewage treatment plants 
(around 12 % of all sewage treatment plants) currently have facilities for produc-
ing digester gas. 63 % of plants also have combined heat and power plants in 
which around 80 % of the gas volume produced is converted into electricity. 
Another way in which sewage treatment plants can contribute to energy self-
sufficiency is by using the digester gas themselves to power heating installations 
within the power plants. Nationwide, 20 % of digester gas is already used for 
this purpose, although in some cases this involves pure thermal conversion (UBA 
 2.  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 125 
 
2008). Due to the simultaneous need for electricity and heat in sewage treatment 
plants, the use of combined heat and power plants makes particular sense be-
cause all the energy produced by digester gas is used. 
Ensuring a network-independent power supply through the production of au-
tonomous energy is also particularly appropriate for wastewater plants because 
it would improve their resilience to power blackouts; the possibility of uninter-
ruptible switching to autonomous energy should be considered (Chapter IV.6). 
STATUTORY REGULATION 2.3.2 
In Germany, the framework conditions for the water sector are determined by 
EU, federal and state legislation, and by corresponding statutory instruments. 
These include the European Water Framework Directive, the federal Drinking 
Water Ordinance (TrinkwV) based on the Federal Water Act, the Waste Water 
Charges Act (AbwAG) and the Law to Safeguard the Water Supply (WasSiG), 
along with the state laws on water and wastewater. Within the framework of 
local self-government, these laws are specified in more detail in state legislation 
and especially in municipal legislation. According to Section 4 [1] of the Drink-
ing Water Ordinance (TrinkwV), the supply of water must comply with the gen-
erally accepted codes of practice. These are, for example, contained in the tech-
nical rules of the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Wa-
ter (DVGW) and are thus authoritative when implementing statutory provisions. 
The technical rules of the German Association for Water, Wastewater and 
Waste (DWA) have the same function in the field of wastewater. 
The Drinking Water Ordinance (TrinkwV) aims to protect human health, to 
guarantee people’s ability to enjoy water and to guarantee the cleanliness of wa-
ter for human usage. In addition, the Drinking Water Ordinance obliges water 
suppliers to draw up plans for measures in the event of acute threats to health 
(e.g. where threshold values are exceeded) in consultation with the public health 
authorities. According to DVGW worksheet W 300, water storage facilities in 
the supply areas must hold a volume of water sufficient to provide supplies for 
at least 24 hours (DIN/DVGW 2005). Prior to the publication of notifications 
W 1001 and W 1002 in 2008, DVGW technical notification W 1050 »Contin-
gency Planning for Emergencies in the Public Drinking Water Supply« applied to 
emergencies (e.g. triggered by acts of sabotage or natural disasters). The subse-
quent new notification W 1002 »Safety of the Drinking Water Supply – Organi-
sation and Management in a Crisis Scenario« contains some more specific de-
tails. However, both sets of technical rules do not differ greatly in terms of prac-
tical counter-measures. 
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The Ordinance Stipulating the General Terms and Conditions Governing the 
Water Supply (AVBWasserV) obliges the water supply companies to make the 
agreed quantity of water available at the end of the connecting pipe at all times. 
Exceptions are largely permitted in cases of force majeure and/or circumstances 
which the companies cannot, from a financial point of view, be expected to rec-
tify. As with the Drinking Water Ordinance (TrinkwV), the ordinance does not 
specify any requirements concerning the provision of emergency power genera-
tion capacities. Fitting of emergency power generators is addressed in DVGW 
worksheet W 610 »Pumping Systems in the Drinking Water Ordinance« 
(DVGW 2010). According to this document, »pump systems with high availabil-
ity requirements« should be fitted with emergency power generators, the fuel 
tanks of which should be of an »adequate« size. Alternatively, pump systems 
can, according to the worksheet, also be equipped with a connection facility for 
mobile emergency power generators. However, the worksheet does not contain 
any more detailed specifications on which pumps are deemed critically im-
portant for the functioning of the infrastructure; similarly, no statements are 
provided on how this should be ascertained. 
The Law to Safeguard the Water Supply (WasSiG) and its associated statutory 
instruments (AVWasSG) regulate safeguarding the supply of the civil population 
and the armed forces with drinking water, service water and fire-fighting water 
in a state of defence. The facilities created under this framework may also be 
used in other crisis and disaster situations during peacetime (BBK 2008c). 
Moreover, the Law to Safeguard the Water Supply (WasSiG) also covers the 
discharge and treatment of wastewater to avert risks to health, although no spe-
cific requirements or recommendations are stipulated. On the basis of the Law 
to Safeguard the Water Supply (WasSiG), the Federal Government is, among 
other things and with the consent of the Bundesrat, authorised to issue require-
ments concerning the equipping of water supply and wastewater disposal facili-
ties. Pumps, emergency power generators and facilities for distributing and treat-
ing water are mentioned explicitly. Among other things, a nationwide system of 
around 5,200 emergency wells has been established for the purposes of supply-
ing water in disaster situations (Chapter III.2.3.5). 
In principle, the same legal requirements apply to the field of water supply in a 
disaster as during normal operations. In a disaster scenario, the health authori-
ties of the Länder can issue emergency response directives on the basis of the Act 
on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases and on the basis of the 
Drinking Water Ordinance (TrinkwV). In addition, Länder police and regulato-
ry laws give the police and the authorities responsible for law and order authori-
ty to intervene in urgent cases. 
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CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
EMERGENCY OPERATION 2.3.3 
The following section uses a time frame to outline the direct consequences of a 
power blackout for the supply and disposal infrastructure.68 Most of the storage 
facilities available in the networks and in plants for both electrical power and 
also for drinking water and wastewater are designed to bridge short interrup-
tions to supplies (i.e. lasting less than 1 day). To enable the processes to be rec-
orded on the basis of time, it is therefore appropriate to use a system of categori-
sation focussing on the first few hours. The time frames for the discussion are 0 
to 4 hours, 4 to 8 hours, 8 to 24 hours and more than 24 hours (see the follow-
ing Tables 6 and 7). 
Within Germany, the consequences of a power blackout on the water infrastruc-
ture systems and on the crisis management capabilities of the water supply and 
wastewater disposal companies reveal major geographic variances; this makes any 
prototypal measurement and description extremely difficult. This is firstly due to 
the structure of the statutory regulations, which place responsibility for elaborat-
ing emergency plans and for ensuring supplies on the cities and local authorities. 
Secondly, local conditions are a major factor in determining the characteristics of 
the direct effects of a power blackout on supply and disposal systems. For exam-
ple, equipping facilities with emergency power generation capacities, the provision 
of emergency power feed points, equipping facilities with network-independent 
communications technology and also topographic parameters such as gradients in 
the pipeline system all play a role in terms of response capabilities. This heteroge-
neity makes it difficult to apply findings from random interviews with operators 
on a generalised basis to over 6,200 water supply operators and 6,900 disposal 
operators within Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WATER SUPPLY 2.3.3.1 
Water supply operations cannot continue on a long-term basis without electrical 
power. It is only possible to bridge a comparatively short period of a few hours 
to up to 1 day by using elevated tanks to generate pressure, provided such tanks 
are available in the network. The storage volumes that are geared to daily con-
sumption in the supply area and designed to cover the fire-fighting water reserve 
vary from supplier to supplier. On average, suppliers can cope with supply dis-
ruptions lasting less than 1 day. However, it is possible to supply water with the 
                                            
68 Explorative guided interviews were conducted on the subject matter. The interview 
partners were from the fields of disaster control (Federal Office of Civil Protection and 
Disaster Assistance) and from water supply and wastewater disposal companies. When 
selecting the interview partners from the companies, an attempt was made to cover dif-
ferent supply structures and different-sized companies. 
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aid of emergency power generators. Consequently, emergency feed devices are 
often provided at key points in the network such as water works (and 
wastewater treatment plants); emergency power generation capacities are also 
often installed. The achievable level of performance depends firstly on the avail-
able emergency power generation capacity and secondly on the scalability of the 
systems and processes (i.e. the ability to operate these at a different – in this case 
lower – level of performance). According to experts, the performance level and 
thus the energy consumption of water works can be reduced relatively easily, 
even if technical elements do not necessarily work at optimum efficiency when 
performance is reduced. Emergency operation at a level of 30 to 60 % is perfect-
ly conceivable. Operators aim to achieve this level in order, for example, to pre-
vent major hygiene problems developing in conurbations. 
Even though it is not possible to guarantee full drinking water quality, water is 
available for a number of uses by consumers. In many cases, consumers can en-
sure potability by using disinfectants or by »boiling«. However, this requires a 
corresponding communications strategy to inform the public; moreover, the 
pipeline system may require expensive cleaning measures when normal opera-
tions resume. 
Where available in the network, remote process, measuring and control systems 
are often electrically buffered meaning they can continue to be operated for a 
few hours. After this time, the data required for operating the network such as 
the fill level of the elevated tanks and the pipeline pressure must be ascertained 
manually and communicated to the operations control centre. 
A power blackout has direct consequences for all electrically operated elements 
within the infrastructure. Equipment and systems that are not buffered by an 
uninterruptible power supply fail immediately. If an uninterruptible power sup-
ply is available, systems can be shut down in a controlled way, thus avoiding 
possibly irreversible damage (e.g. through the loss of data in IT systems). 
Depending on the connection rate of power-supply-dependent components of 
the facilities/systems and on the generation capacity of the emergency power 
network, it is possible to continue operating the infrastructure at part load. 
Where available, pumping stations that are designed to increase pressure in the 
distribution network often obtain their energy from the public electricity grid. In 
many cases, no direct provision is made for an emergency power supply and this 
may first have to be installed if required. If these pumps fail it is in principle pos-
sible to continue operating with reduced pressure. However, this may reduce the 
availability of water in the distribution network (e.g. water can no longer reach 
the upper storeys of high-rise buildings). A temporary loss of network pressure 
creates a risk of air pockets in the network or of damage caused by pressure 
surges. 
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TABLE 6 CONSEQUENCES OF POWER BLACKOUTS FOR THE WATER SUPPLY 
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CONSEQUENCES FOR WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 2.3.3.2 
With wastewater disposal and treatment, the main dependence on electricity 
revolves around the pump and lift stations in the sewage system and the opera-
tion of the sewage treatment plants by means of electrical components such as 
pumps, agitators, ventilation systems and process, measuring and control tech-
nology as a whole. Wastewater lifting pumps often have no emergency electricity 
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back-up, meaning wastewater that is produced can leak from the sewage pipes if 
pumping power is insufficient. However, the power blackout in the Münsterland 
in 2005 revealed that even unconventional solutions can work with small and 
medium accumulations of wastewater. Mobile emergency power generators and 
pumps were used to empty the wastewater tanks of the lift stations and the con-
tents were transported to the nearest sewage system entry point by means of 
slurry tankers. From here, the pipe gradients then enabled transport to the sew-
age treatment plant. 
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During a power blackout, the volume of dirty water is likely to fall because it 
will probably be impossible to maintain the water supply at normal operational 
levels and because the public will in many cases only have cold water available. 
Moreover, the composition of dirty water is likely to change. Since there is likely 
to be a reduction in water usage for personal hygiene purposes, the thinning ef-
fect of water from showers is removed, making the wastewater more concentrat-
ed. There is therefore a danger of increased formation of deposits in the sewage 
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system and of associated problems caused by blockages, odour formation and 
disease carriers such as rats. In combined sewer systems, rainwater may act as an 
additional thinning agent and transport medium. 
The fall in the volume of wastewater enables the performance of the wastewater 
treatment plant to be reduced, while a higher concentration of wastewater may 
produce an opposing trend. Reduced power consumption reduces the need for 
emergency power and fuel. It is possible to scale performance at plants with 
multiple process lines where the volume of wastewater is distributed across pro-
cess lines that are operated in parallel to each other; this allows individual pro-
cess lines to be switched off separately. 
Sewage plants are generally equipped with emergency power supply capacities 
that allow full-load operation. If the emergency power supply stops working, 
operations can no longer continue. Since electric pumps constitute integral com-
ponents, the plants cannot be operated without electricity. Although some vol-
umes of wastewater can be stored in mixing and equalisation tanks which serve 
to level out daily fluctuations and ensure equal loading of the plant, this cannot 
be done for large quantities or for periods lasting much longer than 1 day. If the 
plant comes to a standstill the volumes of wastewater are fed directly into sur-
face waters without passing through the sewage treatment plant. This inflicts 
direct damage on the environment. 
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH AND STRATEGIES FOR 
RESUMING OPERATIONS 2.3.4 
The following section provides an overview of strategies for and possible prob-
lems associated with the resumption of water infrastructure system operations. 
Re-starting the systems can take a long time for technical and organisational 
reasons. Efforts to ensure a fast and efficient recovery process are especially im-
portant for water infrastructure systems because once the power blackout has 
come to an end, a functioning water supply and wastewater disposal system can 
help other infrastructure systems and also the general public to return to an or-
derly existence. 
WATER SUPPLY 
With regard to the water distribution system, experts do not predict any irre-
versible damage to structures or equipment under normal circumstances. How-
ever, due to air pockets and the risk that contamination may have occurred, it is 
highly likely that an extensive, time-consuming and labour-intensive disinfection 
and flushing procedure will be required when restarting the supply infrastructure 
(Wricke/Korth 2007). Although fewer flushing processes are now performed in 
the networks because measuring probes allow the water quality to be constantly 
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checked at many points in the network thus avoiding the need for prophylactic 
flushing procedures, all operators are of the opinion that sufficient correspond-
ing experience is available. 
During the re-start process care must be taken to ensure that the load on the net-
work does not become too high as this could create a risk of pipe ruptures.69 In 
this context, the general public and water consumers must be included in a com-
munications strategy. 
WASTEWATER DISPOSAL AND TREATMENT 
Increased deposits of sand and faecal matter are likely in the sewage system, re-
sulting in a need for flushing measures when normal operations are resumed. 
The disposal companies have corresponding experience in such measures. Flush-
ing measures necessitated by reduced water consumption and demographic 
change are becoming an increasingly frequent element of operations and 
maintenance work. 
Irreversible damage to concrete pipes caused by, for example, hydrogen sulphide 
corrosion, is not likely to occur within a period of 4 to 6 weeks. 
Power blackouts of 6 to 8 hours are not critical to the recovery process in 
wastewater treatment plants. In such cases, a period of around one hour is re-
quired to restore full operational readiness. Even after being shut down for 4 to 
5 days (without electricity and further input of sewage material), resilient sewage 
treatment plants can be re-started without major difficulties because the bacteria 
cultures used can survive such periods. However, if the shutdown lasts any long-
er, the bacteria cultures must be re-cultivated and re-introduced to the plant. 
Nevertheless, irreversible damage to the plant’s technical elements is unlikely, 
and operations can in principle be successfully organised once wastewater input 
is re-started following a power blackout. The plants are generally designed to 
cope with large fluctuations in the volume of sewage material; consequently, re-
starting operations if the bacteria population is intact, although decimated, can 
be considered as an extreme case of such fluctuations and can be successfully 
overcome. 
INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES EMANATING FROM THE 
WATER SUPPLY AND FROM WASTEWATER DISPOSAL 2.3.5 
In addition to the direct consequences for the water infrastructure itself, a power 
failure also has indirect consequences associated with the water infrastructure 
                                            
69 This occurred in July 2007 following a failure of the water supply in parts of Hamburg 
as a result of an incident at the Krümmel nuclear power plant (personal statement by an 
employee of the BBK, 6 July 2010). 
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systems. Breakdowns or disruptions affect those areas of the infrastructure and 
society that depend on the reliable provision of water infrastructure services. 
The following section discusses indirect consequences using the example of three 
key functions of water as a resource: Water as a food, water as an extinguishing 
agent and water as a transport medium in the sewage system. 
WATER AS A FOOD 
During a prolonged power blackout it is essential to ensure a supply of drinking 
water for the population. The extent to which and the length of time for which a 
pipe-based supply of drinking water can be maintained depends on many condi-
tions, not least on the ability to supply fuel for emergency power generation. 
If the pipe-based supply of drinking water is maintained at a low level of per-
formance, operations based on a low pipe pressure can firstly lead to a reduction 
in the number of households supplied with water; secondly, if quality require-
ments for the treatment of natural water are reduced, this can lead to water be-
ing supplied below the quality standard for drinking water. In the first case, al-
ternative sources for the supply of water must be secured. In the second case, 
consumers can take measures to treat water and thus make it potable (boiling 
and the addition of chlorine and/or silver ions). 
An interruption to the water supply has an extensive impact on domestic life. It 
becomes impossible to maintain normal levels of personal hygiene, the ability to 
prepare food and drinks is restricted, washing up and other forms of cleaning 
work are not possible or are only possible to a limited degree, washing machines 
don’t work and toilets can’t be flushed. Plants can’t be watered. The longer the 
blackout lasts, the more pronounced the problems are likely to become. People 
soon run out of clean clothes, toilets may become blocked and there is a further 
decline in personal hygiene. There is an increased risk of outbreaks of disease 
(e.g. through an increase in disease carriers, parasites and pests that are able to 
penetrate living areas more easily). 
Under such circumstances, water is highly likely to assume such paramount im-
portance that providing a water supply becomes one of the most important tasks 
during the disaster. The importance of alternative sources of water increases 
dramatically. 
> Germany has around 5,200 wells designed to supply the public with drinking 
water during crises and disaster situations. The Federation administers the 
emergency wells and is responsible for investments. The Länder are responsi-
ble for their operation and maintenance and fulfil this task at the level of mu-
nicipal administration. The wells are independent of public networks and are 
designed so that they are protected against damage and pollution. The water 
can be made available at corresponding standpipes and can be transported by 
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the public using buckets or canisters. To ensure that minimum hygiene stand-
ards can be met and that meals can also be prepared, a figure of approximate-
ly 15 l per day and per person is used as a basis in Germany when designing 
emergency wells; an emergency well is designed to operate for 15 hours a day 
with an average extraction volume of 6 cubic metres per hour. However, nu-
merous wells also have an output rate of 20 cubic metres or more per hour. 
For wells with a sufficient groundwater level and an output rate of 3 cubic 
metres per hour, the Second Ordinance to Safeguard the Water Supply stipu-
lates that hand pumps must be provided in most cases. Otherwise, a combina-
tion of pumps and engines should be used. Where electric engines are used 
provision must be made for an emergency power supply feed. The water qual-
ity of the emergency wells is checked on a regular basis. Where necessary, a 
disinfection procedure is carried out using chlorine tablets, which are kept in 
stock for all wells (BBK 2008c). 
> In addition, the public can be provided with water that is not supplied via 
pipes by transporting it by lorry in »packaged« form. For example, the Berlin 
water works have a facility for packaging drinking water in pouches, enabling 
the water to be stored for long periods. Electrical power is, however, required 
to operate the machinery; consequently, packaged water must always be kept 
in stock to cover a disaster situation and must be replaced once it reaches its 
expiry date. 
> A similar concept could involve using resources of bottled-water producers 
and beverage-filling companies. Working in cooperation with water works 
and provided the plant could be supplied with power or was outside the af-
fected area, drinking bottles could be filled with water and the producer’s lo-
gistics system used to effect deliveries. 
WATER AS AN EXTINGUISHING AGENT 
In Germany, the supply of fire-fighting water is the responsibility of cities and lo-
cal authorities and includes facilities for making fire-fighting water available; the 
relevant rules are set down in DVGW worksheet W 405 (DVGW 2008a). 
The fire-fighting reserve is included when calculating the size of the water supply 
capacity of the drinking water network for a supply area. Corresponding calcula-
tions reveal that an inhabitant figure of around 15,000 represents the tipping 
point between the amount of water required by households and the required fire-
fighting reserve. Below this threshold, more fire-fighting water than consumption 
water and drinking water is required, while the pattern is reversed above this fig-
ure. The quantity of water stored in the drinking water distribution system must 
be calculated based on 2 hours’ use for fire-fighting purposes with at least 
24 cubic metres per hour (Berufsfeuerwehr Braunschweig 2009; DVGW 2008a). 
No extraction point within the network should dip below a pressure of 1.5 bar 
(Freynik 2009). 
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Different extinguishing agents are used for fire-fighting depending on the situa-
tion and requirements. These agents include water, foam, powder and inert gas-
es. Fire-fighting water is defined as »water« or »water with additives« that is 
used for cooling purposes (DIN 14 011 part 2, draft 1991, No. 2.7). At the same 
time, due to its effective cooling capacity, the comparatively low costs and high 
availability, water is the most important extinguishing agent used for fighting 
fires. 
When referring to the supply of fire-fighting water, a distinction is made be-
tween water that is dependent on the pipeline system and water that is inde-
pendent of pipelines. With water that is dependent on the pipeline system, the 
fire-fighting water is taken from the drinking water distribution system via hy-
drants that are distributed across urban areas on an even and frequent basis. Fire 
brigades take supplies of network-independent water from extraction points in 
watercourses and standing water bodies and from extraction points at specially 
created fire-fighting ponds and cisterns. Fire brigades must work on the principle 
that natural water sources should be used in preference to drinking water from 
the distribution network. However, stream courses must, for example, have a 
minimum depth to enable the suction pieces of the delivery pumps to collect the 
water. In practice, the drinking water supply network is often the only available 
source of fire-fighting water in urban environments. 
The extraction of fire-fighting water and its transport to the site of a fire depend 
on the equipment installed at the extraction stations and on the fire-fighting ve-
hicles. Usually, the fire brigades bring pumps to the extraction site and must en-
sure a supply of power to the pumps. The basic rule for fire engines is that they 
must carry a power reserve for a distance of around 400 km. This corresponds 
to around 4 hours of extinguishing operations for a vehicle. 
If no or insufficient quantities of fire-fighting water are available at the site of 
the fire, a supply must be established via a system of hoses and pipes, or using 
tankers operating in a shuttle service. Setting up long supply lines is time-
consuming and depending on length, requires a number of interconnected 
pumps. Greater recourse must be made to alternative water resources in areas 
where the pipe system is not sufficiently well developed. This requires adequate 
mapping and information on approach routes and capacity. 
A general power blackout will on the one hand probably result in fewer fires 
caused by short circuits in everyday electrical devices. On the other hand, how-
ever, there is a risk of additional fires breaking out in the industrial sector as 
cooling and process control systems stop working. During a power blackout, the 
use of alternative mains-independent means of generating heat for heating and 
cooking purposes and for lighting leads to an increased fire risk because many 
such means rely on the use of naked flames (gas and spirit stoves, ovens and 
charcoal grills, tea lights, candles or oil lamps).  
136 III.  CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT 
 
Fire-fighting in rural and urban areas is heavily geared to the use of water as a 
coolant and extinguishing agent without the special use of high-pressure and 
dispersion methods. In rural areas, the supply of fire-fighting water is less geared 
to the provision of fire-fighting water via the drinking water distribution system 
than to alternative water sources such as water tanks, standing water bodies and 
water courses. In the event of a power blackout, therefore, fire brigades in rural 
areas are less dependent on a working supply via the water infrastructure. In 
urban environments the distribution density of alternative sources of fire-
fighting water is much reduced, resulting in a comparatively high dependence on 
an intact drinking water supply. Moreover, the high population density creates a 
risk of fire breaking out in apartment blocks and possibly even across whole 
districts. Fire-fighting water is thus a critical resource in urban areas. 
WATER AS A TRANSPORT MEDIUM 
Water-borne sewage systems, which represent the main type of system used for 
wastewater disposal, require the use of water as a transport medium. Generally, 
sewage systems are designed for a drinking water consumption of 130 to 150 l 
per person per day. A decline in the water supply and thus in water consumption 
as a result of a power blackout leads to a fall in dry weather flow. 
This can trigger various operational changes and problems (BMVBS/BBR 2006; 
Winkler 2006): 
> Deposits and blockages in the sewage network, 
> Degradation of organic substances (»foul« wastewater), 
> Build-up of corrosive gases (H2S), risk of concrete corrosion, 
> Odour problems, problems caused by disease carriers (e.g. rats). 
In sewage networks, H2S builds up where anaerobic conditions prevail for long 
periods. In practice, this often occurs at transfer points where pressure pipelines 
feed into gravity sewers. 
To prevent/reduce blockages in the sewage networks and the associated hygiene 
problems, water suppliers and wastewater disposal companies endeavour to 
maintain supplies on a constant basis, even if full drinking water quality cannot 
be guaranteed under normal conditions. 
For private households, the restriction in the ability to dispose of faecal products 
becomes a major problem. Toilets cannot be flushed due to a lack of flowing 
water in the cistern. Although toilets can also be flushed by pouring water down 
them, the volume of liquid in the sewage system is not sufficient to fulfil a 
transport function. This results in the aforementioned blockages in the sewage 
networks. The public can be helped through the provision of alternatives such as 
dry toilets and mobile toilet trailers as used at festivals and which can be emp-
tied directly into sewage treatment plants. 
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CONCLUSION 2.3.6 
In the field of water supply, electrical energy is required for the transport, treat-
ment and distribution of water. Electrically operated pumps are especially criti-
cal for guaranteeing the respective functions. If these stop working, the water 
cannot be fed through the processing stages and into the distribution system. A 
natural gradient can only be used for water distribution in a few cases (e.g. the 
long-distance water supply connecting the Harz Mountains with Leipzig). Water 
treatment involves energy-intensive processes, some of which may need to be 
dispensed with in order to save energy during a power blackout. If emergency 
power generators do not offer the required level of performance, it may be pos-
sible to maintain emergency operations restricted to core processes. 
Electrically operated pumps are also required for wastewater disposal, both in 
lifting stations in the sewage system and also in sewage treatment plants for op-
erating the infrastructure. In sewage treatment plants, large quantities of (electri-
cal) energy are required for heating the sewage sludge and for operating the aer-
ation tanks (approximately 50 % of energy consumption). 
Most water supply and wastewater disposal processes are becoming increasingly 
reliant on the use of process, measuring, and control technology, which is also 
dependent on electricity. 
As a result of this major dependence on electricity, a prolonged power blackout 
would drastically restrict the functions of the water infrastructure. 
FOOD SUPPLY 2.4 
The »food« sector covers the complex chain from raw materials production 
through to purchase of the finished products by the end consumer (BLE 2006, 
p. 3). A power blackout has consequences for the entire food supply sector. 
However, because of their heterogeneous character, the individual sub-sectors of 
the food processing industry and the food trade are affected to differing degrees. 
Moreover, the geographical differentiation and intermeshing of production, pro-
cessing, distribution and consumption (BBK 2005b, p. 23) and also the rationali-
sation and decentralisation of warehousing (Prognos 2009, p. 44) create a signifi-
cant dependence on other sectors such as transport and traffic (Chapter III.2.2) 
and information technology and telecommunications (Chapter III.2.1). 
This chapter will first discuss the structures of the sector (Chapter III.2.4.1) and 
also the relevant legal bases for disaster management (Chapter III.2.4.2). The 
consequences of a power blackout for the food supply will then be examined 
using the examples of agriculture and the food trade. In each case, events during 
the first few days and the first week will be considered. The analysis of the food 
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trade will further differentiate between the first 2, 2 to 8 and 8 to 24 hours 
(Chapter III.2.4.3). 
STRUCTURES 2.4.1 
Agriculture produces foodstuffs and raw materials for further processing by in-
dustry; as such, it is the first element in the food supply sector. It is linked with 
upstream and downstream sectors such as the agricultural engineering, fertilisers 
and pesticides or food processing industries. It is also often directly dependent 
on other sectors. For example, many undertakings are dependent on a central 
water supply and wastewater disposal system. The efficiency of almost all agri-
cultural production processes depends on electricity. 
With its broad spectrum of operating forms, the food processing industry pro-
cesses the agricultural raw materials to create semi-finished and finished prod-
ucts and also ready-to-use products. Production by the food processing industry 
largely comes to a standstill as a direct consequence of a power blackout. Only a 
few processing companies have emergency power generators (Prognos 2009, 
p. 49).70 
The food trade industry ensures the public is supplied with foodstuffs. Account-
ing for around 90 % of sales, wholesale chains play a key role within the Ger-
man food market (food-monitor 2008; LZ website). 
The following statements focus on agriculture and the food trade as examples of 
sub-sectors (Figure 20). 
FIGURE 20 STRUCTURES OF THE »FOOD SUPPLY« SECTOR 
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70 However, many mills, for example, obtain some of their electricity requirements from 
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AGRICULTURE 2.4.1.1 
Germany is a major agricultural producer. Within Germany, Lower Saxony, 
Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia represent important agricultural produc-
ers. Areas of key economic focus for German agriculture include the production 
of milk and grain. Horticulture accounts for 10 % of agricultural sales revenues, 
although horticultural production accounts for less than 1 % of the useful agri-
cultural area (BMELV 2008b, 2008c; website of destatis a and d; website of eu-
rostat a, b and c; website of Statistik-Portal). 
The agricultural production of foodstuffs can be divided into the fields of plant 
production and livestock production. 
PLANT PRODUCTION 
Most feed materials and foodstuffs are produced in field crops, although some 
are produced by horticultural means in the open air and under glass. Plant pro-
duction is characterised by a one-off harvest, making storage extremely im-
portant (BBK 2005b, p. 23; Prognos 2009, p. 46 f.). 
The following areas are particularly affected by a power blackout (Prognos 
2009, p. 46 f.): 
> Harvesting and storage 
> Sorting and packing 
> Air conditioning and irrigation 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Livestock production can be divided into dairy cattle farming, beef cattle farming, 
pig farming and poultry farming, and also egg production. These areas are charac-
terised by continuous production (BBK 2005b, p. 23; Prognos 2009, p. 45). 
Beef cattle can be kept in outside-climate areas, in uninsulated stalls or in ther-
mally insulated stalls. The cost-effective option of outside climate stalls is the 
most widely used. The extent to which the different housing forms are used var-
ies regionally. Whereas dairy cattle in the new federal states and in northern 
Germany are mainly kept in modern freestall barns, most dairy cattle in Bavaria 
are still kept in stanchion barns. Beef production is mainly based on bull fatten-
ing and suckler cow farming. In 2009 farmers kept an average of 71 beef cattle 
per farm (Brömmer/Deblitz 2005, p. 51; Gesellschaft für Ökologische 
Tierhaltung e.V. 2003, p. 2 f.; website of destatis c and d; KTBL 2009e; Prognos 
2009, p. 46). Calves are kept alone for the first week after they are born, then 
mainly in groups. They have no special demands in terms of housing and are 
housed in the same way as fully grown beef cattle (Gesellschaft für Ökologische 
Tierhaltung e.V. 2003, p. 10; KTBL 2009e). 
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Pig farming is almost exclusively based on thermally insulated and electrically 
ventilated sheds. Production forms vary according to group size, namely small 
groups of 10 to 20 animals, large groups of 20 to 60 animals and large group 
bays for up to 300 or more animals. In 2009 an average of 398 pigs was kept 
per farm, although in northern Germany 1,000 animals is the norm, while in 
southern Germany the figure is around 200 animals (destatis 2009; KTBL 
2009b and 2009c). Piglet production is based on housing in large groups. The 
piglets require special zone heating, which is generally achieved by underfloor 
heating and heat lamps (Gesellschaft für Ökologische Tierhaltung e.V. 2003, 
p. 38; KTBL 2009f; Zentner 2006, p. 26) 
Poultry farming is based on thermally insulated barns with forced ventilation; the 
barns are usually heated by means of gas-operated blowers or infra-red lamps. 
Most poultry farming is based on floor pens. The fattening methods used vary 
according to the fattening period, which ranges from 32 to 60 days. Most egg 
production is in cages with small groups of hens, with an increasing proportion 
based on floor pens and free range systems. In 2007 the average number of ani-
mals kept per farm was 15,200 (destatis 2008; Homepage destatis b; KTBL 
2009g). 
The following areas are affected by a power blackout (Prognos 2009, p. 45): 
> Milk extraction (milking systems, refrigeration and cleaning) 
> Slurry technology/stall cleaning 
> Feeding/grinding and mixing systems 
> Lighting 
> Air conditioning (heating, cooling and ventilation) 
> Sorting systems 
According to the Animal Welfare Livestock Husbandry Ordinance (Ti-
erSchNutzVO), farms must be equipped with emergency power capabilities if 
the life and health of animals depend on technical facilities. An emergency pow-
er system ensures an adequate supply of feed, light, air, heat and water. The rel-
evant equipment can be designed as stationary devices or as mobile tractive units 
driven by a tractor. For electrically ventilated barns, the ordinance also pre-
scribes an alarm system to warn of malfunctions. 
In addition to feeding systems, the storage of some feed materials also relies on 
electric power. For example, hay needs to be dried, and concentrated feed needs 
continuous ventilation as it can only be stored in conditions with a humidity of 
up to 14 %. If the ventilation stops working, condensation forms and causes the 
feed to stick together, which makes removal difficult (FEDARENE 2008, p. 9; 
KTBL 2009b). 
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Finally, a power blackout jeopardises animals’ water supply. In temperatures of 
around freezing, for example, a cow requires around 50 l of water, a calf 8 l or 
more, a pig around 20 l, pregnant or lactating sows up to 30 l, a piglet 1 l or 
more (BayerFarm n.d.; Ewy 2004, p. 49; Kirchhofer 2003; Meyer 2008; 
Schafzahl 1999). 
THE FOOD TRADE INDUSTRY 2.4.1.2 
The food trade industry ensures the public is supplied with foodstuffs. The sales 
infrastructure includes supermarkets, small retailers such as kiosks and petrol 
stations, specialist shops (e.g. butchers and greengrocers) and weekly markets 
(Prognos 2009, p. 50). According to a study71, around half of all branches in the 
food trade have an independent emergency power supply. These can be used to 
maintain emergency lighting and in most cases also cash tills and IT systems, 
while in some cases the refrigeration system can also continue (BMELV 2005, 
p. 91 f.). 
Upstream from the retail trade is a sales infrastructure that is based on a central 
warehouse or on a regionally organised distribution structure. This acts as an 
interface between the food processing industry and the food trade industry. 
Here, there is a general trend towards reducing stocks and/or logistics hubs, 
leading to a reduction of stocks available to supply the public in the event of a 
disaster. Moreover, if the electricity supply is interrupted, it is no longer possible 
to manage and control the flows of goods using mains-powered information 
technology (BMELV 2005, p. 71 and 98). 
The food trade sector’s warehouses are equipped with electric industrial trucks 
and shelf retrieval systems and also electronic information processing and com-
munications technology. If a power blackout occurs, manual operation is only 
possible to a limited degree because the shelves are often up to 30 m high. The 
warehouses have uninterruptible power supply, generally via emergency power 
generators, and in some cases via an autonomous electricity supply. Around 
40 % of warehouses can maintain full operations including freezer/chiller stor-
age or can at least maintain their IT systems and restricted warehouse opera-
tions. With regard to the length of time for which emergency power supplies in 
warehouses can last, survey responses varied from »2 hours« to »permanently«; 
the average length quoted was around 34 hours (BMELV 2005, p. 70 and 102). 
When considering the overall situation concerning the food supply in a disaster 
situation, stocks kept by households also play an important role. A representa-
tive study examined the level of stocks kept in households, i.e. the stocking of 
                                            
71 The study (BMELV 2005) was based on a survey of eight companies in the food trade 
industry that accounted for around 50 % of total turnover in the food trade industry in 
2002. 
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foodstuffs that are not intended for daily/immediate consumption and that do 
not have to be replaced on a regular basis. According to this study, 71.6 % of 
households maintain stocks; 15.7 % stated they do not keep any foodstuffs in 
stock (Rasche et al. 2001, p. 36). 
In the event of a power blackout, however, the foodstuffs kept in stock must be 
considered against the backdrop of the (limited) possibilities available for their 
preparation. 
STRUCTURE AND REACH OF FOODSTUFFS STORED 
According to Rasche et al. (2001, p. 38), the households surveyed keep the 
following foodstuffs in stock: 
Pasta 49.3 % 
Sugar 41.8 % 
Flour 38.8 % 
Rice 38.1 % 
Tins/preserves 35.1 % 
Vegetables 28.4 % 
Fruit 19.4 % 
Ready meals 18.0 % 
Potatoes 23.9 % 
Frozen products (especially meat) 18.7 % 
Mineral water 18.0 % 
UHT milk 15.7 % 
Juices 15.7 % 
The range of foodstuffs kept in stock72 was determined in an unrepresenta-
tive survey in five areas of the Münsterland in 2006 (Gardemann/Menski 
2008, p. 6 and 10): 
> 8 days 5.4 % 
6 to 8 days 9.9 % 
3 to 5 days 34.7 % 
> 2 days 15.6 % 
2 days 27.4 % 
1 day 6.1 % 
Source: Gardemann/Menski 2008, p. 47 f. 
                                            
72 The BMELV recommends emergency supplies for 14 days (BMELV 2008a). 
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LEGAL BASES 2.4.2 
Critical situations in the food sector are essentially regulated through two laws 
at federal level that are designed to ensure the supply of foodstuffs. In this con-
text, it is important to differentiate between the regulations governing a state of 
tension and a state of defence as covered by the Emergency Food Control Act73 
(ESG) and other supply crises as covered by the Emergency Food Supply Act74 
(EVG). In Section 1 [2], the Emergency Food Supply Act (EVG) defines a supply 
crisis as a situation where there is a serious threat to the ability to cover demand 
for essential food and agricultural products in large parts of the federal territory 
and this threat cannot be removed at all, cannot be removed on time or can only 
be removed with unreasonable means. According to the Emergency Food Supply 
Act (EVG), the existence of a supply crisis is decided by the Federal Government 
(by means of a statutory instrument). Under the Emergency Food Control Act 
(ESG) and the Emergency Food Supply Act (EVG), statutory instruments can be 
used to issue provisions governing, for example, the manufacture, processing, 
delivery and allocation of foodstuffs, their control in terms of time and geogra-
phy; they can also be used to set prices of foodstuffs and to prohibit their com-
mercial sale (BBK 2008a, p. 22; BLE 2006, p. 3).75 In addition, the Traffic Ser-
vices Act (VerkLG)76 permits the requisitioning of transport services or means of 
transport for the purpose of transporting goods. 
The most important provisions governing the keeping of farm animals are set 
forth in the Animal Welfare Livestock Husbandry Ordinance (TierSchNutz 
VO)77. In addition to general requirements for animal husbandry, the ordinance 
also includes structural provisions designed to ensure provision for animals is 
always adequate. 
The Ordinance Concerning the Protection of Animals in Connection with 
Slaughtering78 (TierSchlV) is also of importance for the production of animal 
                                            
73 Act on Ensuring the Supply of Products of the Food and Agricultural Sector and of the 
Forestry and Timber Industry (Emergency Food Control Act) (ESG). In the version pro-
nounced on 27 August 1990. Last amended by Section 182 of the Ninth Ordinance on 
the Adaptation of Responsibilities dated 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407). 
74 Emergency Food Supply Act of 20 August 1990 (BGBl. I, p. 1766), last amended by 
Section 186 of the ordinance of 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407). 
75 Section 2 [1] of the Emergency Food Supply Act (EVG) 
76 Traffic Services Act dated 23 July 2004 (BGBl. I, p. 1865), amended by Section 304 of 
the ordinance of 31 October 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2407) 
77 Animal Welfare Livestock Husbandry Ordinance in the version promulgated on 
22 August 2006 (BGBl. I, p. 2043), amended by the ordinance of 1 October 2009 
(BGBl. I, p. 3223)  
78 Ordinance Concerning the Protection of Animals in Connection with Slaughtering dat-
ed 3 March 1997 (BGBl. I, p. 405), amended by Section 19 of the law of 13 April 2006 
(BGBl. I, p. 855) 
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products as it regulates the anaesthetisation and slaughter of animals from the 
point of view of avoiding agitation, pain, suffering and harm. The law on food-
stuffs focuses on ensuring hygiene. However, there are general clauses dealing 
with operators’ obligations to safeguard critical production areas. 
CONSEQUENCES 2.4.3 
The following section considers the effects of a power blackout during the win-
ter, because seasonal weather conditions are a decisive factor in determining the 
degree to which the food sector is affected.79 
AGRICULTURE 2.4.3.1 
0 TO 24 HOURS 
Hardly any damage is caused within agricultural production during the first 
24 hours. The winter represents a rest period for tilling and open-field produc-
tion, so there is no damage to fields. With horticultural production under glass, 
however, air conditioning and irrigation systems stop working. Storage facility 
ventilation systems that are designed to cool, heat and remove moisture from the 
stored goods are also affected (website of Gut Derenburg; Prognos 2009, 
p. 46 f.). However, production and storage facilities are able to ward off exter-
nal influences such as sharp temperature fluctuations for a certain time, thus 
preventing major losses of production. 
In animal production, emergency power generators safeguard all supply systems 
necessary to the survival and health of the animals. However, additional func-
tional areas may be affected, depending on the sector of production and on the 
available emergency power capacity. This includes the cleaning of stalls, which is 
implemented using different technical means. In beef farming, electric scrapers 
are mainly used; however, the slatted floors used in pig farming and the manure 
pits mainly used in poultry farming do not generally rely on electricity. With 
poultry farming for meat production, cleaning and disinfection of the housing is 
only required between two fattening cycles (Website of IKL a and b; website of 
KTBL; KTBL 2009d, 2009f and 2009g; Pöllinger 2001, p. 35 and 38 f.; Prognos 
2009, p. 45). 
With dairy cattle farming in particular, milking systems and milk storage can be 
affected, depending on the performance capacity of the emergency power gener-
                                            
79 With regard to the damage arising, the regions affected by a power blackout are of rele-
vance for a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. For example, damage would be par-
ticularly severe if the »north-west belt« was affected; this area stretches from Schleswig-
Holstein and across Lower Saxony to North Rhine-Westphalia and has the highest den-
sity of cattle stocks. 
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ator. With cows, a missed milking session or postponement of the milking time 
by several hours can lead to udder infections and ultimately to death. Switching 
to hand milking is out of the question as this requires a lot of practice and 
strength. The animals thus have to be dried out (Schweizer Milchproduzenten 
n.d.; Prognos 2009, p. 45; Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 12). 
Thanks to the emergency power supply, no disruptions are encountered with pig 
and poultry farming for meat production or with egg production. 
24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
After 24 hours the fuel supplies for the emergency power generators and of the 
agricultural machinery on the farms are exhausted. Operations can only be 
maintained where fuel supplies are available or can be organised. 
Where production is under glass, the effects of the cold and a lack of irrigation 
lead to a progressive decline in quality and even to a loss in production. The fall-
ing temperature also affects foodstuffs that are in storage. There is a reduction in 
the quality and shelf life of stored goods such as potatoes that are sensitive to the 
cold. In addition, failed ventilation systems and cooling external walls favour the 
formation of condensation. As a result, even goods such as grain that aren’t sen-
sitive to the cold suffer damage in terms of their quality and shelf life (Maiwald 
2005; Prognos 2009, p. 47). In animal husbandry, lighting, ventilation, heating 
and feeding systems stop working. Depending on the type of farming, the ani-
mals react in different ways to the restricted supplies. In some circumstances, for 
example, they may compensate for problems through physical properties or so-
cial behaviour. 
Lighting, ventilation and heating 
The failure of lighting systems makes numerous work processes more difficult 
(e.g. monitoring the condition of the animals). It also has a negative effect on the 
welfare, health and performance of animals (Prognos 2009, p. 45). The disrup-
tion to the power supply causes ventilation systems to stop working, and fresh 
air is fed through ventilation flaps that are opened either automatically or man-
ually. The inflow of unheated external air causes the temperature in the sheds to 
fall sharply. In addition, the lack of through ventilation causes permitted pollu-
tant concentration thresholds to be exceeded80; this reduces the animals’ per-
formance and increases their propensity to disease (website of HBLFA b; SKOV 
2008). 
                                            
80 The Animal Welfare Livestock Husbandry Ordinance (TierSchNutzVO) specifies 
threshold values for ammonia, carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphide. 
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The loss of heating has different consequences depending on the type of animal 
and housing system. Beef cattle have a higher tolerance to cold (even high-
performance breeds). Provided they have a thermally insulated bedding area, 
they do not suffer any damage to health, even in extremely cold temperatures 
(up to -30 °C) (Kramer 2001, p. 29; KTBL 2009e; Zähner 2004). Calves are 
similarly resilient (KTNL 2009e). Although they should not be exposed to tem-
peratures below 10 °C (up to 10 days after their birth) or 5 °C in the first few 
days of their life, ensuring protection against the elements and re-housing to 
form groups of calves initially prove adequate measures to prevent major losses. 
Pigs are also able to withstand the reduced temperatures (MLR, n.d.). Piglets, on 
the other hand, are more susceptible to cold. Although they can be kept in out-
side conditions, special structural measures are required (KTBL 2009f). Since 
such measures are not part of customary farming methods, the death of the 
youngest animals in particular is unavoidable. 
Poultry stocks are also able to survive the drop in temperature. However, their 
growth and laying rates are significantly reduced. By contrast, chickens require 
constant temperatures of between 20 and 35 °C and perish within a few minutes. 
Hatcheries also suffer a total loss within a matter of minutes because the high 
temperatures required for the eggs can no longer be guaranteed. 
Feeding 
The supply of animal feed using partially or fully automatic mixing and convey-
or systems also runs into problems. The required quantities of feed cannot be 
prepared and distributed by hand. From a physical point of view, fully grown 
animals (beef cattle, pigs and poultry) can generally withstand the restrictions 
created by the failure of the emergency power supply. However, the situation 
produces a significant increase in stress levels for the animals and there is a sharp 
rise in behaviour patterns such as feather pecking, biting other animals or canni-
balism. Possible triggers for this include a lack of light intensity and quality (e.g. 
colour spectrum), increased pollutant gas concentrations and draughts or short-
term temperature fluctuations (website of HBLFA a; KTBL 2009a). Since all these 
factors combine during a power blackout, changes in behaviour are likely to be 
even more pronounced. This creates further threats for animal stocks and also 
hygiene problems (e.g. through injured and dead animals). 
Another problem is that of supplying the animals with drinking water, especially 
from public pipeline networks. The supply of water stops in places where pumps 
have failed and can no longer be operated. A switch to a manual water supply in 
stalls is possible in principle because the animals’ warmth creates a microclimate 
and frequent drinking prevents the water that is provided from freezing. Howev-
er, even if a well is available, it is unlikely that large farms would be able to en-
sure an adequate supply of water for all animals. 
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The longer the power blackout lasts the greater the problems encountered in 
looking after the herds; in some cases, it is no longer possible to ensure adequate 
provision at all. Almost no water is supplied via public water system pipes. In 
many cases, mould formation renders stocks of feed unusable. Outbreaks of dis-
ease (e.g. respiratory) threaten the existence of entire farms. 
Overall  and especially in large pig and poultry farms  there are likely to be 
mass mortalities of animals (Reichenbach et al. 2008, p. 25). 
THE FOOD TRADE INDUSTRY 2.4.3.2 
0 TO 24 HOURS 
Within the first 2 hours, branches without emergency generators turn away new 
customers because lighting, cash tills and billing systems (and the associated 
merchandise management), refrigeration units, security systems and doors stop 
working (Prognos 2009, p. 50). Branches with an emergency power supply can 
continue to operate without major restrictions, although refrigeration units may 
stop working. Most people try to postpone their shopping until the power sup-
ply is restored. Distribution centres where the emergency power supply is unable 
to maintain all functions experience a sharp fall in product-handling perfor-
mance (BMELV 2005, p. 70). Moreover, the traffic situation causes delays in the 
distribution process. 
During the period between 2 and 8 hours, people start to consider the possibility 
of a blackout lasting several days. Branches without an emergency power gener-
ator thus start up temporary operations. Initially, this requires a switch to man-
ual cash tills and subsequently to manual inventory management and re-ordering 
(BMELV 2005, p. 70). As the lighting is no longer working, the cash till area has 
to be lit using torches or similar devices and used as a sales counter where the 
staff hand over goods to customers. Also, and depending on the opening time 
remaining, special offers on frozen products are considered as these will become 
unsaleable overnight. Since the fuel supplies of most emergency generators are 
used up during this period, other branches start to make similar arrangements. 
In the period between 8 and 24 hours, food trade outlets reduce their opening 
times according to the available daylight. The emergency power supply stops 
working in other warehouses. Companies’ emergency plans for such situations 
are not designed for widespread crises. They are generally geared to a power 
blackout affecting a few warehouses within a region or to the loss of a single 
warehouse. Due to the breakdown in communications and the general problems 
encountered in other sectors, the planned measures such as shift work using a 
two or three-shift system at remaining locations or approval of Sunday working 
and Sunday lorry journeys can only be implemented to a limited degree 
(BMELV 2005, p. 70 and 95 f.). 
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24 HOURS TO 1 WEEK 
During the first week there is an increasing change in consumer behaviour be-
cause the power blackout restricts customary mains-based cooking habits. Hot 
meals can only be prepared using camping stoves, gas cookers, barbecues or 
fireplaces (Gardemann/Menski 2008, p. 50). Consequently, the main products 
purchased are ready-to-eat foodstuffs such as bread and bakery products, sau-
sage products, cereals and fruit and also tinned products (BMELV 2005, p. 71), 
basic foodstuffs such as milk, oil, sugar and water, and also items such as blan-
kets, torches, batteries and candles. These products are sold out in many loca-
tions due to the increased demand, which is fuelled by intensive stockpiling pur-
chases at the latest once the duration of the power blackout becomes known. 
Very few food shops have sizeable storage capacities. Supplies can only be re-
plenished on a sporadic basis as product handling in warehouses is restricted 
and fuel for delivery vehicles is in short supply. Shelves thus empty within 2 to 
5 days (Prognos 2009, p. 50). Despite the refrigeration chain having been inter-
rupted, some food is sold or enters circulation as a result of thefts or due to it be-
ing given away later on during the blackout. This harbours increased risks to 
health (Prognos 2009, p. 50 f.) If the region does not receive any further supplies, 
stocks in shops and households are likely to be used up by the end of the first 
week. 
By contrast, warehouse stocks are considerably bigger and are available, provid-
ed an emergency power supply for freezers exists or can be established. Without 
effective refrigeration the required temperatures can only be maintained for 
around 24 hours (BMELV 2005, p. 70). 
STORAGE RANGE FOR WAREHOUSE STOCKS BASED ON A NORMAL FLOW 
OF GOODS (IN DAYS) 
> Frozen products 10 to 50, average 22 
> Refrigerated products 1 to 10, average 5 
> Fresh products 0 to 10, average 4 
> Other  7.5 to 30, average 18 
BMELV 2005, p. 95 
As the emergency power supply can’t be maintained across the board, all ware-
houses within the area affected by the power blackout generally cease operations 
during the first 2 days. 
The increased demand makes the food trade industry the »weakest link« in the 
supply chain. Since data lines and IT have stopped working, it is no longer pos-
sible for head offices, warehouses and branches to communicate with each other 
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about stock levels and demand. Due to the lack of supplies for the public, the 
authorities consider making stocks of food available and mobilising reserves 
kept for crisis situations (BMELV 2005, p. 119 f.). Nevertheless, people in posi-
tions of responsibility still expect drastic supply bottlenecks for key staple foods 
and also for special product areas such as baby food. As reports are received of 
increased deaths in nursing homes and sporadic disputes over food, the authori-
ties become aware of the possibility of risks to public order resulting from out-
breaks of local unrest. 
CONCLUSION 2.4.4 
The developments described highlight the successive build-up of problems for 
the »food supply« sector following a prolonged power blackout. The significant 
damage to stored goods and to animal stocks in agriculture, the extensive col-
lapse of the food processing industry and the inability of retail structures to pro-
vide adequate supplies for large sections of the population mean the sector’s 
ability to function within the region is reduced to a minimum. Due to the gener-
ally low level of stocks held by private households, serious food supply bottle-
necks emerge as early as the end of the first week. 
Less central regions in particular have inadequate supplies. In the few branches 
that remain open, disputes break out over food deliveries, food ration handouts 
or scarce foods; in some cases there are serious, often physical, altercations that 
can’t always be resolved by the law enforcement agencies. The situation causes 
particular suffering for people such as the elderly, the sick or small children who 
have limited capabilities in terms of taking action or who rely on special food-
stuffs. Finally, problems are encountered in ensuring supplies for the local forces 
deployed, especially those from nearby regions. 
Stabilising food supplies and ensuring their fair distribution among the public 
become a priority for the authorities. The survival of large numbers of people 
and also the maintenance and safeguarding of public order depends on these 
authorities’ ability to successfully manage this task. 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2.5 
The most important function of the health care sector is to provide medical and 
pharmaceutical supplies for the population. The sector is organised on a decen-
tralised basis with a strong emphasis on the division of labour. 
This Chapter starts with an outline of structures (Chapter III.2.5.1) of the health 
sector and of the sector-specific legal bases for disaster management (Chap-
ter III.2.5.2). Subsequently, the chapter considers the consequences of a power 
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blackout as experienced in hospitals, doctors’ surgeries, pharmacies, dialysis cen-
tres and nursing homes, by emergency medical services and by manufacturers 
and retailers of pharmaceutical products. In a first step (Chapter III.2.5.3.), the 
consequences are categorised according to the length of time (the first 2 hours, 2 
to 8 hours and 8 to 24 hours) since the onset of the power blackout. A second 
step (Chapter III.2.5.4) discusses possible later consequences occurring from the 
second day to the end of the first week. This is followed by a conclusion (Chap-
ter III.2.5.5). 
STRUCTURES 2.5.1 
The key players (Figure 21) include, among others, over 2,000 hospitals with 
around 21,000 intensive-care beds, 1,200 dialysis centres, around 11,000 nurs-
ing homes, 21,500 public pharmacies (plus 470 hospital pharmacies) and at least 
the specialist physician sections of more than 100,000 doctors’ surgeries (BBK 
2008b; Bundesärztekammer 2006; Frei/Schober-Halstenberg 2008, p. 7; DKG 
2009; Wieler et al. 2008, p. 1). Almost all establishments involved in supplying 
medical and pharmaceutical products/services to the public rely directly on the 
supply of electricity. 
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LEGAL BASES 2.5.2 
LAWS AT THE LEVEL OF THE LÄNDER 
The federal Länder are responsible for legislation governing peacetime disaster 
control, the emergency medical services and public health services; they are also 
responsible for the law relating to hospitals, taking into account the competing 
legislation of the Federal Government. The (fire and) disaster control laws of the 
federal Länder often contain regulations that refer specifically to players within 
the health sector. 
Their cooperation and participation during peacetime disaster control is also 
regulated in the hospital laws of the Länder. In some federal Länder, these laws 
(as also in Section 21 [4] No. 1 of the Civil Protection and Disaster Management 
Law of the Federal Government (ZSKG) in a state of defence) establish an obli-
gation on hospital operators to draw up alarm and operations plans along with 
corresponding exercises to ensure the provision of medical care (e.g. StMI 2006). 
Another important aim is the expansion of treatment and reception capacities in 
the event of a major damage situation or a disaster (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 148). 
Hospitals are obliged to cooperate with, among others, registered doctors, emer-
gency medical services and disaster control authorities.81 
The ordinances of the Länder that set out requirements for hospital buildings 
include various protection requirements (e.g. for electrical systems or for emer-
gency power supplies) (BSI 2005, p. 133). 
The Land laws on emergency medical services (or laws on emergency medical ser-
vices) regulate pre-clinical care for medical emergencies below the disaster thresh-
old (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 134) and therefore also the management of major damage 
situations.82 The emergency medical services and the hospitals are accorded par-
ticular importance. Most public emergency medical services are operated by the 
counties and free cities. The operators are obliged to organise emergency medical 
services on an area-wide basis and in accordance with requirements. Emergency 
medical services are provided either by the municipal operators with their fire bri-
gades or by agents commissioned by them (especially the major aid organisations). 
Finally, it is important to mention the laws on the public health service that deal 
with its inclusion in disaster control (although not on a uniform basis and 
somewhat inadequately) (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 132). 
                                            
81 Not all disaster control laws of the Länder contain rules on the participation of phar-
macies in disaster control and even if they do, this is to very varying degrees. This con-
cerns, among others, functions and duties in connection with alarm and operations 
plans (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 176). 
82 According to the official interpretation, a major damage situation exists within the 
emergency medical services if supply requirements are above normal provisions. 
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FEDERAL LAWS 
Under the Civil Protection Amendment Act of 2 April 2009, Section 12 of the 
Civil Protection and Disaster Management Law of the Federal Government 
(ZSKG) specifies, on a nationwide basis, that the Federation’s civil protection 
capacities are also available to the Länder to help them accomplish their tasks in 
the field of disaster control. According to Section 13 [1] of the Civil Protection 
and Disaster Management Law of the Federal Government (ZSKG), the Federa-
tion augments the disaster control capacities of the Länder in several areas, in-
cluding medical services and care (dual benefit concept for civil protection). This 
includes, for example, the additional provision of medical equipment pursuant 
to Section 23 of the Civil Protection and Disaster Management Law of the Fed-
eral Government (ZSKG), which allows the Länder to plan accordingly. 
Assistance within the context of »civil-military cooperation« involving the use of 
medical equipment of the Federal Armed Forces is also possible as a subsidiary 
task of the Federal Armed Forces. This requires an official request for assistance 
from the competent authority. 
The Pharmacies Act (ApoG) obliges pharmacies to ensure adequate supplies of 
pharmaceuticals for the population in the public interest (Section 1 [1] of the 
Pharmacies Act (ApoG)). Other provisions of the Act and also the provisions of 
the Ordinance on the Operation of Pharmacies (Apo BetrO) define the necessary 
requirements for this. For example, the Ordinance on the Operation of Pharma-
cies (Apo BetrO) regulates the minimum stocks to be held by public and hospital 
pharmacies and also the provision of pharmaceuticals to the emergency medical 
services (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 168 ff.). Hospital pharmacies must keep stocks of 
drugs that equate to at least the average demand over a 2-week period. 
The Pharmaceuticals Act (AMG) contains strict regulations for the licensing, 
manufacture, purchase and sale of pharmaceuticals in the interests of protecting 
consumers. Derogations are stipulated to cover special emergencies and threat 
situations (e.g. epidemics). Section 47 [1] No. 5 of the Pharmaceuticals Act 
(AMG) stipulates that as an exception to the pharmacy monopoly, pharmaceuti-
cals may also be sold to central pharmaceuticals procurement centres to cover 
own requirements of authorities, organisations and companies. 
Finally, it is also important to mention the Narcotics Law (and the Ordinance 
Concerning Foreign Trade in Narcotics) and also medical device legislation (and 
especially the exemptions contained in Section 44). 
GUIDELINES 
The BBK (2007) has issued guidelines for the health sector aimed at reducing the 
vulnerability of disaster control and assistance organisations. Under these guide-
lines, control measures in relevant areas can be verified by means of a checklist. 
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Among the guidelines geared towards a power blackout and individual estab-
lishments (e.g. BBK 2006), it is important to mention a publication by the BBK 
on risk and crisis management in hospitals (BBK 2008b). 
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES 2.5.3 
Even immediately after the power blackout, there are increased numbers of inju-
ries and fatalities due to accidents; the number of injuries and fatalities is in-
creased due to restricted medical rescue and transport capabilities (Prognos 
2009, p. 57, 73 and 75). Hospitals, old people’s homes and nursing homes in 
particular have large numbers of people in a critical condition who cannot toler-
ate a deterioration in treatment conditions. 
HOSPITALS 2.5.3.1 
According to DIN-VDE guideline 0100-710, hospitals have an emergency power 
supply that maintains essential systems in core operational areas for 24 hours. 
Corresponding requirements are also stipulated in the hospitals legislation of the 
individual federal Länder, in special ordinances or in individual decisions relat-
ing to building law (Geier et al. 2009, p. 76). Fuel supplies must be designed to 
last for 1 or 2 days, but can last a little longer with correspondingly lower loads. 
According to a study by Prognos (2009, p. 72 f.), the emergency power genera-
tors that are installed generate 5 to 10 % of a hospital’s average power require-
ments (BBK 2008b, p. 77). This allows the following equipment to be operated: 
> Emergency operating theatres including ventilation 
> Life-supporting medical systems on intensive-care wards (e.g. ventilators) 
> Refrigeration of blood supplies and organs 
> Heating and water pumps 
> Emergency lighting 
> Patient transport lifts 
> Ventilation in sensitive areas 
> Sterilisation (Prognos 2009, p. 72) 
By contrast, areas and equipment that are not directly required for the treatment 
of sick and injured persons are not supplied with electricity: 
> Administration, data centre 
> Physiotherapy, etc. 
> Canteen 
> General hot water supply 
> Large items of diagnostic equipment such as MRI and CT scanners (Prognos 
2009, p. 73). 
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In the first 2 hours following the power blackout the main disruptions are of an 
organisational nature. Processes are delayed due to the failure of information 
and communications systems, because administrative computers no longer work 
and because patient files can’t be processed. In the medical field, some areas of 
diagnostics are affected and apparatus-based diagnoses in particular can no 
longer be made or can only be made on a restricted basis (Prognos 2009, p. 74). 
In addition, the consequences of the blackout in other sectors of society affect op-
erations within hospitals. For example, an increase in injuries typically associated 
with road accidents can be expected, especially if the power blackout occurs in the 
evening. There may also be injuries caused by chemicals leaking from industrial 
processes that can no longer be controlled (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 12). 
More accident victims can be expected in the period from 2 to 8 hours after the 
power blackout strikes. Endeavours are therefore made to mobilise additional 
personnel to care for new admissions and to look after patients who are unsure 
or who need assistance. This proves problematic because of the restricted avail-
ability of telephones. As the blackout continues, the loss of office activities for 
all work processes becomes a problem (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 59) because 
patient data, etc. can’t be viewed and forwarded. The increase in external calls 
received starts to cause a serious problem in terms of overload on telephone 
switchboards (Prezant et al. 2005). Correct storage of pharmaceuticals and medi-
cal products is jeopardised if adequate refrigeration can’t be ensured. Due to the 
fact that the canteen is no longer operational and also to the delivery problems 
caused by the traffic situation, hot meals must be at least partially replaced by 
cold food. Potable water becomes scarce. 
In the period from 8 to 24 hours after the power blackout strikes, the disrup-
tions to medical care increase significantly and extensive organisational 
measures must be taken to mitigate the consequences. As the extent of damage 
has now been roughly ascertained and the expected duration of the blackout has 
been communicated to the public, alarm and emergency plans are put in place. 
These generally provide for the discharge of as many patients as possible (e.g. 
those with minor injuries and convalescents). The establishment of »emergency 
hospitals«83 is also considered. Due to the restricted heating and lighting capaci-
ties, the patients who remain are concentrated together and additional blankets 
are distributed. An alternative roster must also be implemented and staff must 
live in at the hospital where necessary. Administrative activities such as main-
taining patient records have to be carried out manually (Göbel et al. 2008, p. 24; 
Prognos 2009, p. 9, 73 f.; Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 19 and 59). 
                                            
83 The last auxiliary hospital in the Federal Republic was taken out of service in 2007 
after the auxiliary hospitals were gradually removed from the obligation in the 1990s 
(Peters 2009,p. 22). 
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As the traffic situation gradually eases, the number of accident victims attending 
hospitals declines. On the other hand, people freed from lifts, traffic jams or 
trains are admitted suffering from symptoms of dehydration, debilitation and 
hypothermia. Many people who receive medical care at home are brought to 
hospitals by relatives or care services. The number of self-admissions increases 
(Prognos 2009, p. 58; Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 12); in some cases this is be-
cause domestic emergency call systems and medical equipment used at home are 
no longer working (Stahlhut 2010, p. 19). 
It is no longer possible to guarantee the supply of hot meals to patients. In a few 
hospitals ready-prepared foods can still be supplied by delivery services. There is 
a risk that the disruption to nutrition will have a detrimental impact on the heal-
ing process and that the availability of special nutrition for diabetics, dialysis 
patients and others will become a problem (Hye 2000, p. 24). 
DOCTORS’  SURGERIES 2.5.3.2 
Most doctors’ surgeries do not have any emergency power capacities and it is 
also rare for medical centres to have such capacities. General medical practices 
can maintain only rudimentary operations without electricity because many di-
agnoses can be made without using mains-dependent equipment. By contrast, 
specialist doctors’ surgeries rely on specialist technology and cannot therefore 
operate without electricity (Prognos 2009, p. 74). 
During the first 2 hours after the power blackout doctors can continue to provide 
treatment for minor cases. Patients whose diagnosis and treatment requires the 
use of equipment or very good lighting conditions must be turned away or sent 
to a hospital. Some patients with appointments postpone their visits due to the 
power blackout or on account of the major traffic problems. In many practices 
doctors will endeavour to care for their patients in the best possible way, even if 
they can no longer access certain diagnostics equipment or their electronic pa-
tient and information data records. 
If the power blackout occurs in winter, doctors’ surgeries must close in the peri-
od from 8 to 24 hours after the power blackout because of the effects of the 
cold. The mobilisation of registered doctors to assist with hospital care (e.g. in 
accordance with the respective Land disaster control laws84) is therefore consid-
ered. Doctors can for example be deployed in reception centres that are set up or 
used to support the emergency medical services in an attempt to maintain decen-
tralised medical care (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 20). 
                                            
84 For example, in Baden-Württemberg, Section 5 [3] of the Disaster Control Act dated 
22 November 1999 (GBl. p. 625), last amended by Section 3 of the law of 7 March 
2006. 
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PHARMACIES 2.5.3.3 
Most public pharmacies have no emergency power capacities (Prognos 2009, 
p. 74). In the first 2 hours after the power blackout, operations are therefore 
hampered because lighting and cash systems do not work. If pharmacies have 
automatic inventory systems, drugs and other products that are delivered must 
be placed into stock and checked out by staff. Electronic ordering systems can 
no longer be used. 
Fewer customers visit pharmacies in the period up to 8 hours after the blackout. 
In addition, the lack of lighting/makeshift lighting means pharmacies’ opening 
times are restricted to daylight hours. 
Within a period of up to 24 hours after the power blackout, medications that 
require refrigeration and that have to be stored at between 2 and 8 °C become 
unusable. Customers must therefore be referred to hospitals for the issue of such 
medications (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 59). The first pharmacies announce that 
they will close. 
DIALYSIS CENTRES 2.5.3.4 
Most dialysis centres are not located in hospitals and are therefore not subject to 
their requirements in terms of building and safety engineering. Hieter et al. 
(2010) assume that most dialysis centres do not have emergency power supplies. 
Around 60,000 to 80,000 people in Germany rely on dialysis. Essentially, there 
are two types of dialysis – haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis. Both methods 
require large quantities of dialysis fluid that cannot be allowed to freeze. For 
haemodialysis (around 95 % of patients) up to 27 l are required per week and 
per patient, while for peritoneal dialysis the figure is up to 87.5 l per week and 
per patient. Due to the required space and the nursing care required, the vast 
majority of haemodialysis patients undergo dialysis in dialysis centres. In addi-
tion, dialysis centres forward orders for peritoneal dialysis patients (who de-
pending on capacity store their dialysis fluid at home) to suppliers or central 
warehouses (Baxter 2009; Breuch 2003, p. 247; Toepfer n.d. a and n.d. b; web-
site of open drug database; website of Roche; Wieler et al. 2008, p. 2; LIGA. 
NRW 2005, p. 1). 
The treatment of haemodialysis patients is impaired in the first 2 hours after the 
power blackout. Although modern dialysis equipment is fitted with batteries 
that maintain key functions for a certain time, older equipment may not have 
such batteries and treatment has to be interrupted (Breuch/Servos 2006, 
p. 209 f.). In the period from 2 to 8 hours after the blackout even newer equip-
ment stops working and medical care in dialysis centres gradually comes to a 
halt. 
 2.  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 157 
 
In the period up to 24 hours after the power blackout it therefore becomes nec-
essary to take measures to ensure further treatment of patients and avoid panic. 
A start is made on transferring patients, equipment and dialysis products to hos-
pitals or to reception centres, provided sterile conditions can be established at 
such centres. 
OLD PEOPLE’ S HOMES AND NURSING HOMES 2.5.3.5 
Some old people’s homes and nursing homes have an emergency power supply 
(in accordance with hospital regulations specific to the federal states) that is ca-
pable of lasting a few hours.85 In the period of time up to 2 hours after the pow-
er blackout, staff endeavour to respond to the loss of electrical equipment. For 
example, oxygen concentrators are replaced by pressurised gas cylinders where 
possible. Further problems arise due to the failure of facilities such as lifts, door 
access systems and emergency communications and also as a result of possible 
staff shortages (Prognos 2009, p. 75). 
Over the next 6 hours there is little change in the situation, provided the emergen-
cy power generators have enough fuel. If the generator is not sufficiently powerful 
to ensure the kitchen can continue operations, disruptions are encountered with 
the supply of food. If the emergency power generator can’t be replenished with 
fuel or if there is no autonomous power supply, the emergency lighting, hot wa-
ter supply, general air conditioning and refrigeration for the morgue all stop 
working. In the winter, the temperature in internal rooms will fall relatively 
quickly if no heating is available. Depending on the situation, medical treatments 
must be interrupted and it becomes necessary to transfer at least some of the 
patients (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 59; ZVEI n.d.). 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 2.5.3.6 
The emergency medical services86 work in accordance with the Länder laws on 
disaster control and the laws on emergency medical services87 in providing first 
aid and transporting sick and injured persons; they also rescue and free people, 
                                            
85 For Baden-Württemberg it was established that »only around one-third of old people’s 
homes and nursing homes have an emergency power supply« (Hiete et al. 2010, F 10).  
86 For medical care in particular: Workers’ Samaritan Federation [Arbeiter-Samariter-
Bund] (ASB), German Lifeguard Association [Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft] 
(DLRG), German Red Cross [Deutsches Rotes Kreuz] (DRK), St. John Accident Assis-
tance [Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe e.V.] (JUH), fire service, Maltese Cross Relief Service 
[Malteser Hilfsdienst] (MHD). The use of these aid organisations in disaster control is 
regulated in the disaster control laws of the Länder; the Act on the Regulation of the 
Legal Relationships of Volunteers of the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief 
applies to the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). 
87 For example, in North Rhine-Westphalia the Emergency Medical Services Act in the 
version dated 16 July 1998 (GBl. 1998, p. 437), last amended by the law of 
10 November 2009 (GBI. p. 643). 
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repair or replace broken-down infrastructures and clear obstacles. The opera-
tions control centres are equipped with emergency power generators to ensure 
an uninterruptible power supply. The equipment required for operations is sup-
plied with power via the vehicle wiring systems or through batteries (website of 
Freiwillige Feuerwehr Schwandorf; website of THW a, b). 
The number of accidents increases in the first 2 hours following the power 
blackout (Chapter III.3). At the same time, the capacities for making emergency 
calls are heavily restricted as communications infrastructures break down or 
become overloaded. After a while and once it appears that the power blackout 
will last for some time, there is an increase in traffic from workplaces. This 
hampers the ambulances, which need significantly more time to complete their 
missions (Prognos 2009, p. 57 f. and 81). 
The traffic situation eases a little in the time between 2 and 8 hours. Emergency 
services and emergency medical services can now use transport routes better 
(Prognos 2009, p. 58). Most operations involve the provision of care and clear-
ing long traffic jams, and also freeing people from lifts and trains (Steetskamp/ 
Wijk 1994, p. 12). Radio communication encounters increasing problems as the 
BOS radio system gradually stops working (Chapter III.2). The batteries for the 
medical equipment in the ambulances (for electrocardiograms or defibrilation) 
have to be charged at headquarters  provided their emergency generators are 
working. 
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADE 2.5.3.7 
The availability of pharmaceutical products is of crucial importance for medical 
care. The following are required: 
> the correct drugs 
> in the correct quantity 
> at the correct time 
> in the correct place 
> for the correct recipient (Ackermann et al. 2009b, p. 468). 
The pharmaceuticals industry produces drugs in accordance with demand. Med-
icines are either sold directly by manufacturers to hospitals and pharmacies or 
are sold via the wholesale pharmaceuticals trade.88 The wholesale pharmaceuti-
cals trade also performs a warehousing function. This is to enable production 
delays within the industry to be balanced out and to cover any peak demand for 
medicines. Moreover, stockholding by pharmacies is now optimised to such an 
extent that instead of storing medicines, pharmacies receive deliveries from 
                                            
88 The loss of production, communications (e.g. the Internet) and postal services would 
affect direct dispatch to end consumers to such an extent that it is unlikely it would be 
able to continue functioning.  
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wholesalers several times a day, with wholesalers now playing an increasingly 
decentralised warehousing role (website of PHAGRO e.V., a, b and c). 
The power blackout has a direct impact on the production of drugs, which even 
if emergency power capacities are installed at several locations, cannot be main-
tained at adequate levels in order to safeguard segments of production and the 
provision of critical and production-related processes. Moreover, the storage of 
fuel supplies on site may be restricted on operational grounds. The wholesale 
pharmaceuticals trade is also affected to a considerable extent. Many aspects of 
warehousing and associated activities such as sorting, transporting or packaging 
require the use of electricity. Moreover, ensuring a flow of goods that is in line 
with requirements relies on functioning communication between traders and 
pharmacies along with an intact sales infrastructure. 
Pharmaceuticals production comes to a halt within the first 2 hours of the power 
blackout. The wholesale pharmaceuticals trade is also badly affected. For exam-
ple, automated picking systems stop working, meaning pharmaceutical products 
can now only be picked by manual means. However, this is considerably ham-
pered because lighting and data processing systems have stopped working. Pro-
cessing incoming and outgoing deliveries of goods is therefore much more time-
consuming. This creates delays within sales, and these are exacerbated by the 
transport situation. 
In the time period up to 8 hours after the power blackout, production opera-
tions and also operations within the warehouses come to a total standstill. Some 
employees leave their workplace during this phase. The failure of communica-
tions systems means orders can now only be submitted via suppliers. 
Around 24 hours after the power blackout it is no longer possible to guarantee 
the sale of pharmaceutical products differentiated on the basis of time, local area 
and requirements. No further orders can be accepted, goods can’t be processed 
accordingly and can’t be delivered due to the increasingly dwindling supplies of 
fuel for vehicles. Moreover, temperature-sensitive products perish at manufac-
turers and in warehouses. 
FURTHER CONSEQUENCES – A LOOK AT WEEK 1 2.5.4 
After just 24 hours, it can be seen that the loss of the power supply places con-
siderable strains on medical care, which is based on the division of labour and 
which has a decentralised structure. Problems at individual facilities are increas-
ingly compounded and increasingly impair the sector’s role of supplying the 
population with medical and pharmaceutical services. 
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In addition, the increasingly apparent consequences of the blackout in other sec-
tors of society have a growing impact on the supply of medical services and 
products: 
> The food supply sector suffers breakdowns in production, in trade and in 
transport (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 58 ff.). If the power blackout lasts for sev-
eral days the supply chain in the affected area suffers a virtual total collapse. A 
disruption in the supply of foodstuffs and special diets to medical facilities im-
pairs treatment processes and may contribute to an increase in deaths. 
> Problems in supplying drinking water and disposing of wastewater and waste 
jeopardise the ability to guarantee minimum standards of hygiene. 
> The disruptions to the transport and traffic infrastructure hamper not only 
the deployment of emergency medical services but also transport and reloca-
tion operations and also the supply of medical goods. 
> The loss of communications services disrupts key medical supply interfaces: 
between the public and health service establishments (e.g. emergency calls), 
between health service establishments (e.g. provision of advance information 
to hospitals by the emergency medical services) and within the establishments 
(e.g. between wards or functional areas of a hospital such as medical supplies, 
care, technical services). 
> The losses of functions in the financial services sector mean it is no longer 
possible to make purchases or pay invoices. This primarily affects the public’s 
ability to access pharmacy services and the pharmaceuticals trade. 
In the light of the emerging consequences of a serious disruption to or loss of the 
functional interdependencies that these sectors have with the health sector, the 
authorities identify an urgent need for action. 
HOSPITALS 
After just a few days, hospitals face bottlenecks in the supply of blood products, 
insulin and special diets. Since most hospitals do not have their own hospital 
pharmacies, some medicines become scarce. As time passes, (special) waste that 
has not been disposed of and the lack of sterile products and fresh linen lead to 
hygiene problems (Göbel et al 2008, p. 22 f.; Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 68). 
Problems intensify at specialist units such as intensive care wards. It becomes 
necessary to close other areas where ambient air has to be specially controlled or 
where controlled underpressure is required. Even hospital pharmacies that hold 
stocks of drugs and medical supplies sufficient to last 14 days are unable to meet 
demand. Some medicines can only be issued on a sporadic basis or cannot be 
issued at all. Attempts to draw on the medicine supplies of pharmacies, the trade 
and manufacturers prove inadequate after just a few days. 
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Only limited quantities of drinking water are available; in some cases it becomes 
necessary to use emergency drinking water wells located in the vicinity (Chap-
ter III.2.3). 
DOCTORS’  SURGERIES 
Doctors’ surgeries are closed within the first few days. It is no longer possible to 
offer full decentralised provision of care. Doctors support the provision of medi-
cal care in hospitals and reception centres. Provided corresponding requirements 
are met, some larger doctors’ surgeries are planned as ports of call for people 
seeking assistance and as support centres for hospitals. 
PHARMACIES 
A small number of pharmacies are given the role of distributing medicines, pro-
vided they are equipped with emergency power generators and provided suffi-
cient stocks/continual replenishments can be ensured. 
DIALYSIS CENTRES 
Initially, there is no permanent transfer of patients, equipment and dialysis 
products to hospitals or reception centres and it is therefore necessary to estab-
lish emergency power capacities for dialysis centres. If this is not possible, pa-
tients with total kidney failure can only survive for a few days or weeks without 
dialysis treatment (ÄKV n.d.).89 In such cases, managers realise the need to or-
ganise transfers for the people concerned. 
OLD PEOPLE’ S HOMES AND NURSING HOMES 
If patients who require intensive medical care can be transferred and emergency 
power is available, old people’s homes and nursing homes can continue to oper-
ate. However, the loss of toilets, inadequate fresh water and the supply of medi-
cal products, medicines or clean linen then become critical factors in determining 
the quality of care (Steetskamp/Wijk 1994, p. 59). But since many establish-
ments are no longer working or are no longer able to receive adequate supplies, 
patients must be transferred to hospitals or reception centres; however, these 
establishments are also facing the same problems. 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 
The work of the emergency medical services remains heavily restricted due to the 
public’s reduced ability to make emergency calls and due to the limited internal 
communications capabilities. There is a sharp drop in the medical equipment 
                                            
89 If the power blackout lasts for several weeks the number of victims is likely to run into 
five digits (Reichenbach et al. 2008, p. 2). 
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and products available in the ambulances. Moreover, if places are cut off by 
heavy snow falls and/or reduced road clearing services, it becomes necessary to 
deploy rough-terrain vehicles of the Federal Armed Forces within the framework 
of administrative assistance. 
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADE 
In the affected area, the production of medical and pharmaceutical products 
by manufacturers comes to a halt. There are no trade deliveries in the area, 
either. Where possible, warehoused stocks of temperature-sensitive products 
are moved outside the affected area. Transport operations from unaffected 
areas are organised to ensure supplies of pharmaceutical products over the 
longer term. 
CONCLUSION 2.5.5 
The field of medical and pharmaceutical supplies, which is organised on a decen-
tralised basis in accordance with the division of labour, is only able to withstand 
the consequences of a power blackout for a short time. After just 24 hours, the 
health sector’s ability to function is considerably impaired. Over the next few 
days dialysis centres and old people’s homes and nursing homes have to be at 
least partially evacuated. Most doctors’ surgeries and pharmacies are closed. 
Domestic emergency call systems and medical equipment for domestic care can 
longer be used. It is no longer possible to continue the production and sale of 
pharmaceutical products within the area. The stocks at pharmacies that remain 
open and also the stocks at hospital pharmacies become increasingly depleted 
without continuous replenishments. 
The interdependencies with other infrastructures have a negative impact. It 
becomes clear that the sector is crucially dependent on, for example, food-
stuffs, fuel, water and means of communication. The makeshift supply of these 
goods and the exhaustion of internal management capacities reveal the health 
sector’s limits of resilience. Over time, the few key central hospitals that are 
able to maintain an autonomous electricity supply or that have uninterruptible 
standby power systems find themselves overstretched in their attempts to com-
pensate for the loss of outpatient and domestic care. Within one week, the sit-
uation in the sector deteriorates to such an extent that even with intensive de-
ployment of regional assistance capacities, a total collapse in the supply of 
medical and pharmaceutical products and services is likely. The disastrous sit-
uation and the resulting increase in deaths make it necessary to enlist addition-
al external support. 
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FINANCIAL SERVICES 2.6 
Fast and secure processing of various financial services is of vital importance to a 
modern economy. Such services include: 
> Execution of cashless payment transactions,90 
> Acceptance and administration of deposits from the public 
> Issuing of loans 
> Administration and management of investments (e.g. securities, foreign ex-
change) and  
> Operation of a multilateral trading system (stock exchanges). 
STRUCTURES 2.6.1 
The »financial services« sector is heavily dependent on a continuous and stable 
power supply. This is due to the mains-based information and communications 
infrastructures used for communications, for data management, for tracking and 
controlling flows of goods and money and for the transmission of payments and 
data traffic. These information and communications infrastructures represent the 
sector’s »nervous system«. A failure of these infrastructures and the resulting diffi-
culties in providing or inability to provide key financial services would have seri-
ous consequences for industry and society (EBP 2010, p. 34). 
Financial services are provided by numerous players, including: 
> Banks, insurance companies, other financial companies and other bank-
related organisations (e.g. the Postbank, credit card organisations) 
> Central banks (European Central Bank, German Bundesbank) 
> Clearing organisations (e.g. Clearstream, SIX Group, other clearing net-
works/clearing groups91) 
The following section considers three areas of the overall »financial services« 
system in more detail: the system for deposits from the public and issuing of 
loans (banking services system), the system of electronic payment transactions 
and associated elements (payment transactions and data traffic system) and the 
system for administering and trading in investments of all types (stock exchange 
systems). 
                                            
90 In 2007, non-cash transactions via current accounts were made up of 6.9 billion direct 
debits and 5.2 billion transfers (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009a, p. 52) 
91 In Germany, there are five »clearing networks« or »clearing groups« for inter-bank trans-
fers; these are interlinked with each other and also process payments with other countries. 
These are the network of the German Bundesbank, the postal clearing network of the 
Deutsche Postbank, the network for private clearing transactions of the major, regional 
and private banks, the savings clearing network of the municipal banks and savings banks 
and the network for main clearing transactions of the cooperative banks. 
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All sub-systems are based on extensive information and communications systems. 
BANKING SERVICES SYSTEM 
The system for deposits from the public and loan issues (Figure 22) essentially 
comprises the following elements: 
> Employers (wage payers) 
> Labour force (wage recipients, savers) 
> Banks (banks, insurance companies and pension funds, other bank-related 
organisations (e.g. Post) 
> Borrowers (companies, individuals) 
FIGURE 22 BANKING SERVICES SYSTEM (SIMPLIFIED VIEW) 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 36 
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND DATA TRAFFIC SYSTEM 
Essentially, a payment transactions and data traffic system (Figure 23) comprises 
the following elements: 
> Payers 
> Beneficiaries 
> Banks (actual payment intermediaries: banks, Postbank, third parties) 
> Clearing organisations (clearing networks/clearing groups) 
> Central banks (European Central Bank, German Bundesbank) 
STOCK EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
The stock exchange system (Figure 24) primarily comprises the following ele-
ments: 
> Principals (for purchase/sale) 
> Banks executing the orders of the relevant principals 
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> Trading platforms (organisations operating the platforms, e.g. stock ex-
change) 
> Clearing organisations 
> Central banks 
FIGURE 23 PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND DATA TRAFFIC SYSTEM (SIMPLIFIED VIEW) 
 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 37 
FIGURE 24 STOCK EXCHANGE SYSTEM (SIMPLIFIED VIEW) 
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LEGAL BASES 2.6.2 
The relevant legal bases for this sector are presented in accordance with the 
aforementioned classification into the sub-sectors of the banking services system, 
the payment transactions and data traffic system, and stock exchange systems.92 
BANKING SERVICES SYSTEM 
There is no specific set of precautionary statutory instruments for this sub-sector 
that, for example, explicitly differentiates between special obligations as regards 
contingency measures, security concepts, security officers, etc. Instead, legisla-
tion is mainly based on general clauses that stipulate organisational and security 
obligations that are to be fulfilled through interpretations of standards or 
through the specification of more specific details by the authorities (BSI 2005, 
p. 73). One example is Section 25a [1] of the German Banking Act (KWG), 
which stipulates special organisational duties for banking and financial services 
institutes. As well as dealing with aspects relating to electricity and/or IT (e.g. IT 
security measures), these obligations also cover aspects relating to internal audit-
ing, documentation of business activities, etc. Section 25 [1] No. 3 contains ex-
plicit statements on IT-specific obligations; according to this clause, risk man-
agement must include establishment of an appropriate emergency concept, espe-
cially for IT systems. In addition to the German Banking Act (KWG), the Securi-
ties Trading Act (WpHG) also contains general clauses relating to IT security 
(e.g. Section 33 [1] WpHG) (BSI 2005, p. 75). 
The statutory provisions must be implemented so that all IT-specific risks are 
covered – including, therefore, the consequences of a power blackout. Circulars, 
announcements and guidelines of the competent Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) are of relevance in this context. Although these sub-statutory 
precautionary instruments are not legally binding, the people to whom they ap-
ply consider the respective rules as binding and implement them accordingly 
(EBP 2010, p. 9). 
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND DATA TRAFFIC SYSTEM 
The regulations in the Bundesbank Act (BBankG) and especially Section 3 and 
Section 19 [1] No. 2 provide the statutory basis for the structuring of non-cash 
(i.e. electronic) payment transactions. According to this Act, bank-based pro-
cessing of payment transactions within Germany and with other countries and 
also safeguarding the efficiency and security of payment transactions is the re-
sponsibility of the Bundesbank. However, since the Bundesbank Act does not 
                                            
92 The following statements are essentially based on the report on the legal analysis of the 
extent of regulation on IT security in critical infrastructures, which was drawn up by 
the BSI in 2002 and updated in 2005 (BSI 2005). 
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stipulate any supreme powers of intervention in terms of exercising these author-
ities, the Bundesbank relies on cooperation with other relevant players in the 
payment transactions system (BSI 2005, p. 83) – at both national and interna-
tional level.93 The resulting guidelines of the umbrella organisations within the 
banking industry form key elements of Business Continuity Management 
(BCM)94 for the various players within the industry and aim to ensure efficiency 
and security for payment transactions (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009a). For ex-
ample, extensive organisational, technical and personnel measures have been 
implemented to ensure processing of large-volume payments and also to ensure 
the supply of cash, refinancing of the banking industry and the management of 
currency reserves (BBK 2008a, p. 120). 
STOCK-EXCHANGE SYSTEM 
The statutory security obligations of stock exchanges are determined by the 
Stock Exchange Act (BörsG) (e.g. Section 1 [3], which requires measures to en-
sure the secure operation of stock exchanges) and also the Securities Trading Act 
(WpHG), along with sub-statutory regulations such as the stock exchange rules 
issued by the respective stock exchange councils95. For example, the fifth section 
of the Stock Exchange Rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange contains provi-
sions on the electronic trading system; further details are then specified in special 
implementing provisions on technical facilities. Special implementing provisions 
issued by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange include provisions on technical require-
ments, (personnel) contactability and reporting obligations of trading members. 
For example, all hardware configurations used by trading members must receive 
prior approval from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Similarly, trading members 
may only use software provided by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In addition, 
trading members are obliged to draw up an emergency plan and to keep the re-
quired infrastructure and personnel resources ready (BSI 2005, p. 88 ff.). 
Although IT protection measures are mainly standardised in sub-statutory regu-
lations, the scope of regulations for the stock exchange sector is well differenti-
                                            
93 At national level, for example, the Bundesbank participates in the governing organs of 
the Central Credit Committee (ZKA) and is therefore able to influence the structure of 
payment transaction agreements and thus the technical, organisational and legal 
framework for payment transactions in Germany. At European/international level, the 
Bundesbank is an integral component of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
and as a member of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the 
central banks of the G10 countries, it plays an active role in developing corresponding 
guidelines and principles on operational risks relating to payment transactions (EBP 
2010, p. 40). 
94 BCM contains the measures to be taken to ensure operations can be maintained as far 
as possible in the event of a crisis or disaster. 
95 A stock exchange council is a controlling and supervisory organ and has numerous 
tasks including issuing the above-mentioned stock exchange rules. 
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ated and appropriately geared to typical threat situations faced by IT systems 
(BSI 2005, p. 96). 
CONSEQUENCES 2.6.3 
BANKING SERVICES SYSTEM 2.6.3.1 
Major banks, insurance institutes, pension funds and other bank-like organisa-
tions have preparations in place to deal with power blackouts. Although their 
BCM processes vary in terms of managing power blackouts, they do exhibit 
numerous similarities (EBP 2010, p. 42). Generally, the individual business divi-
sions within a company (e.g. payment transactions, investment management) 
define their critical business processes and specify how they will continue these 
in the event of a prolonged power blackout. Critical business processes refer in 
particular to activities relating to payment transactions and data traffic, data 
management and account movements, trade and securities settlement and also 
the supply of liquid funds (including the supply of cash) (Bankenverband 2004, 
p. 20 ff.). 
SUPPLY OF CASH IN GERMANY 
Cash plays an extremely important role in Germany, with 65 % of retail 
payments effected in cash (BBK 2008a, p. 119). 
The German Bundesbank places the cash into circulation. To this end, it 
maintains a branch network throughout Germany which it also uses to main-
tain central strategic reserves (stockpiling of cash). The Bundesbank takes 
appropriate measures to ensure that this branch network can continue to 
function even in the event of a major crisis, i.e. that the payment of cash in 
the volumes required by the banks is guaranteed at all times (BBK 2008a, 
p. 119). The widespread distribution of bank notes (transporting of cash 
from the Bundesbank branches to the banks) is the responsibility of the bank-
ing industry (i.e. of the banks and of the private cash transport companies 
commissioned by them (Fabritius 2009)). 
The cash provided by the Bundesbank branches is transported to the respec-
tive banks by specialist transport companies. The banks themselves make 
cash available to their customers via cash dispensers96 or via serviced coun-
ters. Since this process must also function during periods of crisis, technical 
measures exist alongside general emergency plans in order to safeguard this 
business process; these technical measures can bridge a certain period of time 
if a power blackout strikes (EBP 2010, p. 44). 
                                            
96 In 2008 withdrawals amounted to 1.99 billion euros (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009a). 
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A basic technical means of ensuring these processes is to establish a correspond-
ing emergency power supply for essential information and communications in-
frastructures (servers and data lines) and also for workstations and important 
facilities (e.g. safes). In addition, many organisations make provision for data 
and also staff to be transferred to an unaffected location (e.g. abroad, often to 
London) in the event of a widespread and/or prolonged incident. Some banks 
maintain alternative locations with a corresponding communications and infor-
mation infrastructure in regions that are in some cases a considerable distance 
away. Banks also generally have a secure emergency power supply (diesel-driven 
emergency power system) that can last for around one week, but also have cor-
responding supply contracts with suppliers designed to guarantee a power sup-
ply if a power blackout were to last longer. During this period critical business 
processes could be outsourced to regions not affected by the blackout (EBP 
2010, p. 12 ff.). 
Round-the-clock availability of cash ranks as one of the most important finan-
cial services. If cash is not available in a crisis situation this further exacerbates 
the existing uncertainty felt by the public. Demand for cash is likely to increase 
rapidly in a crisis situation; it is estimated that on average, a citizen of Germany 
carries around 118 euros in cash (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009b, p. 40). It is 
therefore likely that if a power blackout lasts for a long time, banks and private 
cash-in-transit companies will be unable to guarantee the distribution of cash 
throughout the blackout. However, the Bundesbank states that in order to 
»manage an emergency or disaster situation ... special measures have been taken 
within the context of crisis management organisation« (BBK 2008a, p. 120). 
0 to 2 hours 
Following the sudden onset of the power blackout, the banks immediately start 
to implement the measures planned as part of BCM. Major banks have generally 
made provisions to ensure that key financial services (critical business processes) 
can still be guaranteed with the aid of an emergency power supply for the neces-
sary information and communications systems. All banks’ critical servers (con-
taining data on payment transactions, investment management, etc.) are secured 
against power blackouts to ensure essential data are not lost. 
Major banks also have a sufficient emergency power supply to supply employ-
ees’ workstations (back office, counters). To start with, these can continue to 
work as normal. By contrast, many employees at smaller banks that have not 
made the necessary arrangements cannot continue to work. Since it is not initial-
ly known how long the power blackout will last, employees remain in the build-
ing for the moment (EBP 2010, p. 45 ff.). 
The counters are initially still occupied and customers are still served. Sufficient 
cash is available. Cash transport operations that were underway when the power 
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blackout struck are still able to reach their destination, although some delays are 
encountered due to mounting traffic problems such as traffic jams and closures 
(Chapter III.2.2). Some smaller banks have not made any provisions for contin-
ued counter operations and are forced to shut their counters. 
Pure administration of deposits by the public and of (financial) investments is 
not affected at the start of the power blackout, provided the bank in question 
can supply the necessary back-office workstations with emergency power. Data 
are backed up and orders that had been sent to the corresponding trading plat-
form before the power blackout can still be executed. Loans can also still be is-
sued after the start of the power blackout. 
In many parts of the affected area the members of the public are no longer able 
to withdraw cash from or pay in cash at cash dispensers. Cash dispensers do not 
generally have an uninterruptible power supply or an emergency power system 
and consequently stop working immediately the power blackout strikes. This 
does not apply to cash dispensers that are actually fitted to bank buildings and 
are connected to their internal emergency power system. However, the number 
of such cash dispensers is very small (EBP 2010, p. 46). Customers therefore 
queue up at the counters of their banks to withdraw money as it has since also 
become clear that it is no longer possible to pay for goods in shops by electronic 
means using debit or credit cards.97 
Wage payments that have already been commissioned by an employer and for 
which there is corresponding cover at the bank are still executed. In some cases, 
it has already become difficult to issue instructions for new wage payments be-
cause the information and communications structures of many smaller compa-
nies have stopped working (EBP 2010, p.47). 
2 to 8 hours 
Operations in larger banks can largely still be maintained. Critical business pro-
cesses in particular are ensured. However, in some areas it becomes clear that 
communications systems that are based on the public telephone network are 
gradually ceasing to function. 
Counters are still manned, and service is still provided where this is possible and 
where appropriate provision is made as part of BCM. There are significantly 
more customers visiting the counters who wish to withdraw money from their 
accounts as cash dispensers are no longer working. Sufficient supplies of cash 
are available, and cash transport operations are still being carried out. The unin-
terruptible power supply at some smaller banks is no longer working or the 
counters have been closed from the outset. Some complaints are voiced by cus-
                                            
97 In 2008 payments amounting to 2.13 billion euros were effected (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2009a). 
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tomers. In view of the uncertain situation, some transactions are initially record-
ed on paper so that they can be posted in the books at a later date (EBP 2010, 
p. 47). 
While some employees who are unable to work (especially those in the back of-
fice of smaller banks) are sent home, others have to remain at work. They are 
especially deployed at the counters in order to serve the gradual rise in customer 
numbers as best they can. Along with an increasing demand for cash disburse-
ments, staff also have to answer concerned questions about wage payments, 
transfers, etc. In some cases, chaotic scenes break out in banks where staff are 
not adequately prepared and/or where cash cannot be issued properly. In some 
locations it becomes necessary to enlist the assistance of the police – provided 
they are available. These banks decide to close early and resume (unfinished) 
transactions the next day – in the assumption that electricity will be restored by 
then (EBP 2010, p. 47 f.). 
At the latest 8 hours after the start of the power blackout, the day’s business is 
closed out as far as possible. No information is available on the anticipated du-
ration of the blackout. Nevertheless, the managers and BCM officers in some 
larger banks start to consider next steps to cover the eventuality of a prolonged 
power blackout. They examine whether critical business processes should be 
outsourced to areas of the country not affected by the blackout or even to other 
countries. In addition, some employees of larger banks have to stay in the build-
ings overnight in order to ensure that the critical business processes can be con-
tinued the next day if the electricity supply has still not been restored by then 
(EBP 2010, p. 48). 
Management of deposits by the public and of investments stops when banks are 
unable to provide their employees with workstations that are equipped with an 
emergency power supply. This especially applies to smaller banks. Larger insti-
tutes continue normal administrative activities at their most important branches 
until the end of the working day and where this is possible, use their data lines 
that are secured against power blackouts98 to transfer the management of depos-
its by the public and of financial investments to branches that are not affected by 
the blackout. 
Customers in the affected area find it increasingly difficult to communicate with 
their banks. In most cases it is no longer possible to receive/give instructions via 
the telephone (mobile and fixed network) or via the Internet. Investors and 
companies thus suffer financial losses due to lost profits (EBP 2010, p. 48). Few-
er loan negotiations are conducted because the people concerned are unable to 
meet due to the traffic chaos. Inter-account transfers within the banking sector 
                                            
98 Such data lines are generally based on glass fibre cables as the emergency power supply 
in the respective connected data centres is generally sufficient for their operation.  
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continue to function. Just a few hours after the start of the power blackout it 
becomes impossible to conduct negotiations via phone. 
8 to 24 hours 
Even on the day after the power blackout, the major banks are still largely able 
to maintain their critical business processes. However, working conditions dete-
riorate because, for example, most banks are unable to operate their staff restau-
rants and lifts and heating no longer work. Lighting and workstations are still 
available. Around two-thirds of employees who are obliged to turn up for work 
do so (EBP 2010, p. 19). Together with the teams who have remained in the 
building overnight, they must maintain the critical business processes and man 
some of the counters. Communication is now only possible via secure data lines 
(payment transaction systems, connections to clearing organisations and trading 
venues, connections to other major banks) (EBP 2010, p. 49). 
The counters at larger banks are manned and cash can still be issued. Money 
transport operations are still possible. Increasing numbers of people want to 
withdraw cash as purchases can only be made using cash.99 Questions on salary 
payments and invoices also have to be answered. Smaller banks initially don’t 
open at all and only perform back-office functions/critical business processes 
(EBP 2010, p. 49). 
Management of deposits by the public and of financial investments comes to a 
halt, especially at smaller banks whose workstations are not equipped with an 
emergency power supply. Although larger institutes continue management oper-
ations, this is done with many restrictions (deterioration in working conditions, 
hardly any contact or no contact at all with customers/investors). However, they 
take initial steps to outsource these activities to unaffected areas. 
Investors and companies in the affected area now have almost no means of 
communicating with their banks. It is no longer possible to give/receive instruc-
tions via the telephone (mobile and fixed network) or via the Internet, even if the 
investors/companies concerned have functioning terminals. They therefore suffer 
financial losses. Negotiations on the issuing of loans are only conducted in ex-
tremely urgent cases, provided the relevant parties are able to meet despite the 
traffic problems. 
Since it is still assumed that the power supply will soon be restored and since the 
scale of the incident is not yet known in many places, managers and BCM offic-
ers only initiate the first steps for dealing with a prolonged power blackout at 
the end of the day following the onset of the blackout (e.g. transferring critical 
business processes to unaffected regions) (EBP 2010, p. 50). 
                                            
99 Although it would still be possible to pay with cheques these are now rarely used by 
private individuals. Moreover, very few businesses still accept cheques. 
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24 hours to 1 week 
In the week following the power blackout the larger banks are able to maintain 
restricted operations (i.e. maintenance of critical business processes and a – re-
stricted – counter service). Towards the end of the first week critical business 
processes are outsourced to unaffected regions. To this end, the necessary staff 
have been transported, by buses from unaffected areas, to the alternative ven-
ues100 that are kept on standby for such cases. Once at these locations they are 
able to perform the critical business processes using the redundant information 
and communications infrastructures that have been re-started by an advance 
team. However, additional staff from unaffected regions have to be mobilised 
because not all of the required staff were prepared to leave behind their families 
and homes in the affected area (EBP 2010, p. 51). 
After a few days it is virtually impossible to make over-the-counter cash pay-
ments; this is in particular due to the fact that private companies are no longer 
able to transport the required volumes of money from the Bundesbank branches 
to their destinations. The Bundesbank does implement the measures planned for 
such a situation (distribution of bank notes independently of private transport 
operations) once it realises that the power blackout will last for some time. It is 
supported in this by other official agencies (e.g. the police) (BBK 2008a, p. 119). 
However, the size of the affected area means cash remains in short supply. The 
situation is compounded because transport problems and hoarding push up the 
prices of basic foodstuffs and other goods. The public is now very insecure as it 
is becoming increasingly clear that the power blackout will continue for some 
time (EBP 2010, p. 51 ff.). 
At the end of the first week even the larger banks start to experience problems in 
maintaining their emergency power supply. The fuel supplies for the emergency 
power systems dry up and there are problems with deliveries of replenishment 
supplies. Most counters are therefore closed. Critical business processes are not 
affected by this as they have been outsourced to unaffected regions.101 Smaller 
banks suspend their critical business processes and endeavour to prevent data 
losses (EBP 2010, p. 52). Management of deposits by the public and of financial 
investments has either been outsourced to unaffected regions or halted. 
                                            
100 An alternative venue is a building maintained by the respective bank at another location 
to which both data and also parts of the workforce can be transferred. Such buildings 
are equipped with the corresponding redundant communications and information infra-
structure in order to enable them to take over the critical business processes. 
101 In the Swiss financial sector, the provision of mutual support by banks in such a crisis 
situation through the assumption of some banks’ critical business process by others that 
meet the corresponding prerequisities is being considered as an option (Steuerungsgre-
mium BCP Finanzplatz Schweiz [September 2009]). »Business Continuity Planning im 
schweizerischen Finanzsektor: Eine Bestandsaufnahme.« (www.snb.ch/de/mmr/referen 
ce/bcp_2009/source). 
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Companies that have not transferred their activities to unaffected regions or 
whose (smaller) banks are unable to continue administering financial invest-
ments via an alternative infrastructure are now no longer able to invest and ob-
tain finance. They therefore suffer major financial losses. Negotiations on the 
issuing of loans and the actual process of issuing loans have come to a complete 
standstill within the affected area. 
The first businesses encounter liquidity bottlenecks towards the end of the week 
because on the one hand they are unable to generate any income and their cus-
tomers can’t pay any invoices due to the power blackout; on the other hand, 
numerous outstanding debts can still be paid (automated payments are still exe-
cuted by the banks despite the power failure) (EBP 2010, p. 53). 
A look at week 2 
Thanks to the alternative venues, the major banks are still able to guarantee 
their critical business processes. Following the initial shortages in staff to operate 
the alternative venues, this has now been rectified by enlisting staff from unaf-
fected areas. 
Although the main branches of some banks have plans to open at certain times 
and to man a limited number of counters, by the second week most managers 
have decided to close the counters. Such decisions are based on a lack of security 
for staff (dissatisfied and in some cases aggressive customers), a shortage of cash, 
a threat to the emergency power supply and the fact that large numbers of em-
ployees stay away from work in order to look after their families and homes. 
Banks that store valuables in safes are exposed to a higher risk of break-in and 
require surveillance by private security firms or the police where applicable. 
Measures adopted by the Bundesbank only enable the supply of cash to the pub-
lic to be maintained to a limited degree. 
Investors and companies who/that were unable to transfer their activities or do 
not have an alternative infrastructure are no longer able to invest or obtain fi-
nance and suffer financial losses. Many companies whose commitments contin-
ue despite the power blackout experience liquidity bottlenecks. 
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND DATA TRAFFIC SYSTEM 2.6.3.2 
As previously outlined, the payment transactions and data traffic system be-
tween financial intermediaries (banks and bank-like organisations), the trading 
platforms and the central banks is extensively protected against a widespread 
and prolonged power blackout. 
By contrast, (electronic) payment transactions and data traffic between benefi-
ciaries and payers and their respective payment intermediaries are not protected. 
In many shops, when a power blackout strikes it immediately becomes impossi-
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ble to make payments using a debit or credit card because the end terminals stop 
working. If a shop has an uninterruptible power supply, it should be possible to 
continue to make electronic payments for as long as the fixed telephone network 
lines still function (up to around 8 hours). 
0 to 2 hours 
After the power supply fails, uninterruptible power supplies and then emergency 
power systems at both payment intermediaries and also the corresponding clear-
ing organisations ensure that systems can still function. This prevents the loss of 
data for electronic payment transactions. The communications infrastructures 
(secure data lines) also work, meaning (automated) exchanges between the pay-
ment intermediaries, clearing organisations and central banks can continue 
throughout the entire duration of the power blackout (EBP 2010, p. 62). 
The activities of the European Central Bank and of the German Bundesbank are 
not restricted either, as these are also protected against a power blackout. In 
principle, the pan-European payment transactions system is not affected by the 
power blackout and continues to function throughout the power blackout.102 
However, payers and beneficiaries do encounter problems. In many shops, when 
a power blackout strikes it immediately becomes impossible to continue to effect 
payments using debit and credit cards because the corresponding terminals (card 
readers) stop working. This means that cards can’t be read and the correspond-
ing payment instructions can’t be sent to the payment intermediaries. Purchases 
can now only be made using cash. However, even instructions for distance pay-
ments (effected from home via the Internet) are no longer possible because the 
people who wish to make payments cannot use their computers and give corre-
sponding instructions. During this phase, larger companies who are prepared for 
a power blackout and who have installed an uninterruptible power supply for 
their computers are still able to transmit payment instructions to banks or to 
receive confirmations.103 
2 to 8 hours 
In shops, purchases can now only be made using cash. In the first few hours since 
people have become aware of the power blackout and accepted it, this inability to 
conduct electronic payment transactions does not yet represent a major problem. 
Many people assume that the power will be restored in a few hours and delay 
their purchases. Others withdraw money from their banks, a process which is still 
                                            
102 This could be attributable to the measures that were defined and implemented in recent 
years by the »Crisis Management for Payment and Settlement Systems« working group 
that was set up in 2002 (EBP 2010, p. 62). 
103 However, only for as long as the communications lines on which the Internet is based 
continue to function. This should at least still be the case in the first two hours after the 
power blackout (EBP 2010, p. 63). 
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largely unproblematic. Private individuals postpone the payment instructions they 
wanted to place via the Internet until later, again in the assumption that power 
will soon be restored. Larger companies who are prepared for a power blackout 
can continue to transmit their payment instructions for as long as the communica-
tions lines on which the Internet is based are still functioning. 
8 to 24 hours 
Some shops have opened despite the power blackout and offer products on a 
cash payment basis; in some cases the range of goods offered is reduced. Many 
people continue to assume that power will be restored in the next few hours. 
Purchases are therefore postponed until later. Other people withdraw money 
from banks because cash dispensers aren’t working. However, smaller banks 
shut their doors. Even larger companies are now unable to issue payment in-
structions. In addition, many companies are running reduced operations, if at 
all, and many have closed completely. 
24 hours to 1 week 
In the first few days the public can still be supplied with cash from bank coun-
ters that remain open; demand for cash remains moderate as most people expect 
that the power blackout will end soon. Purchases are put off to a later date. 
As soon as it is announced that it is not possible to say when the power blackout 
will end, concerns about supply bottlenecks grow among the public, not least 
because of the lack of means of payment. Chaotic scenes break out at some 
banks and in retail businesses as people attempt to obtain cash or to purchase 
daily requisites. The situation is compounded because some suppliers (can) no 
longer supply businesses – in some cases this is due to a lack of means of 
transport but in others it is for fear that deliveries will not be paid for. There are 
sporadic incidents of theft and looting. 
A look at week 2 
The measures taken by the Bundesbank to supply the public with cash are only 
partly effective because shops are empty and there are sharp rises in the prices of 
goods that are in especially high demand. There is also a rise in the number of 
mobile traders who sell daily requisites at vastly inflated prices. People who had 
a supply of cash or who have obtained cash via the measures adopted by the 
Bundesbank use this to purchase goods from farmers and other food suppliers 
(including some black market dealers). Exchanging valuable items for consumer 
durables and food tends to remain the exception (EBP 2010, p. 65). 
STOCK EXCHANGE SYSTEM 2.6.3.3 
Stock exchanges and trading platforms have today developed into a network of 
global interlinked hubs. Since the entire economy depends heavily on the stock 
 2.  CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF SELECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 177 
 
exchange system, the stock exchanges and their operators must fulfil high re-
quirements in terms of the resilience of their information and communications 
infrastructures. Stock exchange systems are largely protected against a power 
blackout (EBP 2010, p. 70). 
0 to 2 hours 
Thanks to its extensive contingency measures, Germany’s most important stock 
exchange, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, is initially unaffected by the power 
blackout and can continue to work as normal. The regional stock exchanges are 
also armed against a power blackout and are initially able to continue trading 
(EBP 2010, p. 71). Executing banks and the clearing organisations are able to 
maintain their operations because the information and communications infra-
structures that ensure the corresponding critical processes are supplied with 
emergency power via emergency power systems. The necessary data lines (con-
nections between banks, trading platforms and clearing organisations) also re-
main operational, as do the relevant workstations. 
A few minutes after the power blackout strikes, problems are encountered with 
the connection between private customers (natural persons) and the executing 
banks. People who wish to place stock-market orders from their homes or from 
work are no longer able to do so because their communications infrastructures 
no longer work as the end terminals rely on electricity. In practice, stock-market 
orders can now only be transmitted on-site at a bank or via an analogue tele-
phone. 
Companies that trade professionally in financial investments and that have in-
stalled emergency power supply systems can still place orders with their banks. 
2 to 8 hours 
When power is still not available a few hours after the blackout and the effects 
make themselves felt outside the stock exchanges (traffic chaos, businesses clos-
ing early), the managers of the main stock exchange and of the regional stock 
exchanges affected by the blackout decide to end the trading day earlier than 
usual in order to enable staff to get home on time despite the emerging traffic 
chaos.104 Only the BCM officers and small teams remain in the building over-
night in order to ensure trading operations can continue the next day. 
Executing banks and the clearing organisations can still maintain operations and 
remain in contact with all trading venues (including those in other countries). 
People who wish to place stock-market orders from their homes or from work 
now find it difficult to do this and must in some cases visit their bank in person. 
                                            
104 This was the reaction of some stock exchanges during the 2003 blackout in North 
America (www.bis.org/publ/joint17.pdf, p. 19 ff.). 
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However, few people tend to try and execute stock-market orders in the first few 
hours after the power blackout because of the other consequences triggered by 
the blackout. 
Until the end of the day, companies that trade professionally in investments can 
continue to place orders with their banks – provided they have the required 
communications infrastructures to connect to their trading venue (stock ex-
change) and provided these infrastructures are protected against a power black-
out. Companies where this is not the case suffer financial losses. In some com-
panies it also becomes clear that no consideration has been given to the fact that 
as public telephone lines stop working, so this affects the connections to their 
banks (EBP 2010, p. 71 f.). 
8 to 24 hours 
The main stock exchange even opens on the day after the power blackout. 
However, not all staff arrive at work (traffic chaos, people worrying about their 
own families/homes). For the moment, however, this does not restrict the stock 
exchange’s ability to operate. 
Even the regional stock exchanges open for trading. After a few hours, however, 
some stock exchanges’ emergency power supplies based on UPS start to fail and 
traders have to resort to using past methods of pen and paper and have to call 
out orders to each other. Other regional stock exchanges have emergency power 
systems and continue to operate. However, as the trading volume declines at the 
regional stock exchanges in particular and since not all staff have arrived at 
work, the managers of the stock exchanges decide to end trading earlier than 
normal and send staff home. 
People who wish to place stock-market orders now have no means of doing this. 
Some decide to visit the counters of their banks in person in order to place or-
ders. Similarly, companies that trade professionally in investments have very few 
means of continuing activities and in some cases suffer serious losses. 
24 hours to 1 week 
Thanks to its extensive BCM measures, the main stock exchange remains opera-
tional, albeit to a somewhat reduced degree. This is due to some staff absences 
and to the fact that not all workstations can continue to operate. However, the 
core functions (i.e. trading venue operations) are still guaranteed, even for the 
longer term. Towards the end of the week problems are experienced where fuel 
for emergency power systems fails to arrive on time. Some regional stock ex-
changes decide to transfer their trading platforms to other stock exchange ven-
ues (abroad) that are not affected by the power blackout. A temporary closure is 
also considered. 
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The majority of people who wish to place stock-market orders now have to at-
tend their banks in person. In most cases this is now only possible at larger 
banks. However, even these banks will start to gradually close their branches in 
the affected area towards the end of the week. 
A look at week 2 
The main stock exchange even continues to operate during the next week, albeit 
to a reduced degree. However, operations become increasingly difficult: Em-
ployees develop other priorities and remain at home. In addition, many employ-
ees have travelled to relatives and friends in order to await the end of the power 
blackout outside the affected area. By the latest at the end of the second week 
after the power blackout, all regional stock exchanges have shut and transferred 
their trading platforms to other stock exchanges (in other countries) that are not 
affected by the power blackout. Executing banks and clearing organisations are 
able to maintain their operations, mainly from regions that are not affected by 
the power blackout. 
People who normally place stock-market orders have other priorities to worry 
about rather than concerning themselves with their personal financial invest-
ments. People who are staying with relatives and friends outside the affected 
area try to access their financial investments from there. 
CONCLUSION 2.6.4 
BANKING SERVICES 2.6.4.1 
Within this sub-sector, all critical business processes are guaranteed by means of 
UPS or emergency power systems that can function for longer periods. These 
measures generally last until critical business processes can be outsourced to an 
unaffected area. 
In line with BCM, corresponding teams are deployed immediately after the onset 
of the power blackout to ensure critical business processes are maintained. Some 
employees therefore have to stay overnight in the building. At the latest when 
the extent of the blackout becomes known after 2 days, measures are imple-
mented to outsource critical business processes or to safeguard them on a long-
term basis. Data traffic and payment transactions, data management and other 
critical business processes are therefore ensured throughout the power blackout. 
Banks who have valuables stored in safes must take special security measures. 
Steps are also taken to ensure the (emergency) supply of cash; this also requires 
the deployment of police. 
Employees can continue to work on a limited basis for up to one week, and 
counters in larger banks can still be manned. However, employees suffer from a 
180 III.  CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT 
 
deterioration in working conditions. After one week at the latest it becomes nec-
essary to gradually suspend operations. Very little damage to bank buildings is 
likely, although some branches are no longer able to carry out urgent repair and 
maintenance work (e.g. caused by frost damage). 
Communication connections between the banks and customers gradually start 
to fail. After just a few hours, if both mobile and fixed-network telephony have 
stopped working, customers are only able to contact their banks by visiting them 
in person. Immediately after the power blackout strikes people are unable to 
withdraw cash from cash dispensers and this service is not restored for the entire 
duration of the blackout (people are also unable to make electronic payments in 
shops). The supply of cash to the public therefore threatens to collapse. Since 
cashless payment forms can’t be used for purchasing, feelings of uncertainty and 
aggression grow among the population. 
PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND DATA TRAFFIC 
Technical measures (emergency power supply) enable payment transactions be-
tween banks, clearing organisations and central banks to continue throughout 
the power blackout. Prepared emergency plans are implemented. Selected bank-
ing personnel maintain critical business processes within banks. This means con-
siderable pressures on the personnel resources deployed. 
Businesses that are equipped with UPS and/or emergency power systems are still 
able to effect electronic payments for the first few hours. However, this becomes 
impossible as soon as fixed-network telephone connections stop working. Other 
businesses and shops are only able to process cash payments. 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
The technical, personnel and organisational measures prepared in the stock ex-
change sector are sufficient to ensure a stock exchange (and the clearing organi-
sations) can largely continue operations throughout the power blackout. Trad-
ing venues are able to maintain operations thanks to their UPS and emergency 
power systems. Staff ensure continuing operations. Prepared emergency and 
alarm plans are implemented within the framework of BCM. Since the connec-
tions between private individuals/companies on the one hand and banks (execut-
ing parties) on the other are heavily disrupted due to the failure of the fixed-
network and mobile telephone systems, hardly any stock-market orders can now 
be placed. When combined with the other consequences of a power blackout 
and also due to the restricted ability to place stock-market orders, this results in 
a sharp decline in trading volumes and corresponding financial losses. Trade 
starts to return to normal once professional investors have adapted to the new 
situation and have in some cases outsourced their business activities to unaffect-
ed regions. 
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A widespread power blackout thus has only a limited detrimental impact on the 
banking services system. Larger banks in particular can generally administer de-
posits from the public throughout the power blackout and can also maintain 
their connections with clearing organisations, the central bank and the stock 
exchanges. This is made possible by the emergency power supply systems and by 
the outsourcing of critical business processes to unaffected regions. Electronic 
payment transactions and data traffic between banks, clearing organisations and 
trading venues are also protected against a prolonged power blackout and are 
able to continue. Similarly, operation of the trading venues, and in particular of 
the main stock exchange in Frankfurt, is also protected against a prolonged 
power blackout and trading activities are not really affected to any significant 
degree. Regional stock exchanges represent an exception, however (EBP 2010, 
p. 78). 
By contrast, disruptions to communication paths between the banks, clearing 
organisations and trading venues on the one hand and on the other hand indi-
viduals and companies who require financial services represent an Achilles heel 
within the sector. Consequently, most of the people who require financial ser-
vices are unable to use them. After a certain time, therefore, transactions such as 
cash disbursements, salary transfers, borrowing, etc. become impossible. Pay-
ments cannot be made by card, either. 
PUBLIC INSTITUTES – CASE STUDY ON »PRISONS« 2.7 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND INSTITUTES – PRELIMINARY REMARK 2.7.1 
The operational capabilities of state institutions are also affected by a power 
blackout. Public administration, education, research, culture and also the aid 
organisations and public safety bodies face extreme challenges for which many 
players are unprepared (see Prognos 2009, p. 70 ff. on the below statements) 
For example, the use of buildings for official and educational purposes or for 
university research and teaching becomes increasingly restricted and soon be-
comes impossible. Sanitary facilities stop working, water is in scarce supply and 
in many cases lifts, heating, air conditioning, ventilation and communications 
break down. In high-rise and multi-storey buildings the problems are com-
pounded to such an extent they can soon no longer be used. Research projects at 
universities are interrupted or become unusable. Projects can be put back years 
because, for example, air conditioning or systems to ensure special conditions 
such as clean room conditions or other ambient conditions that need to be pre-
cisely maintained stop working. Materials and equipment can be damaged, and 
in areas of highly specialised research this could entail disadvantages in terms of 
location and competition. 
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In museums and archives there is a danger that exhibits and archived items will 
be damaged or become unusable as it becomes impossible to maintain the re-
quired ambient conditions. The failure of electrically operated security systems 
means valuable cultural and scientific goods face a significant risk of theft and 
looting. 
Due in particular to the heavy reliance on information and communications sys-
tems, many public administration bodies (such as education authorities, registra-
tion services, health authorities) find themselves unable to provide services. Dur-
ing the power blackout it is difficult to handle and properly document relevant 
processes (e.g. births, deaths, serious illnesses, accidents). However, since server 
systems at least are equipped with UPS, it is possible to prevent large-scale losses 
of data records. The failure of information and communications systems also 
has major detrimental consequences in terms of the ability of security authorities 
and aid organisations to carry out their duties. An overload of incoming phone 
calls makes it impossible for operational control centres to provide key functions 
(Chapter III.2.1). Despite having emergency power generator back-up, some 
control centres are unable to fulfil their functions because the generators don’t 
work or can’t be replenished with fuel. 
Police forces face sporadic break-ins and vandalism. They must ensure that any 
closures or traffic bans that are imposed are complied with. In some cases evac-
uations have to be carried out against the will of the people concerned. 
Public safety is impaired due to the failure of fire and smoke alarms, meaning 
fires remain undetected for longer. The overload on the telephone networks or 
the loss of communications systems means it takes longer for the alarm to be 
raised with the fire brigades. Their deployment is delayed and fighting fires be-
comes more difficult. Such dangers can mushroom if, to make matters worse, no 
fire-fighting water is available (because the water supply is not functioning) 
(Chapter III.2.3). 
Public lighting stops working over large areas, along with sensor systems such as 
alarm systems and surveillance cameras. The darkness encourages a rise in crim-
inal activities. It is difficult to identify and arrest the perpetrators. However, 
problems are not only encountered in preventing crimes and arresting suspects 
or perpetrators; keeping them in prisons also becomes more difficult. The fol-
lowing sections provide a detailed case study on »prisons«. 
»PRISONS« CASE STUDY 2.7.2 
According to data from the Federal Office of Statistics (in Dünkel 2010), Ger-
many had 195 correctional facilities accommodating 73,592 prisoners as at 
31 March 2009. This means around 90 out of every 100,000 people are in de-
tention facilities. The overall occupancy rate of facilities is 93 %. Capacity is 
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only slightly exceeded in the federal states of Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate. 
The percentage of women is around 5 %. Where possible, prisoners are separat-
ed according to the severity of the crime, the length of the sentence or the num-
ber of convictions. Just under 20 % of cases involve day-release, where prisoners 
are allowed to leave the detention facility during the day (EBP 2010, p. 153). 
The type of sentence can be categorised into custodial sentence (53,334 people), 
young offender sentence (6,180), imprisonment on remand (11,385) and preven-
tive custody (476)   i.e. where dangerous criminals are held in custody to protect 
the general public. Around 2,000 people were in civil confinement or in custody 
pending deportation. Assuming a standard occupancy rate of 85 %, most cor-
rectional facilities are overcrowded (Dünkel 2010). 
A common form of custody involves the holding of individuals in temporary 
custody, for example at police stations. Collective detention centres are set up if 
it becomes likely that normal capacities will not suffice because of the volume of 
arrests at a special event (large demonstration, sporting event). Another form of 
custody is house arrest.105 
LEGAL BASES 2.7.2.1 
The main legal basis for the penal system is provided by the Prisons Act 
(StVollzG) of 16 March 1976. It includes regulations on the general implementa-
tion of custodial sentences, on organisation and responsibilities and on other 
special provisions for limiting freedom. 
Preventive detention is regulated in Part 3. This specifies that preventive deten-
tion must be organised separately from custodial sentences in special institutes 
or in separate departments (Section 140 of the Prisons Act, StVollzG). According 
to Sections 136 to 138, prisoners with psychological problems or serious addic-
tions must be accommodated in specially established institutes. As well as com-
pletion of the custodial sentence, the aim is also to facilitate a cure or to improve 
the prisoner’s condition as much as possible. The necessary supervision, man-
agement and care are provided. Sentences are completed in closed institutes. 
Sections 151 to 153 of the Prisons Act (StVollzG) regulate supervision via cor-
rectional facilities. Responsibility for managing supervision lies with the Land 
Administration of Justice. Supervision authorities can be transferred to correc-
tional facilities. The Land Administration of Justice regulates the local and fac-
tual responsibilities of the correctional facilities in an implementation plan. 
No explicit legal basis for security and contingency measures in the event of a 
prolonged power blackout was identified. 
                                            
105 One future option for surveillance is electronic foot tagging, where the location of the 
individual is constantly transmitted to the relevant authority via the mobile phone net-
work – this brings associated problems if networks are overloaded. 
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CONSEQUENCES 2.7.2.2 
A key aim of correctional facilities is to protect the general public from further 
crimes. Even in a disaster situation, it is therefore necessary to keep prisoners in 
custody. Failure to do so would lead to significant consequences in terms of the 
public’s confidence in the state’s authority (EBP 2010, p. 156). 
DAY-TO-DAY LIFE IN PRISONS 
A prison day starts at 6 a.m. when prisoners are woken and cells opened 
up. The first block of work generally begins an hour later and lasts until 
12 noon. Prisoners can work in the laundry, in the joiner’s shop, in the bak-
ery, in the kitchens or do cleaning. Lunch is from 12 noon until 1 p.m. and is 
usually taken in large rooms. The second block of work generally lasts from 
1 p.m. until 4 p.m. This is followed by free time for the prisoners. This can 
include sporting activities, yard exercise or visiting other prisoners. In the lat-
ter case, a prisoner is locked up in the cell of a fellow prisoner. Sporting ac-
tivities often involve team sports, when a large number of prisoners spend a 
certain amount of time in a confined space. Following the evening meal cells 
are locked at 9 p.m. at the latest. 
Source: EBP 2010, p. 153 f. 
In principle, there are two possible courses of action following a power black-
out: The first involves continuing prison operations in a reduced format. This 
calls for a properly functioning emergency power supply system. This will ensure 
that at least the most important security functions (e.g. locking systems, move-
ment alarms, surveillance cameras) are guaranteed. Lighting is reduced, only 
cold meals are offered and TVs/radios are switched off. Where a permanent 
emergency power supply cannot be guaranteed, the second option consists in 
transferring prisoners to other correctional facilities with an intact power supply 
once initial security measures have been implemented. 
Where a functioning emergency power supply is in place, the availability of fuel 
(diesel) for the emergency power generators plays a decisive role. The length of 
time for which emergency power generators can operate is determined by stocks 
of fuel or by the ability to obtain external supplies. If supply points are available 
on the building it is in principle possible to ensure an adequate power supply us-
ing external mobile generators of the electricity supply companies or the THW. 
0 to 2 hours 
The emergency power system kicks in immediately the power blackout strikes. It 
ensures that the security elements (locking systems, sensors, alarms) and basic 
supplies (lighting, ventilation) still function. This requires regular checks to ensure 
the emergency power generator is functional and also adequate fuel supplies. 
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The initial period after the power blackout sets in is the most chaotic and most 
difficult to control. Staff and prisoners must adapt to the new situation. The main 
priority is to preserve/restore orderly processes. During this first phase priorities 
include suspending activities that are not urgently required, stopping leisure activi-
ties and locking up the prisoners. Visitors are asked to leave the building. 
The consequences of a power blackout during this initial phase depend greatly 
on the time of day. If the blackout strikes during the night the prisoners are al-
ready locked up in their cells. The technology used in modern locking systems 
means that cells remain locked even in the event of a power blackout. A power 
blackout during the day proves more problematic. For example, large numbers 
of prisoners are in the canteen at lunchtime and in the evening. During the after-
noon large numbers of prisoners congregate for sporting activities (especially 
where team activities are taking place). This means an increased risk of security 
staff losing control over the prisoners. 
Computer-based administrative and organisational activities become increasing-
ly impossible if computers do not have an emergency power supply and stop 
working. This makes it difficult, for example, to access prisoner data. This cre-
ates problems in allocating detainees to cells or generates organisational difficul-
ties regarding the admission, discharge and management of prisoners. Other 
administrative activities needed to operate a correctional facility (such as the 
provision of food and other goods, personnel activities, etc.) can also be restrict-
ed (EBP 2010, p. 155 f.). Telephone communication is still largely possible. 
2 to 8 hours 
The prisoners remain locked up. Securing the cells and sections takes longer be-
cause the tense situation and a growing list of tasks means staff are in scarce 
supply and security elements are working on a reduced or slower basis (e.g. elec-
tronic locking systems now have to operated mechanically). 
Ensuring operation of the emergency power generator now assumes top priority. 
This is the only way to ensure (reduced) operations and adequate monitoring of 
the prisoners. Besides checking the emergency power generator, another priority 
task involves clarifying deliveries of additional fuel. Such tasks become increas-
ingly difficult as time progresses because the fixed-network and mobile tele-
phone systems are only available for a limited time. 
Problems can arise where prisoners are gathered in communal areas for a long 
time. Rumours and inaccurate information, changes in detention conditions and 
cancelled activities (sport, work) can trigger unrest and chaos. 
It emerges that many prisoners on day-release have not returned to the correc-
tional facility after work. 
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Where operation of the correctional facility cannot be maintained or can only be 
maintained with considerable difficulty, it becomes necessary to take initial steps 
towards transferring prisoners. However, communication and coordination and 
also mobilising external support are extremely difficult due to the failure of 
communications networks (mobile and fixed-network telephone systems, the 
Internet). 
8 to 24 hours 
With prisoners having been locked up for a long time and detention conditions 
deteriorating, unrest among prisoners grows still further. Staff experience high 
levels of nervous tension. Sporting activities for prisoners and work that are not 
absolutely necessary are stopped. Large gatherings of prisoners are mainly 
avoided. Locking up prisoners in their own cells to maintain security within the 
correctional facility represents the best option. During the night only a reduced 
level of lighting is available. Additional security staff are mobilised for the re-
duced operations under the emergency power supply and to organise a possible 
transfer of prisoners. The other consequences associated with the power black-
out mean the police cannot be relied on to provide support. 
Providing prisoners with food now becomes an additional, urgent problem. As a 
provisional measure, makeshift cold meals are prepared from existing supplies. 
Drinking water is available where water is still being distributed via pipeline 
networks (EBP 2010, p. 159) (Chapter III.2.3). 
There is the issue of ensuring adequate personnel. It must also be expected that 
staff who are due to work on the upcoming second shift will arrive late or will 
be unable to get to work due to disruptions in local public transport and indi-
vidual motor transport. This compounds the staffing situation that has already 
become tense due to the power blackout’s consequences. 
24 hours to 1 week 
Almost all areas relating to operation of the prison become reliant on external 
sources – e.g. the provision of food for prisoners, the support of additional secu-
rity forces to help make the prison secure and fuel deliveries for the emergency 
power supply. The collapse of the telephone system hampers communication 
with external companies, agencies and authorities. 
Medical care becomes critical after just 2 to 3 days. Hygiene conditions also be-
come problematic – not least due to shortages in or the failure of the water sup-
ply and wastewater disposal. There are no deliveries of fresh laundry. Together 
with the constant deterioration in food supplies, this creates constant unrest 
among the prisoners. 
The risk of attempts to free prisoners and breakouts increases. Security and sur-
veillance of prisoners thus remain high priority tasks. External protection is in-
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creasingly enhanced because of the likelihood of attempts to free prisoners.106 
Since the police make numerous arrests (e.g. of looters) in a bid to maintain pub-
lic order and the individuals are soon transferred to the correctional facilities on 
capacity grounds, the problems faced by the correctional facilities are further 
exacerbated.107 
Staff are likely to experience increasing levels of stress and overtiredness. The 
situation at correctional facilities is made worse by the fact that staff on the next 
shift find it difficult to get to work because of the traffic problems (traffic jams, 
loss of the local public transport system) and stay away in some cases. Due to 
the other consequences of the power failure for other sectors, the police and oth-
er services that are also experiencing severe pressures cannot be relied on to pro-
vide effective support for the correctional facilities. 
The situation in the individual correctional facilities primarily depends on the abil-
ity to supply prisoners with food and drinking water, on hygiene and on security 
(staff availability). Transferring prisoners is considered in many cases due to the 
poor custody conditions and because the correctional facilities in question are un-
able to improve the situation to any great extent despite external assistance. 
CONCLUSION 2.7.2.3 
If the emergency power supply is working,108 basic operational functions can be 
maintained for a limited time. These functions include in particular securing the 
prisoners and the supply of essentials such as lighting, ventilation and heating. 
All security elements, building facility components and IT systems and means of 
communication that are not supplied with emergency electricity stop working. If 
an emergency power supply stops working or if the fuel reserves stored at the 
detention facilities dry up then the correctional facilities must be evacuated. 
                                            
106 This task could be carried out by the police or – depending on corresponding decisions 
by the disaster control authorities – within the framework of general securing of popu-
lated areas by the Federal Armed Forces. However, this would presumably exceed tech-
nical assistance by the authorities and would then be based on Article 35 [2] and [3] of 
the Basic Law (GG). In such a case the Federal Armed Forces would have powers of co-
ercion and intervention. 
107 Examples from history (e.g. power blackouts in the USA in 1977 and 2003 or power 
blackout in Brazil in 1999) have shown that criminality can increase during a power 
blackout if certain underlying conditions prevail. The police can mostly accommodate 
the first arrests in cells at police stations. However, if the occupancy capacity is exceed-
ed, prisoners must be transferred to correctional facilities. The problems encountered at 
these facilities are then compounded still further (EBP 2010, p. 160). 
108 For disaster control purposes it could be of major significance whether the emergency 
power infrastructure is largely serviced internally or by an external service provider and 
whether it is upgraded in the event of heavy loads. Service provided by, for example, an 
external facilities management company would undoubtedly be overstretched in the 
event of an extensive power blackout, not least because of the wealth of enquiries faced 
by the company.  
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Even where an emergency power supply is in place the pressures in terms of 
problems increase rapidly. Because they have to be locked up on a permanent 
basis, prisoners are exposed to high levels of psychological stress as they are un-
able to participate in leisure activities and work and are unable to communicate 
with other prisoners. In addition, the constant deterioration in hygiene condi-
tions, inadequate food supplies and an absence of heating lead to unrest, health 
problems and sickness. This situation is compounded because medical care be-
comes more critical the longer the power blackout continues. The risk of unrest 
and dissent among prisoners grows, especially if the number of detainees rises 
over time due to an increase in criminality in the affected area (more arrests). 
Towards the end of the first week the dramatic deterioration in custody condi-
tions therefore makes it necessary to consider transferring prisoners (EBP 2010, 
p. 160). 
BEHAVIOUR-RELATED CONSEQUENCES OF A  
POWER BLACKOUT AND THEIR DETERMINING FACTORS 3. 
People almost take a reliable, efficient supply of electricity in their daily lives for 
granted and rarely pause to think about the issue. For example, modern house-
holds have a large number of technical devices that require electricity: tools, ma-
chinery, apparatus and equipment serving a variety of different functions. The 
everyday technology we use includes craft, household and gardening technology, 
communications and entertainment technology, as well as computers, heating, 
ventilation and refrigeration systems. Some systems are interlinked with each 
other, equipped with control units and connected to external supply networks 
(energy, information). 
Numerous everyday activities such as heating, ventilation, refrigeration, cooking 
and washing are made possible by operating technical devices that have largely 
replaced human sensory motor actions but that also offer functions that would 
otherwise be impossible. However, almost all activities outside the sphere of pri-
vate households such as mobility, work, leisure and associated sectors of the 
economy also involve technology and therefore also rely on electricity. 
If the extensive supply network breaks down, everyday activities are called into 
question and disconnected from the technical systems. According to Vierboom 
and Härlen (2009, p. 3) in an expert report for the TAB, the »associated 
threats« do not only affect vital material services. »The provision of psychologi-
cal services in the context of an extensive, medial and concrete establishment of 
one’s own self is also affected.« The collapse of technical structures as described 
in the previous chapters prompts an individual to doubt his »ability to control 
his living conditions« (Dombrowsky et al. 2009, p. 256). 
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A small number of reports and analyses have been produced on the behaviour of 
the public in a  short-lived  power blackout (see Lorenz 2010). However, 
there are no empirical findings on people’s behaviour resulting from the conse-
quences of a prolonged power blackout. The rest of this discussion is therefore 
focussed on the development of theories on the psychological determining fac-
tors and on behaviour-related consequences of a prolonged power blackout. The 
observations and theories are also intended to provide a basis for research ques-
tions that can be considered and answered through more extensive analyses. 
This cautious approach to the issue is also attributable to the inadequate levels 
of knowledge on the behaviour of individuals during a threat situation. For ex-
ample, Ungerer/Morgenroth (2001, p. 15 ff.) state that there are »hardly any« 
research findings and especially specific, detailed statements on human behav-
iour in real threat situations – which a prolonged power blackout would create. 
Whereas the »human factor« is frequently addressed (often as a cause) when 
describing and analysing the origins of a disaster, less attention is placed on 
»how people feel in such crisis situations«. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINING FACTORS 3.1 
Every citizen needs/uses electricity – every day and every night. People usually 
have little knowledge of the production and supply process, of physical and 
technical aspects surrounding »what comes out of the plug«. They seldom reflect 
on exactly how many devices and processes rely on electricity or on quite how 
heavily everyday activities depend on electricity.109 Consequently, power black-
outs are »not an issue« for the general public   a fact that was, for example, as-
certained by a (non-representative) survey of citizens in Zurich. Minor power 
blackouts are quickly forgotten and leave no lasting impression. The citizens 
questioned did not consider power blackouts to be a threat, especially not to life 
and limb. They therefore don’t make any preparations to deal with a power 
blackout (Stiftung Risiko-Dialog 2007, p. 14; see also Palm 2009).110 It is there-
fore not surprising that citizens are not keen to spend more money to increase 
reliability (Silvast/Kaplinsky 2007, p. 46; see also Brayley et al. 2005, p. 4; Palm 
2009). 
                                            
109 »There is very little knowledge and awareness of the power supply. There are the two 
›ends‹ of production and consumption. There is no perception of the intervening net-
works.« (Stiftung Risiko-Dialog 2007, p. 22; see also Palm 2009) 
110 This fatalism is also reflected in the personal reports on the »snow chaos« in the Mün-
sterland in 2005 that resulted in a power blackout lasting up to 5 days. »The next disas-
ter will again take us by surprise and hit us full in the face.« (Cantauw/Loy 2009, p 119 
and 184); opposing reactions are, however, also evident. »Let’s hope nothing like this 
happens again, but discussions are needed on the issue of ›emergency power supply‹.« 
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Another aspect to consider is the fact that people generally tend to think they are 
well prepared for a disaster situation. One reason is that in general, the potential 
danger presented by risks and threats is underestimated. This also applies to 
power blackouts and the resulting consequences. According to a survey by the 
German Red Cross (DRK), the majority of Germans believe they could look af-
ter themselves even during a power blackout lasting 2 weeks (Emnid 2008). 
Such an attitude presupposes an expectation of reliable supply that is so intrinsic 
that any thought of it being threatened generates »feelings of helplessness« and 
must be fought off. In this context, Vierboom and Härlen (2009, p. 7) use the 
term of collective suppression. This is connected firstly with the fact that people 
do not like to admit dependency and helplessness and secondly with the fact that 
in its pure form, electricity is dangerous and must therefore be cultivated. Con-
sumers have an almost childlike dependence on their electricity supply compa-
nies but do not like to admit this.111 In addition, the supply and the use of elec-
tricity are characterised by the fact that electricity is seldom experienced directly, 
»only via devices that use power, meaning people remain unaware of the fact 
that they are using electricity when a device is used and only realise this when a 
power blackout strikes or an electrical accident occurs«.  
The importance of electricity as a »constituent operating energy for everyday 
life and everyday culture« becomes clear with personal computers, mobile 
phones and televisions (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 8). Devices that are pow-
ered by electricity make people feel they are not alone and that they are, so to 
speak, constantly networked with the »current« of society. Examples include 
constant contactability via e-mail, phone and mobile phone, chatting via the 
Internet or moving images on large-format screens. A study by Stiftung Risiko-
Dialog revealed that the loss of communication »with the outside world« is a 
key concept mentioned by those surveyed when considering the consequences 
of a power blackout. »For many people, electricity and the technologies it op-
erates (televisions, radios, telephones, Internet communications) represent a 
link to the outside world. If this is halted, people feel cut off and isolated. They 
cannot obtain information on what is happening and on what is being done, 
nor can they obtain help if required. This inability to communicate leads to 
uncertainty that is highly unsettling.« (Stiftung Risiko-Dialog 2007, p. 16). 
Inability to communicate by telephone, mobile phone, the Internet and radio is 
also a dominant theme in the more than 40 experience reports on the power 
blackout in the Münsterland in 2005 that were collected by the Commission 
for Ethnology and Folklore in Westphalia. The resulting uncertainty is well 
documented (Cantauw/Loy 2009). 
                                            
111 In a survey of the population on their experiences and opinions concerning the power 
blackout in London in 2003, 55 % of the people surveyed stated that they were not 
concerned about a possible repeat of such an event (Brayley et al. 2005, p. 3). 
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Vierboom and Härlen argue that the increasing technological and media-based 
character of trade is accompanied by a decline in ego strength112 among large 
parts of our society. Consequently, depending on its duration and on the indi-
vidual constitution of the electricity user, a power blackout represents a »threat 
to an individual’s own identity« (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 8). Dependence on 
something that is foreign is felt immediately. »The media-based corset that sup-
ports us through life and that is fed by electricity is lost. From that moment on 
an individual relies on simple, archaic and physical forms of everyday activities.« 
(Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 9) The way in which mass media communication 
loads subjective experience with relevance in the midst of the disaster is also re-
flected in the following quotation: »The overall extent of the disaster became 
visible on the TV.« (Cantauw/Loy 2009) 
The social consequences of a power blackout are akin to a »cultural break-
down«: Traditional patterns of experience and behaviour are called into ques-
tion; previous ordering principles no longer provide structure and orientation. It 
is important to consider that »order« as a principle does not cease to exist; what 
does, however, disappear are »previously existing and familiar connective and 
assertive forces« (Dombrowsky et al. 2009, p. 262). In contrast to other disas-
ters (such as a pandemic), a power blackout also has a unique structure in terms 
of time. It occurs suddenly, without any advance warning and there is total un-
certainty surrounding its duration. Both factors hamper an individual’s ability to 
deal with the situation. 
If the blackout lasts for only a short time, it is not necessary to confront the re-
appearance of what has been suppressed, to develop an awareness of dependen-
cies, to activate one’s inner self.113 Paradoxically, the short nature of the power 
blackout seems to prove the reliability of supply. 
By contrast, a power blackout lasting for several hours or 1 or 2 days could 
make people more aware of dependencies and of the consequences of a blackout 
(for the following see Vierboom/Härlen, p. 11): 
> The unquestioned expected stability in terms of the supply’s previous ability 
to function is cast aside. When an individual turns on the radio or television 
or tries to use the fixed-line network to make a phone call and discovers that 
these devices don’t work without electricity, this is at the latest the point 
when he realises that wider areas of customary everyday life are now disrupt-
ed. The lack of information (e.g. on the expected duration) is felt particularly 
strongly (Palm 2009). 
                                            
112 In this context, ego strength especially means a (relatively) low dependence on environ-
mental conditions. 
113 In a survey of Dutch citizens on a power blackout in 2007, 40 % stated that they con-
tinued with their normal everyday lives; around one quarter attempted to obtain infor-
mation. Nobody stated that they panicked (Helsloot/Beerens 2009, p. 66). 
192 III.  CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND WIDESPREAD POWER BLACKOUT 
 
> The sudden silence of media and telecommunications technology (radios, 
TVs, PCs, mobile phone systems), of household appliances (coffee machines, 
cookers, dishwashers, fridges and freezers), of personal hygiene appliances 
(razors, hair dryers) and of domestic technology (heating systems, alarm sys-
tems, lighting, doorbells, electrically operated shutters) immediately highlights 
the fact that the modern world in which we live is extensively reliant on me-
dia, that the »current of everyday life« is also one of the noises. However, it 
also becomes clear that only a few everyday tasks can really be accomplished 
by hand. 
> Retaining a familiar structure to everyday life proves difficult without electric-
ity. Functions that are taken for granted no longer work. Garage doors won’t 
open, water leaks from freezers as they defrost, surveillance cameras stop 
working, and appliances can’t be used for heating, cooking and cooling.  
> Some people are unable to withstand the sudden realisation of dependency 
and the need to readjust for an uncertain time. This translates into greater or 
lesser physical forms of »de-regulation« through the consumption of alcohol 
and violence and also into archaic types of group formation such as mobs. 
> However, the experience of the breakdown in everyday organisation also 
leads to processes and to the formation of structures where social cohesion is 
sought and established between attachment figures or family connections114. 
Attempts are made to bring and keep the family together. If it becomes neces-
sary for an individual to leave his familiar environment, he will only do this 
with his relatives. 
> The experiences of a power blackout that is limited in terms of time are also 
ambivalent. As well as experiencing feelings of uncertainty and irritation, peo-
ple are also fascinated by the incident (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 12 and 13). 
During a power blackout that lasts for several days or weeks it can firstly be 
expected that – due to stress, emotions, affects, cognitive blockages – the process 
of civilisation »retreats« (Dombrowsky et al. 2009, p. 257). Some individuals 
and groups become less considerate, more aggressive and more prone to vio-
lence, and thus abandon the established standards of social interaction.115 On 
the other hand, types of reaction and behaviour are revealed that enable people 
to »distance« themselves from extreme situations and events in such a way that 
                                            
114 In disaster research, the role of the family/of the social network it represents is mainly 
described in positive terms, including in the context of a positive contribution to »disas-
ter preparedness« (see Kirschenbaum 2006). This is also a theme in the experience re-
ports of Cantauw/Loy (2009). 
115 At the end of the 1930s the sociologist Norbert Elias presented his studies on the »civili-
sation process« (Elias 1989). He reconstructed how a civilisation of human behaviour 
has developed since the Middle Ages. People learn to curb their affects, they consider 
the consequences of their actions, their propensity to violence falls (without however 
disappearing completely), eating, drinking and interaction with one another become in-
creasingly uninhibited and casual.  
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potentially aggressive, panicked or apathetic reactions do not materialise or are 
overcome by the individuals in question. If self-control, cooperation, empathy 
and a willingness to help come to the fore, »the individuals concerned regain 
their sovereignty and also a feeling that the overwhelming can be overcome« 
(Dombrowsky et al. 2009, p. 263; see also Schutzkommission 2006, p. 45). 
All measures by authorities and aid organisations, all technical support and as-
sistance and also all human affection must ultimately aim to mitigate material 
shortcomings and psychological pressures in order to enable people to develop 
such a conviction. This would also help to activate »social capital« within socie-
ty (Murphy 2007), i.e. the potential of non-professional helpers to provide assis-
tance. 
THEORIES ON THE BEHAVIOUR-RELATED CONSEQUENCES 
OF A PROLONGED POWER BLACKOUT 3.2 
The following section discusses possible types of experience and behaviour associ-
ated with a prolonged power blackout116 in theoretical and exaggerated form. The 
statements are largely based on the report by Vierboom/Härlen (2009, p. 15 ff.) 
and represent theories for discussion. 
A first dimension of the prolonged power blackout is the manifest threat to cus-
tomary »everyday operations«. Actions involving the body such as cooking, eat-
ing and personal hygiene are taken out of step, as are cultural communication 
tools. The power blackout means these actions have to be re-thought and prac-
tised. For example, face-to-face communication replaces communication by 
technical means and assumes a new importance. The desire for and the dissemi-
nation of news and information manifests itself in rumours that in the circum-
stances are deemed an »intensive quest for information« (Turner 1994). In addi-
tion, thresholds that have been established and guaranteed through civilisation 
and law can become questionable and threatened. »Boundaries are dissolved; 
examples include violence, alcohol consumption, sexualisation, looting, mobs, 
the formation of gangs. However, the power of de-differentiation also extends to 
more subtle areas. Houses and apartments gradually reduce to one room, school 
teaching is cancelled or is continued using »on-board resources«, physical dis-
tances disappear, inhibitions are lost, hygiene standards can no longer be main-
tained, special skills and professional expertise are no longer in demand, person-
al tastes and extravagances are suppressed, etc. This dissolving of borders is 
heightened by the fact that the power blackout strikes people unprepared and by 
                                            
116 Ungerer/Morgenroth (2001, p. 112) refer to the behaviour of people in a threat situa-
tion as »disclosure documentation of emotional/affective, cognitive and ethical/moral 
dispositions« of human beings. 
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the fact that there is uncertainty surrounding its duration. The experience of 
time thus also becomes de-differentiated« (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 16) 
Feelings of helplessness develop despite efforts to maintain order and despite 
hope that the power blackout cannot last for ever. This is followed by »attempts 
at explanations, attempts at pacification, morale-boosting talk, obtaining infor-
mation, making contact, drawing up organisational plans and allocating roles 
for purchasing food, cooking, eating, personal hygiene«. Yet the realisation re-
mains that one is almost helplessly exposed to the conditions and consequences 
of a prolonged power blackout (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 16 f.). However, any 
conception of humans as helpless victims of disasters is misleading – not least 
because experiences of disasters have shown that more people are saved by non-
professional helpers than by members of the aid organisations. 
The resulting consequences for people’s perception of tension and their means of 
coping with this are by no means uniform: »On the one hand, the loss of order 
and the breakdown of familiar functions and tasks releases energies that float 
freely and can translate into fears and psychotic reactions. On the other hand 
familiar unities are replaced by new unities and focuses, for example in the form 
of complex, long-winded energy-sapping processes to procure food.« There is 
only a modest re-establishment of order with a view to achieving a functioning 
everyday existence – »people are happy if at least something starts working 
again« (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 17). 
The aforementioned processes of the dissolution of borders intensify as the dis-
aster unfolds. »To begin with, a power blackout is at most annoying, uncom-
fortable, perhaps unsettling for some, while for others it is exciting and irritating 
in a positive way. Then, however, public order begins to disintegrate.« A short-
age of drinking water, food shortages, aggressive altercations, increases in fatali-
ties in hospitals and old people’s homes are signs of the failing efforts to manage 
the situation and provide assistance. The concentration of such circumstances 
»acts like a mixing bowl, where everything is thrown in together. In a state of 
extreme de-differentiation, an extensive conglomeration of disasters opens up 
threatening many fatalities and provoking increased efforts by individuals to 
protect and arm themselves.« (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 17) 
Finally, the reflections so far need to be condensed into hypothetical coping 
strategies and patterns of behaviour that could materialise during a prolonged 
power blackout. This typification serves to combine a wide variety of behaviour 
patterns117 that indicate interpersonal and intrapersonal differences. The discus-
                                            
117 In emergency psychology this fact is attributed to a set of different biological, socio-
cultural and psychological factors (Lasogga/Gasch 2008). This is confirmed by (empiri-
cally backed) disaster research. 
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sion is based on adapted versus deviant behaviour, each in combination with ego 
strength and ego weakness (according to Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 17 ff.).118 
EGO STRENGTH IN COMBINATION WITH ADAPTED BEHAVIOUR 
This type of behaviour is characterised by the self-determined goal of replacing 
the emerging chaos with a newly structured order based on traditional rules. For 
people who exhibit this type of behaviour, protecting family members or sensi-
tive parties such as partners, friends and close acquaintances is especially im-
portant and serves to motivate them. 
Adherence to culture describes an individual who keeps a stiff upper lip even 
during the disaster and who takes on responsibility (Wallenius 2001, p. 158), 
who will not let himself go and who pursues his goals with determination. Peo-
ple who fall into this category include people who have survived even seemingly 
impossible situations by displaying ego strength and a life-affirming attitude. 
Maintaining order and actively managing the disaster represent the guidelines 
that form the basis for the behaviour of people who attempt to maintain calm 
and retain an overview while also playing an active role. They have a high level 
of controlling conviction. This could manifest itself by individuals taking on 
management tasks in a considered and responsible way. They could also be clas-
sified as self-declared »custodians of order«, which is a somewhat problematic 
role (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 19). 
Vierboom and Härlen (2009, p. 20) describe a special form of ego strength as 
rustic survival. This category includes individuals who can manage for some 
time without a civilisation-based environment (e.g. people with pathfinder and 
camping experience, lone fighter training, survival training and people who can 
manage without the frequent use of lots of technical equipment). 
EGO STRENGTH IN COMBINATION WITH DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR 
Coping strategies from the criminal-deviant spectrum are also target-oriented, 
but are characterised by deviant behaviour that uses the threat situation faced by 
public order for aggressive action and criminal activities. 
Subversion: This form of coping is furthest removed from socially accepted 
standards. It includes forms of sabotage, organised and serious breaches of the 
peace and terrorism. Planned actions aimed at undermining existing social order 
render this form dangerous. 
                                            
118 Adapted behaviour means behaviour geared to moral rules, rules of law and rules of 
public order; deviant behaviour goes against these standards. Ego strength means a rela-
tively low dependence on external conditions due to continuous character development; 
ego weakness refers to »a lack of anchor and structural weakness« and a relatively high 
dependence on surrounding conditions. 
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Intelligent forms of criminality exploit the situation caused by the power black-
out (e.g. in the form of targeted break-ins at banks or shops). 
Opportunistic criminality also exploits the circumstances, but with less planning 
involved (pick-pocketing, robbing kiosks). 
EGO WEAKNESS IN COMBINATION WITH ADAPTED BEHAVIOUR 
Helplessness can be triggered by an individual feeling he has no influence over 
events. Helplessness that needs management by others can represent a form of 
coping. 
> Overload and passivity: Many people find themselves overtaxed by the con-
sequences of an extensive power blackout. They don’t know how to help 
themselves, tend to have panic reactions119 or withdraw passively (»freez-
ing«). A feeling of suffering is combined with a strong need to manage. Such 
people also align themselves closely to others and behave in the same way as 
them (»passive following«) Wallenius 2001, p. 163). 
> Apathy and depression: A combination of stress and overload can lead to 
trauma being expressed to a greater or lesser degree. Traumatised people have 
»looked too deep into the abyss«. They have no drive and tend to give up.120 
EGO WEAKNESS IN COMBINATION WITH DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR 
Forms of behaviour that are characterised by destructive and aggressive conduct 
and that border on the psychotic are usually associated with ego weakness. They 
are also a form of coping with a situation in which there is little to hold on to. 
> Looting, vandalism: Groups such as hooligans or anarchists are driven by the 
chaos and exacerbate the chaos (Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 21). Spontaneous 
mobs, looting and unrest represent an expression and a consequence of a dis-
ordered and uncertain situation. 
> Sexually aggressive empowerment: From extreme situations such as war and 
disasters, forms of sexually aggressive behaviour that especially appear when 
the »corset« of cultivation comes loose are known as »cultural failures«. 
> Psychotic plundering may also occur if the power blackout continues for a 
long time. In heightened form this reflects a general state of uncertainty 
among large sections of the population. 
Figure 25 summarises the above statements. 
                                            
119 American literature in particular heavily emphasises that panic reactions tend to be rare 
(»panic myth«). 
120 Ungerer/Morgenroth (2001, p. 121) refer to »mental unfaithfulness« if the threat situa-
tion is not confronted. 
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FIGURE 25 FOUR TEXTBOOK FORMS OF BEHAVIOUR 
 
Source: According to Vierboom/Härlen 2009, p. 19 
The above statements describe four textbook behaviour clusters that are exag-
gerated from a theoretical point of view. Overall, it can be said that the de-
scribed forms of deviant behaviour will probably be found among only a small 
section of the population. The forms of adapted behaviour (ego strength and ego 
weakness forms) will represent the majority of coping strategies (Vierboom/ 
Härlen 2009, p. 21). Social resources, i.e. the ability for one or more individuals 
to provide emotional support, should help significantly in overcoming individual 
critical situations and the associated on-going stress (Lasogga/Gasch 2008, 
p. 144). This assumption is supported by findings on disaster research. According 
to these findings, it appears plausible that popular assumptions on people’s behav-
iour in threat situations – which are often disseminated by media – do not apply 
across-the-board (Dombrowsky/Schuh 2008). According to Quarantelli (1985, 
p. 8 ff.), for example, experience shows that individual conduct and behaviour 
in disasters cannot be described as mainly panic-stricken, anti-social and passive. 
Reality shows a very different picture: relatively controlled (including a rational 
decision to escape), altruistic, supportive and energetic actions are far more typi-
cal and frequent than panic-stricken, anti-social actions (see also Wallenius 
2001, p. 158; Nye 2010). Many case studies on threat situations such as earth-
quakes, fires in underground rail stations or shipping disasters (e.g. Cornwell et al. 
2001) emphasise the pronounced desire to help even where underlying conditions 
are critical. Some reports also provide evidence of this in the case of power 
blackouts (e.g. Nye 2010 for New York; see also Murphy 2007, Yuill 2004). 
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However, such behaviour does not necessarily have to lead to self-abandonment 
and a neglect of one’s own safety/security and interests. A phase where assis-
tance is provided can thus switch, more or less abruptly, to a phase involving 
purely egoistic behaviour, if circumstances and events become life-threatening 
for helpers (Wallenius 2001, p. 182). 
The above deliberations and hypotheses undoubtedly need to be verified and 
developed in order to provide a sounder basis for understanding the psychody-
namics of dealing with people faced with a gradually unfolding disaster. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND RESEARCH 3.3 
Attitudes and behaviour of groups and individuals in disaster situations repre-
sent an area that has not been sufficiently researched. At the same time, howev-
er, a number of assumptions exist – especially concerning anticipated antisocial, 
apathetic or panic-stricken behaviour by the public (»panic myth«) – which 
would probably not withstand examination. Further clarification is therefore 
also required regarding power blackouts as a type of disaster; these could build 
on the few available reports and analyses on power blackouts in America and 
Europe (e.g. Nye 2010). 
One approach could be to conduct in-depth psychological studies (Vierboom/ 
Härlen 2009, p. 24 ff.). These could include intensive surveys of three groups 
based on the above theories: 
> People who have already experienced a power blackout lasting several days 
(e.g. people from the Münsterland region or from the Netherlands), 
> People without any experience of a widespread power blackout and 
> People involved in disaster management (managers, local emergency forces) 
with and without experience of a (prolonged) power blackout. 
Such an approach – and also other possible methods – could provide a contribu-
tion, based on the example of a power blackout, to an analysis of human behav-
iour and misconduct in threat situations and the associated causes; this repre-
sents a subject that has not been widely addressed (Ungerer/Morgenroth 2001, 
p. 272). However, studies could also investigate whether and under what cir-
cumstances the traits of altruism and willingness to help others, which are fre-
quently observed in disaster situations, could be strengthened in order to sup-
port the work of professional helpers (Murphy 2007). 
For the members of the various aid organisations and support forces, the conse-
quences of the power blackout will mean continuous extreme stress. The adverse 
circumstances, the pressure to make fast decisions even where uncertainty pre-
vails, the many requests for assistance, the feeling of helplessness and the loss of 
 3.  BEHAVIOUR-RELATED CONSEQUENCES OF A POWER BLACKOUT 199 
 
communications structures create high levels of physical and psychological 
stress. Experience shows that problems are less likely to be encountered regard-
ing dedication and loyalty on the part of helpers (e.g. Dynes 1990). On the con-
trary, it is likely that different organisational cultures121 could trigger incorrect 
behaviour in the face of a threat and stand in the way of efficient communica-
tion and cooperation within and between the emergency forces (Drabek/McEn-
tire 2002; see also Drabek 2010; Lasogga/Gasch 2008, p. 403 ff.). Conflicts 
could therefore also arise between helpers during major emergencies where very 
different groups such as the police, fire service, rescue organisations, the THW 
and psycho-social emergency assistants are brought together (Lasogga/Gasch 
2008, p. 142). 
Prejudices and barriers to communication are especially prevalent if emergency 
forces do not know each other. Conversely, there are numerous indications that 
obstructions can be reduced if the relevant parties obtain a better mutual under-
standing of each others’ respective tasks and roles by ensuring local proximity, 
joint exercises or operational experience. Research efforts are also required into 
these aspects. The factors that promote and hamper communication should be 
further clarified by conducting more intensive socio-scientific and interdiscipli-
nary analyses. 
                                            





VULNERABILITY, OPTIONS FOR COPING AND 
NEED FOR ACTION – CONCLUSIONS IV. 
Chapter II above described the German system for crisis management, while 
Chapter III then described the consequences of a power blackout for seven se-
lected sectors (Chapter III.2.2). This chapter now provides a conclusion. It 
brings together the statements made in the respective sector analyses in order to 
assess the vulnerability of these sectors and also the opportunities available to 
and the limits of disaster management (Chapter IV.1 to IV.7). These sector-
specific observations are followed by cross-sector conclusions (Chapters IV.8 to 
IV.13). In each case, statements are made concerning the need for information 
and research and also on possible action. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1. 
A power blackout has a huge detrimental impact on the »information technolo-
gy and telecommunications« (IT/TC) sector. After just a short time it is no long-
er possible to use fixed-network and mobile telephony or indeed the Internet and 
in some cases it is not possible to receive radio broadcasts. Even satellite-based 
telephones can only be used while the end terminals’ energy-storage devices are 
still functioning. It is only possible to dial into mobile phone networks on the 
edges of the area affected by the power blackout. Even in the first few days it 
becomes clear that telecommunications suppliers are unable to provide the min-
imum level of telecommunications services that are planned for a disaster situa-
tion and required by law. The reserve capacities such as UPS and emergency 
power generators that are kept for key communications facilities are exhausted 
after a few hours or days or become unusable because end terminals are no 
longer working. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
Although individual infrastructure elements (e.g. terminals, networks, switching 
centres) in the various sub-sectors are able to bridge a certain period of time, 
these are not harmonised with each other and the resilience of an infrastructure 
therefore depends on its weakest element. 
> In the field of fixed-network telephony, trunk exchanges have emergency 
power capacities designed to last up to a few days, but these prove ineffective 
because the subordinate switching centres and terminals stop working. 
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> By contrast, mobile phone terminals could be used for several days and even 
up to a few weeks with corresponding usage and even central switching sta-
tions could still operate for a few days. The weak point in this infrastructure 
is set by the base stations which  due to the increased volume of calls  can 
only continue to work for a few minutes or hours. 
> Satellite telephony is far more resilient, and depending on capacity and usage 
of terminals can enable communication for hours or days. However, satellite 
telephones are not very widely used and are thus of minor importance in 
terms of maintaining general communications. 
> The Internet is operated via the well-protected remote transmission network. 
However, because the end devices and access devices are powered by electrici-
ty, dial-in is only possible to a limited degree and at most for only a short pe-
riod if mobile computers or smart phones can dial in to local switching cen-
tres or base stations that are still working. 
> With their legal mandate to provide emergency communication and infor-
mation, radio broadcasting corporations have contingency preparations in 
place and can continue to work for several days. However, televisions stop 
working immediately, and (battery) operated radios represent the only re-
maining option in terms of receiving devices. The millions of radios in circula-
tion can in principle continue to work and receive broadcasts for hours or 
weeks (e.g. car radio).  
> Despite the presence of emergency power generators in printing shops, logis-
tical challenges and restrictions in terms of editorial work mean print media 
can only be used to a limited degree for information and communication pur-
poses. 
Within a very short time, therefore, the public is deprived of the ability to engage 
in active and dialogue-based communication by telephone and the Internet. The 
network structure of many electrically driven network routers, switching ex-
changes and radio antennae for fixed and mobile telephony and also the Internet 
makes it almost impossible to ensure wide-scale reconnection because thousands 
of battery storage units would have to be charged and fuel tanks supplied. At 
most, it is conceivable that partial reactivation of individual infrastructure ele-
ments would be possible at the edges of the area affected by the power blackout. 
Moreover, the failure of communications infrastructures also affects the authori-
ties and task forces, who use the remaining communications capabilities on a 
priority basis. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
It would appear that in economic and technical terms, it is not possible to ensure 
sustained safeguarding of communications networks that makes it possible to 
maintain a stable, extensive offering of services for the public. As far as can be 
seen, concepts that offer at least a defined minimum level of supply in the event 
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of a prolonged power blackout have not yet been developed. In this context, 
extensive and detailed information is required on the existing coping capacities 
of authorities and private companies. Overall, there is a lack of relevant data 
and specific vulnerability analyses for the sector. Chapters IV.4.10 and IV.4.11 
include a discussion on the need for further research. 
TRANSPORT AND TRAFFIC 2. 
In the »transport and traffic« sector, electrically powered elements of the 
transport modes road, rail, air and water stop working immediately or after a 
few hours. Numerous accidents, traffic jams, stranded trains and underground 
trains, diverted flights and logjams of lorries and goods in ports create major 
restrictions for individual mobility and for goods transport, and therefore for 
supplies for the population. A prolonged power blackout – and thus an exten-
sive blockage of traffic modes and traffic flows – would have menacing conse-
quences for Germany in its capacity as a transit country, a production location 
and an exporter (BBK 2008a, p. 18). 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
In the first few hours after the power blackout in particular, the authorities and 
aid organisations encounter growing problems in major cities and conurbations. 
Fire-fighting, emergency rescues and missions to ensure emergency power sup-
plies and a number of additional measures to manage the general damage situa-
tion are significantly hampered. Almost all petrol stations are out of action. In 
addition, the increasing problems in the field of telephony are making them-
selves more apparent. There is also a threat of major bottlenecks in supplying 
the population with, for example, food or medical requisites. 
The authorities are thus faced with complex challenges. At local level, it is neces-
sary to ensure an adequate supply of fuel for task forces and for the emergency 
generators of particularly sensitive critical infrastructure components (such as 
control centres, BOS, hospitals). In addition, it is necessary to clear, block off 
and impose traffic bans for important routes to ensure they are made clear and 
also kept clear for the emergency task forces. Finally, it is necessary to establish 
(interregional) transport axes and to make transport capacities available in order 
to ensure the supply of essential goods. 
The systems of the different transport modes must at least be restored in such a 
way as to ensure that the infrastructure requirements for reaching the required 
destinations are in place. Here, there are considerable differences in terms of 
resilience and coping capacities. 
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In the roads sub-sector, roads and track systems in major cities and densely 
populated areas must be cleared to enable the vehicles of the emergency forces to 
reach locations where they are needed to carry out tasks. Buses are used in an 
attempt to ensure rudimentary local public transport. Motorways and highways 
can be used as transport axes. Within and outside the area affected by the power 
blackout, lorries and buses can be used on the basis of the Traffic Services Act 
(VerkLG) to carry out supply and evacuation operations. 
In the rail sub-sector, available emergency forces and rail staff are widely used in 
the first few hours in a bid to evacuate underground trains and stranded passen-
ger trains and also to clear railway stations and care for the people involved. 
Capacities of the fire services, the THW and the police are deployed. A few 
hours after the start of the power blackout the first diesel locomotives can be 
used to recover stranded trains. Heatable points components cannot be kept free 
of frost in the winter and are bolted down. Railway control centres and points 
have to be operated manually by rail staff. Shunt yards are also likely to have 
increased staffing requirements. 
Pressures of time and the adverse circumstances mean huge stresses for helpers, 
and also for rail staff in the shunt yards, control centres and for those working 
with control and safety technology. Symptoms of stress and exhaustion can in 
particular be expected after a few days/a week. The breakdown of communica-
tions structures means almost insurmountable difficulties are encountered in co-
ordinating measures and the task forces. 
Rail transport is of crucial importance in terms of ensuring supplies for the pub-
lic. Once tracks have been cleared and points bolted down, key stretches of the 
rail network can be made passable and diesel trains can be used on these routes 
to transport larger volumes of goods and people. During the power blackout the 
relevant authorities must work with the rail operators to decide on routes and 
measures that will enable emergency operations.122 
In the air sector, airports prove relatively resilient because of their extensive 
emergency power supplies. Some scheduled take-offs and landings can still be 
processed, but some flight movements are prohibited (EBP 2010, p. 22). Once it 
becomes clear that the power blackout will last for some time the crisis units 
adapt their plans and measures to the new underlying conditions. Air-traffic 
control and aviation companies divert flights and start to re-plan. The main pri-
ority is then to look after all passengers who are still waiting, to maintain 
ground operations and to ensure airport security. In addition, the question of to 
what extent supply flights are possible (where applicable as visual flights) is ex-
amined. 
                                            
122 DB AG has set up the DB situation centre as an »operational instrument and organisa-
tional tool for crisis units and work forces« (BBK 2008a, p. 122). 
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In the sub-sector of water, problems mount at sea and inland ports and operations 
come to a virtual standstill. The respective port authorities implement their 
emergency plans and endeavour to reduce port operations, clear traffic jams and 
make contact with ships and the competent authorities. During the power 
blackout the police are unable to perform any security tasks for port facilities. 
The fire service and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) are used 
where necessary, e.g. to establish a power supply using mobile generators or if 
dangerous situations arise in connection with hazardous goods. 
Once it becomes clear that the power blackout will last for some time, attempts 
are made to divert arriving or scheduled goods traffic and for such traffic to be 
handled by road and rail. This requires agreements between the competent de-
partments and the companies and also with ports in Germany and Europe that 
are not affected by the blackout. This can present major difficulties given the 
breakdowns in information and communications technology. 
WATER AND WASTEWATER 3. 
Water infrastructure systems cannot be operated on a long-term basis without 
an available electricity supply. In the same way as the water supply system, so 
wastewater disposal uses electric pumps at key points within the system. The 
consequences of these pumps being out of action for a long period would be 
catastrophic, especially as regards supplying the public with drinking water. Al-
so, if a power blackout lasts for a long time, fire-fighting water is likely to be-
come so scarce in cities that it becomes impossible to ensure effective prevention 
of fires and fire cascades. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
As shown by the analyses of the direct and indirect consequences of a power 
blackout for water infrastructure systems, the current available structures and 
technologies used for water supply and wastewater disposal would mean having 
to resort almost entirely to makeshift solutions that are highly complex in terms 
of the personnel, organisation, time and materials required. This includes 
providing supplies to the public through the use of emergency wells and the use 
of tankers and mobile toilet trailers. Additional measures include maintaining 
the supply and disposal networks at a low level of operating performance by 
bridging measures and by functional replacement of individual components and 
facilities that are dependent on the power supply. This especially requires the use 
of mobile emergency power generators. As they are probably only available in 
small numbers, they would have to be used at alternating locations (e.g. at water 
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works123 or lift systems in the sewage system). It would also be necessary to 
flush the sewage networks, e.g. using water from tankers. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION AND PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
Since Germany currently needs high volumes of investment in order to maintain, 
restore and rebuild its water infrastructure systems, this provides an opportunity 
to consider vulnerability and resilience factors when planning and designing fu-
ture systems and to create synergies designed to ensure systematic solutions for 
disaster situations. 
Synergies are, for example, possible with wastewater treatment plants. Intensive 
research and development work is already being conducted with a view to in-
creasing energy efficiency and autonomous energy production through the con-
version of biogas into electricity at cogeneration power stations; this work is 
also driven by financial considerations (MUFV Rh-Pf. 2007; UBA 2008). Based 
on the current state of the art, further expansion of the conversion of biogas into 
electricity at cogeneration power stations and a simultaneous increase in energy 
efficiency would make an autonomous energy supply a conceivable option (UBA 
2008). Currently, large sewage plants that use this technology have a self-
sufficient energy supply rate of between 25 and 30 %. However, the power gen-
eration plants cannot easily be used for isolated network operation.124. Isolated 
network compatibility requires power electronics that enable an isolated micro 
network (individual plants or even groups of houses) to be supplied via decen-
tralised systems (Chapter IV.12). 
In a disaster situation, energy self-sufficiency through autonomous energy pro-
duction and isolated network compatibility of decentralised power generators 
would help ensure supplies after a power blackout. Such systems could aim to 
enable sewage treatment plants to work safely and simply on an autonomous 
basis without having to implement costly improvisation measures or commit 
staff and mobile resources. As a central part of the infrastructure, water works 
should also aim to achieve this objective by becoming integrated in a supply 
structure that offers isolated network compatibility. 
A less extensive option for disaster management involves the introduction of 
energy-saving minimal operation for the water infrastructure. The operators 
surveyed during the TAB project hope to introduce this type of operation. Min-
                                            
123 Although water works often have their own emergency power generators or have access 
to generators owned by, for example, municipal utilities or the local authorities, it is 
questionable whether these are actually available when required and whether it is possi-
ble for the switchover to emergency operation (which may be hampered by transport 
problems or competition for emergency power generators) to proceed smoothly. 
124 In Baden-Württemberg around 40 % of sewage plants that are operated by means of a 
cogeneration plant can also work independently of the power grid (Keicher et al. 2008). 
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imal operation must be based on available resources and must combine and use 
the existing infrastructure elements to optimum effect, e.g. by switching off par-
allel water treatment process lines in sewage plants in order to save energy or 
through mobile and flexible use of emergency power generators at lifting sys-
tems in the sewage network.  
Among other things, this could have the following implications for private 
households: 
> Water supplied at a reduced pressure, water doesn’t reach upper storeys; 
> Supply focuses on selected parts of the supply network; 
> Reduced quality of water supply to ensure faecal transport from homes and 
to the sewage system is still guaranteed, but food-quality water can only be 
achieved by consumers carrying out further processing (e.g. disinfection). 
Finally, there is still a considerable need for improvements to simple (i.e. not 
system-based) safety concepts for sewage plants, for example. For Baden-Würt-
temberg, Keicher et al. (2008) identify considerable residual potential for equip-
ping systems with an uninterruptible power supply, for stocking operating re-
sources (e.g. diesel) for emergency power generators (supplies are generally only 
enough for 24 hours) and also for drawing up emergency plans that help set 
necessary priorities. 
The field of fire protection offers opportunities for reducing vulnerability – for 
example by developing and using new technologies that reduce water require-
ments through more effective use of fire-fighting water. These include mobile 
high-pressure extinguishing systems on board fire engines and stationary extin-
guishing systems in apartment blocks, office buildings and industrial facilities 
(e.g. high-pressure extinguishing systems that use a fine mist of water to cool 
and smother the fire at the same time). These can be powered by an emergency 
power supply or using gas from pressurised cylinders and require small-volume 
water tanks in the buildings. In terms of the size of the water infrastructure, 
these systems represent an improvement in terms of costs and efficiency and are 
currently the focus of research. 
In view of the overriding importance of water infrastructure systems, greater 
consideration should be given to measures to improve their resilience. The 
aforementioned system-based and non-system-based approaches could make 
useful contributions towards improving the resilience of the water supply in the 
event of a prolonged power blackout. 
SAFETY CONCEPTS, RESEARCH ON VULNERABILITY 
In 2004 the WHO published new guidelines on drinking water quality and re-
commended the drafting of a drinking water safety concept (Water Safety Plan) 
to guarantee drinking water quality. This includes comprehensive risk assess-
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ment and management approaches covering all stages from water extraction to 
delivery (WHO 2009). 
FIGURE 26 ELEMENTS OF A DRINKING WATER SAFETY PLAN IN SELECTED PARTS 
 OF THE DVGW TECHNICAL RULES 
 
Source: Bethmann et al. 2006 
Bethmann et al. (2006) demonstrate that the DVGW technical rules already in-
clude key elements of the WHO water safety plan. Figure 26 provides a graph-
ical overview. However, the graphical illustration also shows that the issue of 
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risk assessment is hardly implemented in the fields of water extraction, water 
treatment, water storage and water distribution. Here, there is a need for exten-
sive augmentation because priorities for developing measures can only be set on 
the basis of risk assessments. 
Among other things, methods based on simulation models are used to conduct 
risk and vulnerability analyses for major technical systems such as water infra-
structure systems. Frequently considered threats include contamination of drink-
ing water and malfunctions of individual components or system components 
(caused either by deliberate actions, accidents or by natural events). The conse-
quences of a prolonged power blackout on the water infrastructure have not yet 
been investigated on the basis of models. In the field of infrastructure systems, 
modelling is used at different levels of detail and with different objectives and 
perspectives (e.g. the analysis of probabilities of occurrence and the simulation 
of damaging events and their spread). Subjects used for the models include, for 
example, relevant physical processes such as hydraulic processes in pipeline sys-
tems. Models of this type are often used to answer very specific technical ques-
tions relating to optimising operations or planning. Technically detailed models 
of the water supply infrastructure include EPANET, a software development by 
the USA Environmental Protection Agency which aims to improve the water 
supply. EPANET is also used in a series of publications as a basis for vulnerabil-
ity analyses that consider various threat situations. For example, Navarro-Roa et 
al. (2008) conduct probabilistic defect analyses by simulating malfunctions of 
individual technical elements. Tidwell et al. (2005) and Thompson et al. (2007) 
analyse the threats that can result when water is contaminated. 
However, abstract models that consider the water infrastructure system as part 
of a mesh of interacting infrastructures (»system of systems«) are also used. 
These models are based on approaches that focus on the links between the indi-
vidual infrastructure systems and their input and output factors. The importance 
of this system-of-systems approach is emphasised by Kröger (2008), who also 
deduces a need for new modelling methods suited to this purpose. The resulting 
gain in knowledge concerning the mutual dependencies between infrastructures 
could prove useful when developing a preventive disaster management system 
(Dombrowsky 2007). 
FOOD SUPPLY 4. 
The food sector is characterised by a high level of vulnerability. Within a week, 
plant production and animal husbandry suffer considerable damage. In particu-
lar, it can be expected that even during the first 2 days, the supply chain from 
retail food warehouses to branches and thus to consumers is severely disrupted 
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and collapses soon after. Since all data lines have stopped working, there is no 
flow of information available to enable operators to respond to local needs and 
to arrange deliveries where they are required. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
Supplying the population with food is one of the key functions of the critical in-
frastructure system; indeed, it is vital for survival (BSI 2005, p. 137). In a disaster 
situation, ensuring the supply of food forms part of the state’s duty of protection 
pursuant to Article 2 [2] clause 1 of the Basic Law (GG). 
As part of their disaster management endeavours, the authorities can – some-
times working in conjunction with the retail trade – take the following measures, 
among others: 
> The rationed release of stocks of the »civil emergency reserve« and of the 
»federal reserve of grain« is initiated on the basis of the Emergency Food 
Supply Act. The »federal reserve of grain« stores grain such as wheat and 
oats, while the »civil emergency reserve« stores rice, pulses, milk powder and 
condensed milk. Where possible, these undergo further processing and are 
handed out via collective care centres (BLE 2006, p. 3 and 7). The Traffic 
Services Act (VerkLG) is used to counter logistics problems faced in distrib-
uting the reserve stocks by adding extra transport capacities. In addition to 
these measures, the retail sector starts intensive interregional efforts to supply 
the affected region (BMELV 2005, p. 71). Where food is able to be delivered, 
some sales are conducted directly from lorries in front of branches (BMELV 
2005, p. 120). 
> Food handout centres are set up in selected retail food branches. These are 
equipped with emergency power generators and are where possible given con-
sideration during the allocation of fuel. The corresponding companies in are-
as of Germany that are not affected or in other countries coordinate the re-
quired logistics processes in consultation with the authorities. 
> Since most people have no facilities to prepare hot meals, large canteens are 
for example set up by the THW, the German Red Cross (DRK) and the Fed-
eral Armed Forces or hot meals are handed out. 
Nevertheless, stocks of food in households and in branches and warehouses of 
the food trade sector could dry up by the end of the first week in the area affect-
ed by the power blackout. The possibility of also resorting to German stocks of 
the EU intervention reserve is therefore considered. This includes cereals, rice, 
olive oil and table olives, milk and milk products, beef, pork, lamb and goat 
meat. The question of requesting stocks from other EU states could also be con-
sidered. However, since large quantities of the warehoused goods (e.g. barley) 
can only be used to a limited degree for food and the goods are not generally 
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stored in the vicinity of production locations, this option is rejected (Rasche et 
al. 2001, p. 63). 
Despite best efforts, however, it is highly probable that it will not be possible to 
ensure a satisfactory extensive supply of food to meet requirements. The main 
obstacles are likely to be the fact that the various players are poorly networked 
in some cases and also the lack of means of communication. No uniform picture 
of the situation is available, making interregional coordination of measures ex-
tremely difficult. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION, PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
Assuming that the above observations are accepted, key starting points for im-
proving the resilience of the sector could in particular include the regional cen-
tral warehouses of the retail trade and also in some cases selected branches. 
These could be equipped with a resilient emergency power supply. The question 
of agreements with the petroleum trade to ensure deliveries for the emergency 
power generators could, for example, be considered. If power supply points are 
available this would enable the use of mobile generators (by electricity supply 
companies, the THW and the Federal Armed Forces where applicable), although 
their long-term use would have to be ensured. 
More far-reaching concepts along the lines of a public-private security partnership 
could be examined. For example, efforts could be made to reach an agreement 
with the retail trade specifying the provision of one branch outlet suitable for cop-
ing with disasters for every 10,000 inhabitants and also specifying the provision, 
in every federal state, of a food warehouse that is equipped with an extensive 
storage facility, means of communication and emergency power generators. These 
would be recorded in a central database, which could be used by authorities and 
companies to coordinate deliveries in the event of a disaster. 
The specific conditions of a power blackout also make it necessary to consider if 
the type of food stockpiled by the state and also the planned processing and dis-
tribution of such foodstuffs are appropriate to the situation. For example, it may 
not be possible to produce flour in mills. Also, private households do not have 
sources of heat to prepare food. Aspects such as these should therefore be includ-
ed in current reflections on how to improve provisioning. 
Another possible course of action would be for the retail trade’s central ware-
houses to have an autonomous power supply based on renewable energies, thus 
permitting a high level of self-sufficiency. Since central warehouses have a large 
roof area and are generally located on the outskirts of or outside towns, it would 
be possible to use renewable energy sources such as solar power and wind power 
and to use corresponding storage technologies, provided thorough planning was 
carried out; cogeneration diesel generators could also be used. 
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Since it has been shown that a large number of animals would not only suffer 
harm but would in many cases also die in the event of a power blackout, steps 
should be taken to examine whether legislative provisions (e.g. the Animal Wel-
fare Livestock Husbandry Ordinance, TierSchNutzVO) could include more pre-
cise requirements on emergency power supplies and an associated obligation to 
store fuel to operate emergency power generators. 
HEALTH SECTOR 5. 
This sector is organised on a decentralised basis with a strong emphasis on the 
division of labour; this factor and also its lack of adequate protection through 
an emergency power supply means that after just a few days, it is unable to cope 
with managing the consequences of the power blackout. Alongside the increas-
ing exhaustion of internal capacities, the efficiency of the health sector is also 
reduced by the impairment of other critical infrastructure functions. In particu-
lar, shortages in the supply of energy, food, communications, water and 
transport services exacerbate the declines in terms of the scope and quality of 
medical care. By the end of the first week at the latest there would be a high 
probability of damage to the health of, a threat to or the death of very large 
numbers of people; moreover, it is unlikely that the problem situation could be 
overcome by relying solely on locally/regionally available resources and person-
nel capacities. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
The internal (especially material) capacities of the regional health system are 
largely exhausted within the first week. There is a lack of insulin, blood supplies, 
blood products, sterile products and fresh linen. Measures such as isolated blood 
donation campaigns or the treatment of laundry in field laundries are unable to 
adequately cover demand. It also becomes increasingly impossible to supply 
medications because stocks at hospital pharmacies are used up125 and manufac-
turers and the trade sector are unable to effect deliveries to meet requirements. It 
is also not possible to guarantee the supply of special products (e.g. special diets) 
required by certain patient groups or to guarantee the supply of suitable prod-
ucts for dialysis patients. This increases the mortality rate considerably. 
                                            
125 According to the Ordinance on the Operation of Pharmacies, hospital pharmacies must 
keep sufficient supplies to meet the average 14-day demand for drugs and medicine 
products. In principle, they should also be able to produce drugs themselves. This is not 
universally guaranteed due to scarce financial resources or a lack of storage space. In 
some federal Länder hospital pharmacies designated by the state health authorities are 
responsible for managing and issuing basic drugs in the event of disaster situations 
(Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 165). 
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Some hospitals can maintain a minimum level of operations and thus become 
central hubs within the medical care network. They still have a certain but 
dwindling stock of medicines and also sufficient staff and fuel. However, this 
relatively good situation also means that when other establishments have to be 
evacuated, their patients are sent to these hospitals. As a result, the hospitals face 
self-perpetuating problems: on the one hand dwindling reserves and an extensive 
loss of specialised units, and on the other hand an increasing overload on exist-
ing capacities due to the rising occupancy levels. It is difficult to defuse the situa-
tion by discharging patients as this is only acceptable for patients who can look 
after themselves. Increasing problems are encountered with the drinking water 
supply and it becomes necessary to resort to emergency wells.126 However, 
transporting the water to hospitals and nursing homes proves problematic (Geier 
et al. 2009, p. 76). 
Some old people’s homes and nursing homes are still able to provide a basic lev-
el of care with the assistance of aid organisations (e.g. an adequate supply of 
food and clean linen). However it is not possible to provide more extensive care 
for patients requiring medical care. Additional overload symptoms manifest 
themselves through increased enquiries from individuals who are cared for at 
home. 
Although the emergency medical services can still be used to a limited degree for 
transport and evacuation operations and the THW and fire services can re-
place/provide infrastructures such as power generators or pumps at many loca-
tions, the disruptions to the communications infrastructure mean the emergency 
medical services are largely unable to receive emergency calls from the public or 
only receive such calls following significant delays. This has a huge detrimental 
impact on pre-clinical medical care. 
At the end of the first week the sector’s basic infrastructure services have come 
to a virtual standstill as a result of the power blackout. For example, most doc-
tors’ surgeries and pharmacies are unable to operate and can no longer fulfil 
their role as a distributor of medicines due to the dwindling supplies. Dialysis 
centres are closed, patients and remaining treatment capacities have been trans-
ferred to hospitals. The production and sale of pharmaceutical products has 
come to a complete halt in the area affected by the power blackout. The disaster 
protection laws of the Länder do not make explicit provision for the participa-
tion of manufacturers and the retail trade in disaster control and such participa-
tion is only anchored in a few hospital alarm and emergency plans. There is 
therefore a need to conclude agreements on production and logistics with repre-
sentatives of manufacturers and the retail trade. 
                                            
126 In the 1970s emphasis was placed on establishing these in the vicinity of hospitals and 
nursing homes (Geier et al. 2009, p. 75; see also Chapter III.2.3.4). 
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At best, first aid services by the Federal Armed Forces within the framework of 
»civil-military cooperation« provide only sporadic relief (Ackermann et al. 
2009a, p. 71; Wagner 2009a, p. 407 and 2009b, p. XXXVI). The collapse of 
medical care focussed in hospitals is imminent. 
If one imagines a scenario where the developments and situations that have 
emerged by the end of the first week continue for even longer, it can be seen that 
it would be virtually impossible to guarantee the health sector’s key function of 
supplying people with the necessary medical services. The risks for life and limb 
would rise exponentially, and the state as a whole would be unable to fulfil its 
duty of protection. Without any external input of medical goods, infrastructures 
and specialist personnel it is no longer possible to provide medico-pharmaceuti-
cal care. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION, PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
Hospitals play a key role as anchor points for medical care of the public. Alt-
hough they do exhibit a certain level of resilience, this is not sufficient to com-
pensate for the loss of all other facilities – especially decentralised outpatient 
care. If diesel generators are made available to provide an emergency power 
supply it is necessary to guarantee continuous replenishments of fuel. To a lim-
ited extent, this requires the storage of fuel on-site or agreements with suppliers 
(who would probably find it difficult to effect deliveries because of the general 
consequences associated with the power blackout). 
In principle, supply points for an emergency power supply need to be included in 
plans for new hospital buildings. Ultimately, hospitals should be defined as hav-
ing priority entitlement in terms of the allocation of fuel by the disaster control 
authorities. A more far-reaching approach is to ensure the highest possible level 
of energy self-sufficiency and isolated network capability; work on this has al-
ready been started in many hospitals within the context of environmental pro-
tection efforts and measures to reduce energy consumption. Possibilities for 
treating water/transporting water from emergency wells to hospitals/emergency 
hospitals should be examined in greater depth in order to ensure the supply of 
drinking water to hospitals (Schutzkommission 2006, p. 83). 
The current underlying economic and political conditions are not entirely con-
ducive to improving provisioning in hospitals. However, the sector analysis has 
demonstrated that this could play a major role in improving resilience. Another 
option worthy of consideration is the inclusion of more extensive derogations in 
the Pharmaceuticals Act to accommodate disasters and emergencies. The aim 
must be to ensure practical regulations for supplying the public in a prolonged 
disaster situation (Paul/Ufer 2009, p. 157 ff.). 
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Another option could be to include manufacturers and the retail trade and also 
pharmacies in disaster management. Here, it would be necessary to ensure that 
all the aforementioned players take precautions to ensure manufacture and dis-
tribution in the event of a prolonged power blackout. In view of the general re-
duction in stocks kept and sophisticated just-in-time logistics, it is necessary to 
examine what economic consequences this could entail and in which legal form 
this could be implemented. 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 6. 
Whereas payment transactions and data traffic of banks and also stock-market 
trading activities prove relatively resilient even during a power blackout, bank-
ing services for customers soon threaten to collapse due to the failure of com-
munication paths. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
Customers are unable to conduct transactions with their banks via telephone or 
the Internet. Banks cannot issue cash from cash dispensers and customers are 
unable to make cashless payments in shops. Demand for cash will therefore rise 
quickly, not least because people in Germany apparently only carry 118 euros 
on them (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009 b, p. 40). Despite an initial calmness, the 
immediate breakdown in the supply of cash via cash dispensers and subsequent-
ly at bank counters and also the collapse of cashless payments lead to expres-
sions of annoyance in shops and banks and to aggressive altercations in some 
cases. Once it becomes clear that the power blackout will last for some time, 
uncertainty grows among the public. People are afraid they won’t be able to get 
supplies of food and other daily requisites because they soon won’t have any 
money left and won’t have the option of cashless payments, either. In some cases 
this leads to violent altercations, theft and break-ins. The police are forced to 
intervene at times. Moreover, as the power blackout continues it becomes neces-
sary to guard individual shops. Shop sales plummet. It is also not possible to rule 
out the possibility of prices of everyday essentials increasing even during the 
course of the first week. Informing customers and ensuring appropriate risk 
communication in consultation with the disaster control authorities thus be-
comes even more important. 
Getting cash supplies to the population becomes a key focus. According to the 
German Bundesbank »special provisions have been made as part of crisis man-
agement organisation to manage an emergency or disaster« (BBK 2008a, 
p. 120). However, it is questionable whether sufficient supplies of cash to meet 
requirements can be continuously transported into a large area over a long peri-
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od of time by private cash transit companies, distributed and subsequently is-
sued by the banks. 
The economy suffers due to the extensive inability of the public and companies 
to make cashless purchases, conduct loan negotiations, make wage payments, 
issue stock-market orders; it also suffers due to the liquidity shortages that soon 
emerge. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION, PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
The consequence analyses have identified the provision of cash supplies to the 
public as a particular weakness. Consequently, the German Bundesbank must 
cooperate with other organisations and civil protection task forces and also the 
banks in order to ensure at least a rudimentary supply of cash for the public 
(EBP 2010, p. 79). To create better conditions for this, it is necessary to examine 
if the Bundesbank should also be included among the organisations authorised 
to request priority access to transport capacities pursuant to the Traffic Services 
Act (VerkLG). An extended logistics and security concept is probably required for 
disaster situations because, for example, it is not possible to ascertain whether and 
how private service providers could adequately safeguard higher volumes of cash 
deliveries. 
There are plans to close numerous branches of the German Bundesbank over the 
next few years. Consideration should be given as whether and to what extent 
these cuts to the infrastructure will affect the supply of cash in a disaster situa-
tion. 
»PRISONS« CASE STUDY 7. 
Initially, correctional facilities are able to maintain reduced operations with the 
help of a functioning emergency power supply. Among other things, this makes 
it possible to ensure prisoners are locked up in their cells and that sufficient 
lighting, ventilation, heating and surveillance systems are available. Nevertheless, 
a significant problem overload develops after a few days: hygiene and the supply 
of medicines and food cannot be ensured across the board and to a sufficient 
degree. Unrest and aggressiveness rise among prisoners; staff experience contin-
uous increases in stress levels. 
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES 
Fuel reserves at correctional facilities are probably only sufficient for a few days. 
The provision of mobile emergency power generators and the delivery of addi-
tional quantities of fuel are therefore imperative to ensure continued emergency 
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power supplies.127 If emergency power supplies are jeopardised, transferring 
prisoners to other correctional facilities outside the affected areas that have not 
reached their maximum occupancy rates would appear almost unavoidable. In 
some circumstances, occupancy capacities could, where necessary, be temporari-
ly increased by accommodating prisoners two to a cell instead of in single cells. 
Accommodating (some) prisoners on a temporary basis in suitable larger buildings 
(e.g. barracks) in areas with a functioning power supply could also be considered. 
However, this would create problems in terms of the restricted ability to control 
individual prisoners, and also in terms of ensuring hygiene, supplying prisoners 
with food and supplying the staff required to provide surveillance and care. 
Even if it were possible to maintain an emergency power supply, it would proba-
bly be impossible to ensure orderly operations because the problems of ensuring 
supplies and of securing prisoners would be too great. If detainees flee from cor-
rectional facilities or are indeed released this can trigger major uncertainty among 
the public; the competent authorities and politicians with relevant responsibility 
would also find themselves under pressure (EBP 2010, p. 162). Depending on the 
situation in the individual correctional facilities, the management of the respective 
correctional facilities and also those responsible within the crisis units must decide 
whether it is appropriate to transfer the detainees and how this should be imple-
mented. This could create huge problems in terms of coordination due to the fail-
ure of fixed-network and mobile telephone systems (Chapter IV.1). It is also 
doubtful whether it would be possible to call on sufficient suitable transport ca-
pacities including the necessary security personnel. 
NEED FOR INFORMATION, PROSPECTS FOR ACTION 
In terms of their functions, prisons are not critical in the sense of being »vital for 
survival«. However, if those in charge are not able to maintain operations or to 
evacuate the buildings in an orderly manner, this would probably considerably 
dent the public’s confidence in the ability of state organisations to manage situa-
tions. Under no circumstances should there be any damage to the expectation 
that authorities are able to guarantee public safety and security. Consequently, 
correctional facilities are included among the buildings where corresponding 
contingency measures are taken to ensure a stable emergency power supply and 
that should be given priority consideration as regards the allocation of emergen-
cy power systems and/or fuel. 
                                            
127 Although this can be organised prior to a power blackout by concluding contracts with 
relevant suppliers, it is questionable whether such delivery contracts could actually be 
adhered to given the other consequences of the blackout (e.g. traffic chaos, shortage of 
fuel, failure of fixed-network and mobile telephone systems). Consequently, the alloca-
tion of fuel by the competent crisis units/operational control centres becomes a priority 
task. 
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As in other sectors, the case study on prisons was unable to definitively ascertain 
whether, how and for what lengths of time an emergency power supply is guar-
anteed. It is also uncertain whether a prolonged power blackout is an issue con-
sidered in correctional facilities’ emergency plans or in alarm and emergency 
plans of the subordinate civil protection authority and whether corresponding 
exercises are organised with the involvement of external support forces. It is not 
possible to identify explicit statutory regulations on emergency power supplies in 
correctional facilities. It was not possible to clarify with certainty whether rele-
vant standards exist at the level of administrative regulations, based on the disas-
ter control and intervention acts of the federal Länder. In addition to this issue, 
there is also a need for further information and legal clarification concerning 
possible measures that may become necessary (e.g. non-admission of day-release 
prisoners or »prison leave« for selected groups of prisoners). 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACROSS SECTORS AND 
ORGANISATIONS 8. 
The sector analyses have shown that the consequences and chains of conse-
quences triggered by the power blackout create a situation in which the life, 
physical integrity and safety/security of the population are threatened to a high 
level and in which major material damage occurs. Local authorities and aid or-
ganisations and also available resources are insufficient to cope with the disaster. 
This threat and damage situation requires the mobilisation of interregional re-
sources to enable the state to meet its duty of protection. 
LEGAL BASES 
As demonstrated in Chapter II, corresponding requirements have been created 
by the legislator and regulator at legal and administrative level. External man-
agement capacities and an interregional joint action force can be mobilised on 
the basis of Article 35 of the Basic Law (GG) (administrative assistance) or on 
the basis of various precautionary acts in order to support regional capacities. 
This opens up the following options: 
> Elements of the Federal Armed Forces can be mobilised within the context of 
»civil-military cooperation«. As well as providing personnel support (e.g. for 
the police, disaster control authorities, local aid organisations or health estab-
lishments), this also makes material resources available. For example, hospi-
tals and reception centres can be equipped with camp beds and tents, large 
canteens can be set up or Federal Armed Forces vehicles can be used for 
transport and evacuation measures. 
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> Certain (mainly public) operators can be granted preferential access to tele-
communications and postal services on the basis of the Law Concerning the 
Transformation of the Deutsche Bundespost Enterprises into the Legal Struc-
ture of Stock Corporation (PTSG) and a corresponding statutory instrument 
by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). In addition 
to radio and tannoy announcements, this would also enable the fixed-line and 
mobile phone network to be used at least on a local basis. This allows better 
coordination of the authorities and under certain circumstances also makes it 
possible to keep the public better informed. 
> To safeguard food supplies, recourse can be made to the »civil emergency 
reserve« and the »federal reserve of grain« in accordance with the Emergency 
Food Supply Act (BMELV 2005, p. 95). 
> Once the Federal Government has declared a special emergency situation, pri-
vate companies can provide transport capacities under the Traffic Services Act 
(VerkLG) to support the area affected by the crisis. The Federal Office for 
Goods Transport undertakes preparations to make these transport capacities 
available to the agencies requesting assistance. To relieve the pressures on 
transport routes the disaster control authorities can also impose a general ban 
on driving. Priority can also be given to clearing corridors and transition points 
to regions with an intact power supply and to providing reception capacities. 
> Finally, to safeguard fuel supplies, the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology (BMWi) can issue a statutory ordinance to release stocks on the 
basis of the Petroleum Stockholding Act. Large quantities of fuel can then be 
made available via the rail network or by means of diesel-powered vehicles. 
In combination with other legislation and statutory instruments at federal state 
level and also official implementing provisions, the necessary prerequisites for 
mobilising disaster management capacities have been established on a compre-
hensive and differentiated basis to meet specific and cross-sector requirements, 
especially with regard to back-up forces and resources. 
At the same time and to a certain extent, this plethora of legal materials and the 
possibilities for action it creates appear excessively complex with little coordina-
tion. For example, the legal bases for disaster management in the »health« sector 
are set down in at least eleven federal and Land laws and ten statutory instru-
ments/administrative regulations. As in other critical infrastructure sectors, it is 
clear that instead of a uniform legal framework, »the legal relationships of indi-
viduals and institutions in the event of disasters« are controlled by »differently 
structured, poorly coordinated regulations at several administrative levels« 
(Stober 2008, p. 44). There is therefore a temptation to agree with Unger (2008, 
p. 101), who in the light of out-dated regulations and fragmented competences 
makes the critical observation that »our actual preparations for disasters and the 
corresponding legal bases are gradually drifting apart«. 
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For those responsible for disaster management, this makes an already difficult 
task even harder. The multiplicity of instruments must be used by the relevant 
players at the various levels in an objectively appropriate way, at the correct 
time and in a way that ensures all instruments are coordinated with each other. 
Managing such a demanding task by means of interdepartmental and cross-
organisational crisis management depends heavily on all crisis units having com-
petent specialist personnel with a common understanding of the regulations and 
on »foresighted judgements being made and precautions taken to ensure the 
laws and statutory instruments can be used at the optimum moment« (Hiete et 
al. 2010, C15).128 
This very aptly described challenge will prove difficult to overcome. LÜKEX 
2004 demonstrated that significant improvements are required in terms of estab-
lishing the underlying prerequisites: 
> the different organisations focussing on their own professional tasks rather 
than considering the complex situation, 
> a lack of knowledge of legal material, 
> hesitance on the part of the Länder to include players at federal level and 
> a lack of consideration for the psychological effects of the power blackout. 
PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERS 
The task of ensuring well-coordinated emergency and crisis management is made 
even more complex because of the need to include relevant players from outside 
the authorities. Alongside the energy utility companies, these include numerous 
additional companies such as information and communications companies, the 
food industry or the security industry. When developing feasible concepts it is 
important to consider the plurality and heterogeneity of critical infrastructure 
operators and other companies and establishments. For example, there are 
around 1,100 service providers in the power supply sector, 6,200 suppliers and 
6,900 wastewater disposal operators in the »water infrastructure systems« sec-
tor and 3,000 suppliers of telecommunications services in the »IT/TC« sector. 
These companies are extremely heterogeneous. Some operate at local level, oth-
ers at national or international level. There are also vast differences in terms of 
their disaster management expertise and capacities. It can therefore be assumed 
that there is a need for further optimisation as regards securing private security 
partners at county and federal state level (Hiete et al. 2010, D 25) in order to 
improve integration of private and public disaster prevention and management. 
Here, it is also important to consider private security service providers, which 
have now established themselves as a key element in Germany’s security infra-
                                            
128 All players in the international assistance system should therefore have a command of 
»uniform management rules« in order »to be prepared for joint operations through 
regular exercises« (Schutzkommission 2006, p. 44).  
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structure. They are responsible for the security of airports and railway stations 
and also for nuclear facilities and shopping centres. In reality, close cooperation 
already exists between private security services and the police (Schönbohm 
2010, p. 51). Given the expected increase in the areas in which private service 
providers are used, there is a need to clarify the extent to which it is, in legal,129 
technical and organisational terms, possible to create conditions for a function-
ing security partnership between public and private operators in the event of a 
disaster situation. 
NETWORKED DISASTER MANAGEMENT – 
WITHOUT A NETWORK 9. 
The authorities rely on functioning communications infrastructures to enable 
them to ascertain a picture of the situation, to disseminate information, to or-
ganise resources and to alert and coordinate task forces. However, after just a 
short time the crisis units, operational control centres, aid organisations and 
support forces are hardly able to access public communications infrastructures 
(Chapter IV.1). Difficulties are encountered in alerting people and in mobilising 
additional support.130 The available management capacities and the authorities’ 
own communications networks are not designed for a prolonged power black-
out. Most communications networks are based on historically evolved, different 
line-based networks and radio networks and can only bridge a few hours or 
days without electricity. 
WEAKNESSES AND OPTIONS 
> The communications networks of the Federation (i.e. of the IVBB or IVBV) 
can generally only be operated for 48 hours using emergency power genera-
tors. However, this is insufficient for functioning communication. In addition, 
it is important that the communications technology of the respective member 
institutions has the same level of safeguards. According to an initial assess-
ment, this is certainly the case for the core institutions in Bonn and Berlin, but 
not necessarily for all federal authorities throughout the federal territory. 
> Communication by public safety authorities and organisations (BOS) is via the 
private BOS radio network that is, for example, used by police forces, the 
                                            
129 »For reasons of legal certainty and in order to preserve the reservation of law«, Stober 
(2008, p. 49), for example, proposes augmenting the relevant sectoral laws.  
130 According to Weinheimer (2008, p. 165), the permanently available fire service forces 
of around 8,000 people could grow to 400,000 within 5 minutes; a further 200,000 fire 
officers could be available within 1 hour. Of these, 60,000 would be available for inter-
regional operations within 8 hours. However, it is doubtful whether this level of mobili-
sation would be possible if telecommunications infrastructures were not working. 
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THW, customs authorities, disaster control authorities, fire services and rescue 
services. It is based on relay stations (automatic radio stations generally sited at 
exposed locations) that enable transmission over large distances. Due to the 
out-dated technology, shortage of channels and the lack of or weak encoding 
facilities for analogue radio, a digital radio network is being introduced for the 
BOS radio network; this project is currently underway and will continue until 
2012. The system is based on the TETRA 25 standard. The digital radio net-
work in Germany will essentially comprise around 4,300 base stations and a 
core network with 62 transmission stations (Hiete et al. 2010). The first sec-
tions and sub-sections of the network have already been constructed. However, 
in terms of dependence on a power supply, the modernisation of the BOS radio 
network means greater vulnerability in the event of a power blackout. Whereas 
the BOS analogue relay stations had an emergency power supply of 4 to 
8 hours, the base stations of the new TETRA system are only designed to allow 
battery-based bridging of 2 hours (Hiete et al. 2010, F 30). 
> Comparable problems are encountered when mobilising members of the Fed-
eral Armed Forces. They use the digital TETRAPOL radio network, which is 
based on a cellular system and allows mobile voice and data communications. 
This is not directly compatible with the digital BOS radio network, and must 
instead be connected via transmission stations. However, since the Federal 
Armed Forces are unlikely to be deployed until after a few days, the BOS ra-
dio network will no longer be functioning by the time they are deployed. Pre-
sumably, this will also apply to the TETRAPOL systems. It is also questiona-
ble whether sufficient terminals are available for integrating civil task forces. 
> Crisis units at local level also have the option of using mobile radio stations 
that are not dependent on the power supply network. The telecommunica-
tions companies and also the THW and the Federal Armed Forces have alter-
native network equipment that enables them to establish voice and data ser-
vices in the event of a crisis and to supply them via emergency generators. 
This equipment includes, for example, mobile directional antennae which are 
also compatible with W-LAN and ISDN where necessary. However, the rele-
vant capacities of the THW are limited and are not designed to establish voice 
and data services in a large region for a large circle of users. They are primari-
ly intended for communication by the crisis units and operations control cen-
tres. The capacities of the telecommunications companies are not known. 
Moreover, logistics problems are likely to be encountered in making such sys-
tems available. Even if it did prove possible to establish a substitute network 
early on, the batteries of the terminals would need replacing or charging on a 
regular basis.131 
                                            
131 Based on the information provided by various manufacturers and depending on the 
intensity of use, standard/high-performance batteries can be expected to provide be-
tween 12 to 16/18 to 26 hours of use.  
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> Other possible options in the event of a power blackout include the estab-
lishment of temporary field cable networks, assistance by amateur radio op-
erators pursuant to Section 2 [2] of the Law Concerning Amateur Radio Ser-
vice and recourse to satellite communications. Communication by means of 
field cables is based on mobile power generators, which have to be supplied 
with fuel after a short time. By contrast, amateur radio equipment has ex-
tremely low energy requirements. Amateur radio is practised independently of 
an existing   electricity-based   radio infrastructure. Customary radios can be 
operated by means of batteries, car batteries or solar cells, even over long dis-
tances. Satellite telephony and satellite-based Internet connection also offer 
sufficient transmission routes, provided the required terrestrial elements (e.g. 
the ground stations) have a power supply. However, establishing connections 
between the different satellite networks could prove problematic as these in-
terfaces are generally reliant on terrestrial facilities. 
A major problem, however, is the issue of charging and replacement of radio 
and satellite telephone batteries. The extent to which these fall-back solutions 
can actually be used in the event of a power blackout is therefore questionable. 
The authorities still have the option of restoring individual infrastructures on a 
selective basis. One possibility is to supply mobile communications base stations 
and the corresponding mobile services switching centre (MSC) with emergency 
power/fuel on at least an hourly basis. Provided a connecting chain can be estab-
lished via additional MSCs, it would be possible to establish connections be-
tween users within range and also in the area not affected by the power black-
out. With the additional use of pagers this would at least enable rudimentary 
local coordination of assistance measures. However, it is important not to un-
derestimate the challenges of enabling a permanent supply for these infrastruc-
tures and also of the networking with other MSCs within and outside the area 
affected by the power blackout. 
From these observations it follows that at a technical level, there is a lack of feasi-
ble short-term approaches for improving this sector’s resilience in terms of disaster 
management. Significant expense would be required to prepare the existing public 
and official communications infrastructures for a prolonged and widespread pow-
er blackout. Due to the network structure of the system, it is generally impossible 
to use selective upgrading to make the system able to withstand a power blackout, 
not least because widespread communication and coordination is dependent on 
end terminals being in working order. Once again, the terminal batteries prove 
problematic because they need to be regularly recharged or replaced within the 
area affected by the power blackout. 
Local conditions and available resources and also the subjective opinion of the 
individuals with local responsibility will determine which technical solution is 
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implemented in each individual case. Consequently and due to the pressure to 
act, there is a risk that although individual infrastructure elements such as radio 
transmitters or mobile phone stations will be restored to working capacity in 
many places, these will remain isolated and would not be networked to form an 
extensive comprehensive communications infrastructure. Achieving this requires 
a well-planned and coordinated process. Priority institutions and where applica-
ble core operating times need to be specified in order to enable the establishment 
of a network (e.g. consisting of mobile phone stations) even where resources are 
scarce and thus to enable communication within the area affected by the power 
blackout. It is also necessary to establish when resources should be used for ra-
dio relay communications or whether, for example, preference should be given 
to pagers. Based on available capacities, this could enable an established core 
network to be expanded to form an infrastructure that was able to function at 
least at regional level. 
Overall, it can be assumed that despite intensive efforts to restore communica-
tions infrastructures, it is not possible to establish a uniform picture of the situa-
tion. The technical options that are feasible tend to be improvised and of a short 
range and duration; supply proves problematic and it is likely that forces and 
measures can only be coordinated to an unsatisfactory degree. A special chal-
lenge faced when dealing with a damage scenario such as an interregional power 
blackout is that units from outside the area often have to be drafted in over long 
distances. Establishing technical and geographical operations sections and com-
mand posts is not possible without adequate means of communication (Re-
chenbach 2005, p. 200). In combination, these reasons mean disaster manage-
ment by the authorities will continue to show major shortcomings. 
PROSPECTS FOR INFORMATION AND ACTION 
The above assessment and also the assessment contained in Chapter IV.1 con-
cerning the vulnerability and coping capacities of the »information technology 
and telecommunications« sector in the event of a prolonged, widespread power 
blackout involve numerous uncertainties. There is therefore a clear need for fur-
ther information and research. 
> In principle, it is necessary to assess the minimum level of communication for 
the underlying case; this would then make it possible to determine the tech-
nical requirements for various levels of supply. Corresponding sub-questions 
would include an estimate of customary communications and data flows and 
also the ascertainment of existing redundancies and network segments and 
nodes that are critical for operations. These efforts would aim to obtain a 
quantitative estimate of the level of supply with communications services in 
the event of a power blackout after a few hours, days and weeks. 
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> In addition, existing concepts for emergency power supplies in the field of 
information technology and communications infrastructures could be re-
viewed and new, improved approaches developed. In this context, it would be 
necessary to prepare an overview of emergency power supplies for the various 
communications networks and services and also of their components and 
players. The same applies for the capacities and possible uses of telecommu-
nications emergency power systems that can be used on a mobile basis and 
that have to be supplied with emergency power. This would make it possible 
to specify the underlying technical requirements necessary for a crisis com-
munications network that is reduced to major cities and central nodal points. 
> It would also be possible to examine possible adjustments to the precaution-
ary measures prescribed by law. Such legal/scientific analyses should aim to 
identify approaches for increasing the resilience of the »information technol-
ogy and telecommunications sector« in the event of a power blackout. A sur-
vey and assessment of the relevant legal bases applicable to a prolonged pow-
er blackout and an examination of the need for adjustment should also in-
clude the little-considered field of the Internet and telemedia and multimedia 
services. This would provide a basis for specifying in concrete terms the need 
for changes regarding the requirements for telecommunications providers to 
ensure an »adequate« supply. 
> Finally, it is important to mention forward-looking analyses of the framework 
conditions for the sector. These should consider technological innovations (»in-
telligent« networks, electro-mobility) and also political (liberalisation, privati-
sation and deregulation), economic (diversity of competing suppliers, rapid 
product change) or socio-cultural changes (such as changes in forms of com-
munication and media usage among the population). Here, it is necessary to 
investigate which technical developments tend to lead to an increase/decrease in 
dependence on (grid-based) power and which research and development pro-
cesses could be furthered in order to develop information and telecommunica-
tions applications that are less heavily reliant on the power grid. 
CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT POWER 10. 
The failures in the »information technology and telecommunications« sector 
make it virtually impossible to maintain dialogue-based crisis communication 
between the authorities and the public. Since the rudimentary remaining or re-
stored communications facilities are used by the authorities for direct rectifica-
tion of damage and disaster control, informing members of the public and com-
municating with them is mainly restricted to local battery-based alert systems 
(e.g. sirens that enable voice announcements), radio announcements, distribution 
of flyers, personal contacts and news transmitted by means of sound trucks. Ra-
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dio transmitters have a certain capacity in terms of emergency power supply. As 
they are also suited to broadcasting warning messages and information via the 
Federal Government’s satellite-based warning system (SatWaS)132, the authori-
ties endeavour to supply selected broadcasting stations with fuel in order to en-
sure a means of communication during the crisis. Experience has shown that 
established reception centres such as mayor’s offices, fire stations or church halls 
can become hubs for the dissemination of information (e.g. Deverell 2003, 
Scholtens et al. 2008). Such locations generally have a radio available, notices 
can be displayed and contact persons are available for the large numbers of peo-
ple who congregate at the centres. 
It is, however, clear that such fragmented (one-way) communication cannot 
meet the requirements as stated in the literature and in guidelines for »continu-
ously coordinated« crisis communication (BBK 2008a, p. 147). If electricity-
based communication fails as extensively as described above, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to convey credibility and create trust on a local, regional or na-
tional level   i.e. to meet key basic conditions for crisis communications – with-
out the assistance of functioning communications channels, which are taken for 
granted. However, the question of how preparations can be made for »tempo-
rary assistance for such a case« (BBK 2008a, p. 147) and of how alternative cur-
rentless communication that meets the needs of the respective target groups can 
be achieved is seldom addressed. There is a need here for conceptual and practi-
cal reflection on how currentless crisis communication could be structured. 
In recent years there has been a growing awareness about the issue of alerting 
the public and ensuring a continued flow of information. Since the processes of 
alerting the public and lowering the alarm level require adequate infrastructures 
(Schutzkommission 2006, p. 48), technical options have been examined and also 
implemented in some cases in order to at least partially close existing »gaps in 
terms of the alert process« (Schutzkommission 2006, p. 50 ff.) and also to im-
prove ways of informing and communicating with the public. However, while 
some technical solutions for alerting and educating the public may be elegant 
and sophisticated, they do not represent the optimum solution during a power 
cut. Such warning concepts are often based on mobile phone capabilities (e.g. 
sending mass SMS text messages using cell broadcast technology). Moreover, it 
has been proposed that cars, radio clocks or smoke alarms should be fitted with 
radio receivers to enable them to be used for alerting the public. Against the 
backdrop of such examples, when developing innovative solutions in particular 
it is advisable to also consider the special circumstances of a power blackout 
including consequences such as the widespread failure of communications infra-
structures and the limited range of battery charges. In particular, it is important 
to avoid a situation where the people with relevant responsibility are »well in-
                                            
132 Like deNIS II plus, SatWaS relies on a supply of electricity. 
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formed« but the public affected by the disaster is largely »ignorant« of the situa-
tion (Schutzkommission 2006, p. 50 f.). 
SUPPLY OF FUEL, ENSURING A STABLE EMERGENCY 
POWER SUPPLY 11. 
The availability of fuel as a resource is vitally important for disaster manage-
ment. The supply of fuel is indispensable for, for example: 
> Emergency vehicles of the aid organisations and support forces; 
> Diesel-operated rail vehicles to evacuate stranded trains and for transport 
purposes and also local public transport buses to maintain a minimum level 
of transport services; 
> Emergency power generators that maintain the functionality of sensitive in-
frastructure components (e.g. emergency control centres, fire stations, mobile 
radio stations) as hubs for disaster management information, communica-
tions and coordination (e.g. Hoffman 2009, p. 24 ff.). 
Despite the unfavourable underlying conditions (including in particular the loss 
of petrol stations), the existing management capacities in the form of fuel stocks 
offer the necessary prerequisites for ensuring the mobility that is required for 
those involved in disaster management. In addition, refineries have their own 
power generation capacities that can cover up to 90 % of electricity require-
ments; in many cases, their own power network can be operated as an isolated 
network (Hiete et al. 2020, F 20). Consequently, at least some refineries are like-
ly to be in a position to continue with (reduced) operations. 
The petroleum stocks prescribed by law mean significant reserves of fuel are 
available that could cover requirements even during a prolonged power blackout. 
Since petrol and diesel are mainly stored in above-ground tank facilities, the tank-
ers or tank wagons can be filled using the principle of gravity (Prognos 2009, 
p. 84) if electricity is not available for the pumps. The fact that locations are well 
distributed across the regions ensures comprehensive availability (website of EBV 
a, b, d; ÖGEW/ DKGM 2007). The Traffic Services Act (VerkLG) allows for the 
option of making transport capacities of private companies available. 
Despite this potential there are question marks over the extent to which these 
capacities and resources can be mobilised and used in a way that is tailored to 
requirements in the event of a power blackout. 
A key obstacle could be the fact that issuing the required statutory instrument 
pursuant to Section 30 of the Petroleum Stockholding Act (ErdölBevG) could 
take some time. In such case, provision is made for stocks to be made available 
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to the petroleum companies by the Petroleum Stockpiling Association (EBV)133 
(website of EBV c). Measures can also make provision for targeted release of 
fuel to certain purchasers. In such cases the released stocks must be transported 
by inland water vessels, rail tankers134 or tanker lorries. However, the disrup-
tions to communications and transport infrastructures may mean the transport 
vehicles can’t be mobilised quickly and extensively enough to prevent fuel bot-
tlenecks. It is also unclear whether, for example, the petroleum companies 
would be prepared for a situation involving the release of petroleum stocks 
(Hiete et al. 2020, F 21). It is also possible that stocks of companies or private 
individuals may have to be seized at local level in order to cover the require-
ments of vehicles operated by the authorities and the emergency services and 
also of relevant emergency power generators until such time as replenishment 
deliveries can be organised. 
In addition, coordinating the distribution of fuel deliveries in line with require-
ments at local level is extremely complex, even if it does prove possible to mobi-
lise sufficient tankers of petroleum companies and logistics service providers un-
der the Traffic Services Act (VerkLG). Since a large area is involved, problems 
are likely to be encountered in agreeing responsibilities; logistics challenges (e.g. 
designating, establishing and operating central transhipment and distribution 
centres) can also be expected (EBP 2010, p. 104). Problems are compounded by 
the shortage of communications capabilities for authorities and task forces, re-
sulting in many places receiving inadequate supplies, excess supplies or no sup-
plies at all. 
Overall, it is clear that although extensive measures are in place to guarantee 
transport services to supply fuel in the event of a crisis, the specific conditions of a 
power blackout mean that prompt, well-coordinated mobilisation of fuel reserves 
is a critical factor in determining further development of the situation and also in 
managing the associated consequences. 
One means of increasing the sector’s resilience would be to improve the re-
sources available directly at local level (e.g. by ensuring selected petrol stations 
are equipped with emergency power generators and are supplied with fuel on a 
continuous basis). Assuming such fuel was made available to the public safety 
authorities and organisations and to the aid organisations on a priority basis, the 
time pressures for delivering fuel reserves would be reduced and the local mobili-
ty and ability of the emergency forces and also where applicable of the public to 
take action would be guaranteed for a certain time. 
                                            
133 The EBV’s computer network does not have an emergency power supply. If a power 
blackout were to last longer than 8 hours the EBV would relocate to a secure data cen-
tre (Hiete et al. 2010, F 21). 
134 Rail tankers could not be used without problems in the event of a power blackout. 
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In order to ensure continuous operation of emergency generators, it would at the 
same time be necessary to replenish fuel stocks in time at selected relevant loca-
tions. To enable the complicated logistics process to run smoothly on a continu-
ous basis, it is necessary to ensure IT networking for petroleum storage facilities, 
petrol stations and infrastructure elements that need to be supplied with emer-
gency power generators and fuel. However, such a network does not yet exist.135 
ISOLATED NETWORKS AS A MEANS OF INCREASING 
THE RESILIENCE OF THE POWER SUPPLY FOLLOWING 
A POWER BLACKOUT 12. 
Individual sector analyses have revealed that many infrastructure elements are 
equipped with »uninterruptible power supply systems« (UPS) while certain facil-
ities are equipped with emergency power generators. However, these generally 
have limited battery capacities or fuel reserves and therefore a low level of resili-
ence. Once the direct contingency measures for a power blackout are exhausted, 
competition develops for mobile power generators in particular and also for the 
necessary fuel supplies. A large number of sensitive infrastructures in all sectors 
(e.g. milking systems, operating theatres in hospitals and mobile phone masts) 
compete for a very limited number of mobile generators and fuel. Although gen-
erators that have run out of fuel can be topped up or replaced with new genera-
tors, this only serves to gain an additional few hours. Ultimately, stationary and 
mobile emergency power generators need to be replenished with fuel after a few 
hours or days. Given the general restrictions in terms of logistics and coordina-
tion and also the number of customers and the competition among them, it is 
unlikely that it would be possible to provide adequate supplies for everyone. 
Consequently, it is worth considering more sustainable options for increasing 
the resilience of key infrastructure elements and for managing a prolonged and 
widespread power blackout. This could, for example, be achieved through an 
emergency power supply concept based on decentralised power generators with 
isolated network capability136 since only a few facilities permit an autonomous 
self-sufficient power supply (e.g. waste incineration plants or sewage treatment 
plants that have a »natural« fuel supply). The basic idea consists in equip-
                                            
135 Corresponding technical options are currently being examined by the Federal Ministry 
for Education and Research in a project entitled »The Supply of Energy and Fuel for 
Petrol Stations and Emergency Power Generators in the Event of a Power Blackout« 
(TankNotStrom) under the »Research for Civil Security« programme. 
136 The »Smart Emergency supply System (SES2)« research project funded by the Federal 
Ministry for Education and Research is investigating how a minimum level of supply 
could be ensured during a prolonged power blackout by using renewable and decentral-
ised power sources (www.bmbf.de/pubRD/Projektin formationen_SES2.pdf). 
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ping/networking selected critical infrastructure elements such as hospitals, (op-
erations) control centres, facilities of public safety authorities and organisations 
or food warehouses with cogeneration and/or renewable energy plants, thus en-
suring they are not affected by a power blackout. 
The technical and economic feasibility of this concept could be tested in region-
ally restricted model projects. In particular, facilities with existing emergency 
power generators or co-generation plants that are relatively close to critical in-
frastructure elements could be used as starting points for establishing a self-
sufficient power supply through an isolated network. Renewable energies would 
initially play a complementary role. Infrastructure facilities and public buildings 
would be networked with each other or in public-private partnerships with in-
dustrial plants, cogeneration power plants or in some cases with residential are-
as. This would enable authorities and emergency forces such as the police, fire 
services and emergency medical services to continue operating with virtually no 
restrictions during a prolonged and widespread power blackout. Since official 
communication paths still work, this enables a rapid assessment of the situation 
and a coordinated approach to managing the situation. Moreover, town halls, 
schools, swimming pools and church halls can be made available to the public 
for accommodation, supply and personal hygiene purposes. Hospitals can main-
tain and continue all key functions. The fragmented structure of the networks 
means it is not possible for all sectors to be supplied on a long-term basis. Also, 
a shortage of fuel forces many isolated networks to disconnect consumers after a 
short time to enable authorities, hospitals and contact centres to continue oper-
ating services for the public. Consequently, most establishments, companies and 
households connected to the isolated network remain without power. However, 
the fact that official communication paths are working makes it possible to or-
ganise local coordination of aid deliveries, thus safeguarding public order and 
safety. 
Such a model project would also aim to ascertain the potential for technical in-
novation, market mechanisms and public subsidy programmes to activate learn-
ing curves and economies of scale. 
An even more foresighted development strategy could involve incorporating iso-
lated network solutions based on renewable energies into existing solutions, tak-
ing into account the specific characteristics of the respective locations and the 
facilities to be supplied, along with the findings of the model project. This would 
mean that the isolated network would take over supplying the most important 
critical infrastructure systems and functions in a disaster situation; in all other 
cases grid infeed operation would be selected. When planning and designing 
such a solution, however, it would be necessary to remember that a series of ad-
ditional technical devices would have to be installed in order to synchronise 
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power supply and demand. Where the power supply fluctuates, power storage 
devices must be included and management systems provided; certain cogenera-
tion plants require an emergency cooler for operation outside the heating period. 
Technically speaking, such an approach does not involve insurmountable prob-
lems; however, it is important not to disregard the additional costs involved. 
Against this backdrop it is necessary to examine whether it would be possible to 
reduce the current economic restrictions by setting a political framework and 
introducing relevant incentives. 
Looking to the future, a more intensive development strategy could enable cost 
reductions and increases in efficiency while also helping create a leading market 
for electrical engineering and battery technology in particular. Linking in with 
programmes to promote combined heat and power, renewable energies and the 
modernisation of the electricity grid infrastructure could generate synergistic ef-
fects (e.g. as regards storing fluctuating energy input). 
PROVIDING INFORMATION TO AND HEIGHTENING 
AWARENESS AMONG THE POPULATION 13. 
The discussion on the behaviour of the public during a power blackout raised 
additional questions on its role within disaster management. These questions 
concern, for example, the level of information available to the public, their pre-
paredness and ability to help themselves and also the opportunities and limits 
regarding informing citizens and encouraging their ability to help themselves. 
A significant deficit exists regarding the public’s awareness and perception. The 
public does not consider the power supply as a critical infrastructure to be an 
important issue; the possibility of power blackouts and the consequences of an 
interruption to the power supply are ignored. The public feels assured that (ma-
jor) power blackouts only occur in countries where the power supply is not very 
reliable. People who experience power blackouts are generally quick to forget 
them (Chapter III.3, p. 2; Stiftung Risikodialog 2007, p. 14). Media reporting 
primarily focuses on major power blackouts, which are a rare occurrence in 
Germany (Lorenz 2010, p. 18 ff.). 
Disasters such as power blackouts are usually associated with extreme weather 
events and terrorism. Since natural events are perceived as unavoidable and ter-
rorism is viewed with a certain fatalism, individuals believe they cannot take 
precautions against what are assumed to be exclusive causes (Lorenz 2010, 
p. 22). Consequently, the public is not prepared for a power blackout to any 
noticeable degree (e.g. Gardemann/Menski 2008) and people are therefore una-
ble to cope adequately with the consequences. 
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In view of society’s growing dependence on critical infrastructures, Lorenz 
(2010, p. 28) notes that this process »has not been given or has at least not been 
given adequate attention in terms of risk communication«. The resulting general 
low level of awareness surrounding the risk of and dangers of a power blackout 
limit the options available to the authorities for 
> informing the public of dangers and risks and for heightening awareness 
> encouraging the public to become prepared and ensure provisions are kept in 
stock, 
> providing information by means of alerts in the event of a disaster and for 
> mobilising individuals’ ability to help themselves and others. 
In principle, it can be said that communicating risks and possible dangers should 
create trust and that providing information and advice should maintain the pub-
lic’s interest and thus make it possible to address citizens in an appropriate way 
during a crisis situation (Geenen 2009, p. 91; Lorenz 2010, p. 26). It is unclear 
how risk communication or an awareness campaign concerning the risk of pow-
er blackout could be structured because little scientific literature is available on 
the public’s attitude and opinions on the subject. Moreover, little is known on 
how information campaigns are perceived or on the effects of such campaigns. 
In this context, the first task consists in elaborating a scientific strategy for enter-
ing into risk communication with the public before a power blackout. One pos-
sibility could involve a citizens’ or consensus conference on critical infrastruc-
tures. Another option is to consider involving citizens’ groups in emergency 
planning. Participative processes such as these would help move away from the 
traditional approach of viewing citizens as passive disaster victims and would 
instead help integrate them more fully as competent, active players. 
It is important to remember that the general disinterest in the subject shown by 
citizens should not be simply dismissed as an unwillingness to learn or as unrea-
sonableness. The fact that the public behaves in such a way reflects a specific 
rationale  towards a risk whose consequences are indeed considerable but 
whose likelihood of occurring is low. A pedantic approach would therefore not 
be conducive. 
CONCLUSION 14. 
The consequence analyses have demonstrated that even after a few days, it is no 
longer possible to guarantee area-wide supplies of vital/necessary goods and ser-
vices to meet the population’s requirements within the region affected by the 
blackout. Public safety and security is jeopardised; the state can no longer meet 
its duty of protection, as anchored in the Basic Law, to protect the life and limb 
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of its citizens. The state therefore also loses one of its most important resources – 
the trust of its citizens. 
Although the probability of a prolonged power blackout affecting several federal 
states may be low, if such a case were to materialise the resulting consequences 
would be tantamount to a national disaster. Even if all internal and external 
forces and resources were mobilised, this would not be »controllable« and could 
at most only be mitigated. Historically, the German system of assistance may 
indeed have been well prepared for disasters, with »nothing« that »was impossi-
ble to overcome« (Unger 2008, p. 100). It is doubtful whether this also applies 
to a »combined disaster« of a power blackout. 
Further efforts are therefore necessary at all levels in order to increase the resili-
ence of critical infrastructure sectors in both the short and medium-term and 
also to further optimise the capacities of the national system for disaster control 
in a carefully targeted manner. However, it will not always be possible to im-
plement corresponding measures without extra cost. It must be emphasised that 
the aim should be to achieve at least relative, rather than absolute, safe-
ty/security. It will at all times be necessary to consider various factors and set 
priorities during the development and implementation process: How safe is safe 
enough? What costs and what obligations are reasonable and for which players? 
What residual risk must be accepted? 
The individuals with responsibility in politics and society should continue to 
accord high priority to the issue of a power blackout as a prime example of 
»cascading damaging effects«, not least in order to also raise awareness of the 
subject within industry and among the public. The present TAB report aims to 
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In recent years, power blackouts in Europe and North America have given a lasting im-
pression of the vulnerability of modern and high-technology societies. Although these 
outages did not last longer than a week and were locally limited, they already caused 
massive functional or supply disruptions, risks to public safety and damages running 
into billions. This book reveals possible consequences of a prolonged and widespread 
power outage for society and its critical infrastructures and it shows how Germany is 
prepared for such a disaster. By means of comprehensive impact analyses, the authors 
demonstrate dramatically that even after a few days only it is no longer possible to 
ensure that goods and services that are vitally necessary to the public are supplied as 
needed throughout the area affected. Moreover, it is revealed that further efforts must 
be made to improve the resilience of critical infrastructures and to further optimize the 
capacities of the national system of disaster management.
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